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
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THE PLATONISM OF GREGORY OF NYSSA

BY

HAROLD FREDRIK CHERNISS

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

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THE PLATONISM OF GREGORY OF NYSSA

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I

Introduction

Reason is mighty for its own destruction. For it casts a spell upon men—not to serve it as a mistress—but to use it as a handmaiden. So that faith, drawn by the spell of reason, enlists the service of this, her natural enemy; and in the final syllogism we find a conclusion drawn by faith from reason and the contradictory theses of the two incompatible sides of human mentality amalgamated to form a doctrine which claims to withstand successfully the attack of either.

Such is the recipe of theology; of no theology is it so strikingly true as of the Christian theology of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, brother of Saint Basil, Saint Makrina, and St. Peter, himself canonized and by the second Nicene Council given the title of "Father of the Fathers." Clement of Alexandria was the first Christian philosopher; Origen had attempted to disguise Christian doctrine itself as a philosophical system; but it was Gregory who first effectually subdued philosophy to the service of theology. And this service has won him unstinted praise. Ueberweg says: "Niemand vor Gregor hat die rationale Begründung des Glaubens in so umfassender Weise durchzuführen gesucht."[1] In the same strain a recent writer proceeds:

> He placed an appreciative but not an excessive value on profane or secular learning, not so much for what it is in itself as for the service it could render to the church. He followed no particular school of philosophy, but used his judgment and common sense in selecting from the various systems, considering that heathen philosophy was only a means to an end. (Stein, *Encomium of St. Gregory on His Brother Basil*, p. xxi.)

These are but two examples of the praise generally accorded Gregory for having harnessed philosophic speculation to the productive machine of faith. A third brings us abruptly to our problem.

> Now, that there is a "complex of orthodox doctrines" to defend, philosophy becomes the handmaid of theology. Gregory, in this respect, has done the most important service of any of the writers of the Church in the fourth century. He treats each single philosophical view only as a help to grasp the formulae of faith; and the truth of that view consists with him only in its adaptability to that end . . . . . If this be true, the question as to his attitude towards Plato, which is one of the first that suggests itself, is settled.[2]

What the settlement is, is not stated, unless the inference is meant that Gregory used Plato, as he used all other philosophers, for an arsenal whence to take down such weapons as he thought not double-edged.

A hasty perusal of Gregory's writings will show the facts on which these praises rest to be quite correct. Gregory was learned; he knew Origen's works intimately; and he quotes Greek philosophers and poets frequently. Karl Gronau in his Göttingen dissertation[3] has collected a list of Platonic quotations and "parallels" from his works which, in themselves, show Gregory's intimate acquaintance with Plato. But the use which the theologian made of philosophy has never been set forth; this link in the chain of Platonism has never been examined as a part of the Platonic chain; Gregory himself has never been studied as a type of the philosophic mind; and a list of "parallels," useful as they are, is but a foundation whereon to build. This, then, is my purpose, to discover how much of the Platonic doctrine Gregory knew and how much he used, whence he obtained his knowledge, and how he treated it to make it subserve the Catholic dogma.

The fashion in which one philosopher has used the knowledge which he gleaned from his study of others—the manner, in short, in which the human fund of philosophic conceptions has grown and changed—must ever be inextricably related to the idiosyncracies of the thinker himself. The manner of human actions is

never completely described until the reason for those actions is detailed. And the reasons for the quirks of any individual's thoughts are inscrutable. This is doubly true in the case of a person whose external life even is imperfectly known. Of Gregory's life we know little. We have but few dates, and such incidents as he himself mentions throw little light upon our problem. But of the circumstances of his entry into the clerical life we have some shadows, shadows which, I believe, are most significant for plotting the outline of this mind that was to be the philosopher of the Church and a transmuter of Platonism into Christian doctrine.

Gregory was born not earlier than 331, probably some few years later. His mother was pious to the point of superstition. His father, though almost equally zealous in the faith, was well educated in the heathen literature and a rhetorician of local prominence. Although his elder brother, Basil, was sent to Athens to complete his education, it seems that Gregory had no more than the ordinary schooling of a Cappadocian community. The early death of his father may have been the cause of this family economy. A most religious grandmother, a superstitiously pious mother, and a sister, the eldest of the children, who was a saint even to her contemporaries, swayed the household in which Gregory was reared. Basil, upon his return from Athens, was forced to enter the Church by his importunate sister. This girl, Makrina, outstripped her mother and grandmother in her devotion to orthodoxy. Through her dominance her mother sold her goods and opened a convent, one of her brothers became a hermit, and three other brothers became churchmen and bishops and finally saints. Such was the success of Makrina, but in the case of Gregory it was not gained without a struggle. This is the one revealing incident of his life which we know—and from his own pen. In his eulogy on the "Forty Martyrs" he relates how, at the time when his mother had built a chapel for the remains of these martyrs and had required him to attend at the prayers which lasted through the night, he was angry that he should have been called away from his studies, and he secretly left before the prayers were finished. But to him, having fallen asleep,

a threatening dream of the martyrs appeared, and he awoke in terror and repentance and returned to weep over the urn and ask forgiveness of God and the sacred relics. It may have been this same dream which caused him to become a lector. At any rate, he did not remain in the service of the Church but turned to the more congenial profession of rhetorician. This we know from the eleventh epistle of Gregory the Nazianzene, in which his friend upbraids the young deserter. It may be that this occurred before the year 363 and that it was Julian's order of that year which forced him and all other Christians to desist from the profession of heathen literature; but it is more likely that his family once more—and especially Makrina whom even the strong-willed Basil could not withstand—was too much for the renegade. He was brought back to the service of the Church. Such subsequent external events as we know explain little of the philosopher's background. He retired with Basil to a monastic retreat and here doubtlessly profited by Basil's Athenian education to further his own studies. The rest of his history is Church politics. In 371 he became Bishop of Nyssa, much against his will. But he was drawn into Basil's ecclesiastical campaigns and, after Basil's death, became one of the foremost champions of orthodoxy. Yet his reluctance at being drawn into the Church is important. Rupp rightly says, without noticing the importance of his statement for the interpretation of Gregory, "Wenn jener feste Grund des Çhristenthums [the religious zeal of Makrina in its effect upon the family] bei einem der Brüder nöthig gewesen, dieses der Fall bei unserm Gregorius war."[4] The young man could not withstand a saintly sister, a saintly mother, and a saintly grandmother.

Earnest Christian as Gregory always was, his true intellectual interests had been with Greek philosophy and poetry; he could not fling away with hatred this love of his youth, he must try to reconcile it with his love of God and His Church. Even his admirers have complained of a lack of geniality in the writings of Gregory. There are four letters which stand apart from his writings for their pleasantness, two to a student of the classics,[5] two to a pagan professor.[6] In these letters to men outside the

faith Gregory seems more at his ease, no philosopher but much more of a man. It is in the letter to Libanius[7] that Gregory himself betrays the pride he had in his erudition; there he writes that the praise of Libanius had made him feel "as if he had been cited for the fairest accomplishments before all men."[8]

Before attempting to ascertain the sources of Gregory's philosophy in the Grecian schools, we should with profit examine those passages in which he definitely names Greek philosophers. So we may first know the extent of the pagan knowledge he openly confesses and what his public attitude toward it may have been. We shall discover first, that such passages are few and never euologistic, hardly even tolerant. There is first, a set of three references to Stoics and Epicureans.[9] In the essay on the Soul and the Resurrection,[10] after Gregory has set forth a materialistic explanation of the universe, Makrina[11] is made to say *τάχα που ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φησὶ* [i.e. Makrina] *πρὸς τὸν Ἀπόστολον ἐν Ἀθήναις ποτὲ συστάντες προέφερον Στωϊκοί τε καὶ Ἐπικούρειοι. καὶ γὰρ ἀκούω πρὸς ταῦτα μάλιστα τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ταῖς ὑπολήψεσι φέρεσθαι ὡς τυχαία τις καὶ αὐτόματος ἡ τῶν ὄντων ὑπενοήθη φύσις ὡς οὐδεμιᾶς προνοίας διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων διηκούσης.* We have here to notice the vagueness which is purposefully produced by the *τάχα που ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*, and by the *ἀκούω* of the second sentence. It is implied that these pagan names have come to Makrina's ears by chance nor would she seek to know more of them. Furthermore, both Stoics and Epicureans are loosely branded with a doctrine which belongs to the latter alone; and this seeming carelessness is also intended to show a generous disregard for the distinctions between systems which, being pagan, must be equally false. For Gregory can distinguish the two when he chooses, as in the essay on the Deity of the Son and the Holy Spirit:[12] *ὑλικὸν τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς τὸ θεῖον εἶναι ὑπονοεῖται, κτιστὸν καὶ οὗτοι τὸν μονογενῆ Υἱὸν εἶναι κατασκευάζουσιν . . . . πάλιν τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις οὐδὲν ὑπερκεῖσθαι δοκεῖ τῆς τῶν ὄντων συστάσεώς τε καὶ διοικήσεως ἀλλ' αὐτομάτως τὰ πάντα φέρεσθαι . . . . καὶ ὡς ἂν συντομώτερον εἴποιμεν τὴν πλάνην αὐτῶν, πρὸς ἀθεΐαν αὐτοῖς βλέπει τὰ δόγματα. Σκοπήσωμεν τοίνυν εἰ μὴ μιμηταὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων οἱ τὸν Υἱὸν ἀθετοῦντες εἰσί.* Here Gregory is trying to brand the Anomoean with the title of *ἄλλος Ἐπίκουρος*[13] and to show that in

setting aside the Son he also denies the Father "as Epicurus did." Gregory prepares for this attack by reminding his audience that it was the Stoics and Epicureans with whom Paul was embroiled at Athens.[14] For rhetorical purposes this damns them quite as much as any doctrine could, and in the previous quotation Makrina did not fail to remind her brother of that blot on their scutcheon. Once more in the Books against Eunomius[15] Gregory mentions the Epicurean tenets, this time merely in passing. He is deriding the claim of Eunomius to knowledge of the Divine essence and says that man cannot understand even the smallest work of God. *Τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος συγκρίσει τοῦ παντὸς θεωρούμενος; ποῖον γεωμετρικὸν σημεῖον οὕτως ἀμερές; τί τῶν Ἐπικουρείων ἀτόμων οὕτω τῇ ματαιότητι τῶν ταῦτα θεωρούντων ἀπολεπτύνεται καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεται . . . . .* It is one of the many places in which he tries to turn the Christian mind against Eunomius by attaching to him in one way or another the names of the pagan thinkers. It is in this same work that he brings his scorn to heap upon the heads of Eunomius and Aristotle. He attacks Aetius, the teacher of Eunomius, saying that he was schooled in the gymnasium of Arius, but outstripped his master[16] *τινα συλλογισμῶν ἔφοδον ἐξ Ἀριστοτελικῶν ἀπηχημάτων παρατηρήσας*; and later for Eunomius just as for Aetius[17] *πορισμός ἦν ἀσεβείας ἡ Ἀριστοτέλους κακοτεχνία.* Twice Gregory refers sarcastically to Eunomius's vaunted studies of Arisotelian logic when he believes the heretic to have involved himself in absurdity.[18]

It is evident that Eunomius had made much of his knowledge and his opponents' ignorance of Aristotle, for Gregory elsewhere[19] is ironically astounded that he should subscribe to an article of faith which Aristotle did not teach among his *τεχνικαὶ περίοδοι.*[20] Nor does Gregory let slip the chance to show that he himself understands both Epicurus and Aristotle better than Eunomius.[21]

An examination of these actual occurrences of the name of Aristotle in the text of Gregory shows that that philosopher is mentioned only scornfully; but more, they all are found in the book written against a heretic who seems to have plumed himself upon his knowledge of Aristotelian logic and to have sought to deny the ability of his opponents to understand him, because of

their deficiency in this erudition. In this same essay appears twice the name of Philo the Jew, and it is introduced by Gregory for the same purpose. He desires to show that the work of Eunomius is nothing but a patchwork of phrases pillaged, some here some there, from all the philosophers and rhetoricians who had preceded him. The reason for the almost complete lack of such names in Gregory's own work is not far to seek. It is not so much that he would appear as the originator of all his ideas; he imputes them rather to Scripture where he can. But he desires that no one may be able to charge him, as he charges Eunomius, with being a pagan in disguise, even with knowing too much pagan philosophy, which in his day was enough to prove a theologian wrong, nay to prove him an heretic. That Philo was well known and much used by Basil and Gregory we shall later see; yet all that is attached to his name is a reference to the statement of Eunomius that the high God before all creatures is master of His own Power, whereto Gregory adds *ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς λέξεως ἀπὸ τοῦ Φίλωνος τοῦ Ἑβραίου μετενήνεκται παρὰ τοῦ λογογράφου ἐπὶ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον.*[22] Once previously in that passage,[23] where he says that Eunomius has patched together the "rags of phrases cast off in the crossroads," Gregory adds *καὶ πάλιν ὁ τλήμων Ἰσοκράτης περιεσθίεται ῥήματά τε καὶ σχήματα πρὸς τὴν σύνθεσιν τοῦ προκειμένου περιτιλλόμενος, ἔστι δὲ ὅπου καὶ ὁ Ἑβραῖος Φίλων τὰ ἴσα πάσχει ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόνων συνερανίζων αὐτῷ τὰ λεξείδια.*

Let us now see what mention is made of the name of Plato himself. In this same work against Eunomius there are three references to the name of Plato, all made in the same spirit as that which prompted the mentions of Aristotle. Gregory would damn Eunomius by showing that he was akin in spirit to a pagan thinker. Where Eunomius has spoken of God as "Almighty, the King of Kings, Lord of Lords," Gregory says:[24] "If he says this of the Father, we agree *εἰ δὲ ἀφεὶς τὸν Πατέρα ἄλλον παντοκράτορα λέγει, τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων λέγει ἢ καὶ τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἕπεται λόγοις. Καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖνόν φασι τὸν φιλόσοφον λέγειν εἶναί τινα ὑπεράνωθεν κτίστην καὶ ποιητὴν ὑποβεβηκότων τινῶν θεῶν.* From the wording one would think that Gregory had never read this heathen philosopher—"they say that he says" . . . . ; we shall see hereafter how the

Bishop of Nyssa too could help himself from the Timaeus when he was not condemning an opponent for subscribing to similar doctrines. As here Gregory knew Plato well enough to attach the Timaeus to Eunomius, so elsewhere he refers the sayings of the heretic to their Platonic sources with the glee of a modern "Quellenforscher." Πόθεν οὖν ὁ Πλατωνικὸς οὗτος Φαῖδρος[25] [meaning Eunomius] τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐκεῖ φιλοσοφηθέντα τῷ Πλάτωνι τοῖς ἰδίοις δόγμασιν ἀσυναρτήτως ἐκράπτει; Ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἐκεῖ παῦσαν εἶπε κινήσεως οὕτω παῦσαν καὶ οὗτος γεννήσεως εἰπεῖν ἐπεθύμησεν ὡς ἂν τοὺς ἀπείρους τούτων ταῖς Πλατωνικαῖς καλλιφωνίαις περιβομβήσειεν. As discredit was thrown upon the Aristotelian τεχνολογία so here the "pretty sounds" of Plato are butts of Gregory's sneers. Once more he attacks Eunomius through Plato in the same fashion,[26] when in response to Eunomius' assertion of the divine origin of names he says: Ταῦτα Κρατύλῳ τάχα τῷ Πλατωνικῷ διαλόγῳ ἢ αὐτὸς ἐντυχὼν ἤ τινος τῶν ἐντετυχηκότων ἀκούσας [for Gregory misses no chance of abuse, though his abuses be inconsistent] διὰ τὴν πολλὴν οἶμαι πτωχείαν τῶν νοημάτων ἐρράπτει τοῖς ἰδίοις λήροις τὰς ἐκεῖ φλυαρίας . . . καὶ τούτου χάριν περικτυπηθεὶς τῇ καλλιφωνίᾳ τῆς Πλατωνικῆς λέξεως, πρέπον οἴεται δόγμα τῆς Ἐκκλησίας τὴν ἐκείνου φιλοσοφίαν ποιήσασθαι. This last, indeed, is a heavy charge against which it would not be easy for Gregory to defend himself. However, we shall see that on the matter of names—or the origin of language—Gregory had an honest difference of opinion from Plato. His attitude toward the Cratylus we shall have occasion to examine in this regard.

Thrice more does Gregory mention the name of Plato. In his essay, "De Infantibus, etc." written to explain the death of children, he attempts to support his own lame explanations with the words[27] καὶ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τοῖς ἔξω Πλάτων πολλὰς ἐκ προσώπου ἀναβεβιωκότος περὶ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν δικαστηρίων φιλοσοφήσας ἀφῆκεν ἀπόῤῥητα ὡς κρείττονα ὄντα δηλαδὴ ἢ ὥστε ὑπὸ λογισμὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐλθεῖν. That this is a private dissertation written for the Prefect Hierius of Cappadocia affects the tone in which Gregory mentions Plato, even as does the audience of the essay against Fate.[28] For that is a discussion, which indeed becomes a lecture, with a heathen in Constantinople, and it is a powerful rhetorical device to show

that one is acquainted with the best representatives of one's adversary's party. So here[29] he cites the cases of Galen and Hippocrates as pagans who cared not for "the motion of the stars" and then quotes a story from Plato to show that Fate may be thwarted.[30] The last instance of a direct reference to Plato is in the dialogue with Makrina, where his sister in the psychological discussion exhorts him to "leave the Platonic chariot."[31] The reason here given for abandoning the Platonic psychology illuminates that method of using pagan learning without abandoning Christian dogma which Gregory introduced, the combination of faith and science to which we have already alluded. "We," says Makrina,[32] "are not accorded this freedom [i.e. the freedom, which pagan philosophers enjoy, of following the argument out *κατ' ἐξουσίαν κατὰ τὸ φανὲν ἀκόλουθον*] . . . . since we use as the measure and rule of every belief the Holy Scripture. Necessarily looking to this (the Scriptures) we accept only that which accords with the view of the Scriptures." So Gregory allows himself to accept all things which accord with Scripture or may be so treated as to seem to accord therewith. Such an attitude must lead to the habit—for one who is of a philosophical temper—of so interpreting Scripture now and again as to make it accord with gentile philosophy.

It has been seen that Gregory uses the names of Greek philosophers to discredit his adversaries by attaching their interpretations to the beliefs of the former. In spite of his care in not naming any gentile authority for his own philosophical tenets and exegeses, it is not improbable that those adversaries retorted in his own coin by pointing out that Gregory himself was much influenced by pagan studies. For example, we cannot believe that in those attacks of Eunomius upon Basil, the heretic whom Gregory abuses as a lame follower of Aristotle and Plato, a second Epicurus, did not include some remarks upon Basil's education at Athens where he was a fellow-student of the Emperor Julian. This belief of ours is warranted by a set of passages which show that Gregory was eager to defend a certain amount of pagan learning as an asset of an orthodox apologist. In his essay on the making of man, he implies that a Christian might justly be

chary of reading pagan works but might rightly desire to know the scientific results of their investigations, and for that reason, he says, he includes a brief discussion of anatomy.[33] *Εἰ δέ τις ἐπιζητοίη πάντων αὐτῶν τήν ἐκκλησίαν διδάσκαλον γίνεσθαι, ὡς εἰς μηδὲν τῆς ἔξωθεν φωνῆς ἐπιδεῖσθαι . . . . διὰ βραχέων καὶ τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον διαληψόμεθα.* In his praise of the Holy Father Ephraem, he takes pains to mention the erudition of that orthodox father. Not only did he drain the cup of inspired wisdom[34] *ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἔξω κοσμικῆς ὅση τε περὶ τὸ κατεγλωττισμένον καὶ ὀρθὸν τοῦ λόγου ὅση τε περὶ τὸ τῶν νοημάτων βάθος ὅτι μάλα ἐξασκήσας ὅσον μὲν χρήσιμον προσελάβετο ὅσον δ'ἀνόνητον ἀπεβάλετο.* He is here stressing the point that there is a distinction to be made between various parts of heathen knowledge and that one would as sinfully reject all as accept all. Nay, in his life of Saint Gregory the Thaumaturge he goes beyond this to show that even the worst of pagan learning may be good training, may lead a man up to the true faith. For of this Saint who seems to have been the idol of the Cappadocians he says:[35] *Μέγας οὗτος τῇ ἔξω φιλοσοφίᾳ δι' ἐπιμελείας καθομιλήσας, δι' ὧν ὁ Ἑλληνισμὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς βεβαιοῦται διὰ τούτων ὁδηγήθη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Χριστιανισμοῦ κατανόησιν καὶ καταλιπὼν τὴν πεπλανημένην τῶν πατέρων θρησκείαν, ἐζήτει τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πεπονημένων τοῖς ἔξωθεν διδαχθεὶς τὸ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δογμάτων ἀσύστατον.*[36]

But his most outspoken defense of pagan learning occurs in the *Life of Moses*, in the explanation of the theft of the Egyptian jewels by the Jews. The true and higher meaning of this story, he says, is that a man who enters upon a free life through virtue should array himself also with the riches of the gentile learning.[37] *Τήν τε γὰρ ἠθικὴν καὶ φυσικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, γεωμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, καὶ τὴν λογικὴν πραγματείαν καὶ πάντα ὅσα παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς Ἐκκλησίας σπουδάζεται, κελεύει ὁ τῆς ἀρετῆς καθηγούμενος παρὰ τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα πλουτούντων ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ λαβόντα λόγῳ χρήσεως ὑποδέξασθαι ὡς ἐν καιρῷ χρησιμευόντων, ὅταν δέῃ τὸν θεῖον τοῦ μυστηρίου ναὸν διὰ τοῦ λογικοῦ πλούτου καλλωπισθῆναι.* Gregory would not have had this read closely with those slurs of his against Eunomius; yet they are not entirely inconsistent, for, he would say, pagan learning is commendable only when it is used for the sake of the orthodox

Catholic church. But it is a fair sign, this sort of justification of gentile learning, that his enemies were not leaving unused the opportunities which his obvious philosophical tendencies offered them to make against him the same accusations he brought against Eunomius. In this same *Life of Moses* he says[38] *ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ τῆς ἔξω παιδεύσεως πρὸς συζυγίαν ἡμῶν εἰς τεκνογονίαν ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἀπόβλητον. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἠθική τε καὶ φυσικὴ φιλοσοφία γένοιτο ἄν ποτε τῷ ὑψηλοτέρῳ βίῳ σύζυγός τε καὶ φίλη καὶ κοινωνὸς τῆς ζωῆς. Μόνον εἰ τὰ ἐκ ταύτης κνήματα μηδὲν ἐπάγοιτο τοῦ ἀλλοφύλου μιάσματος.*

Yet it would be too much to expect that a man who had—as Gregory seems to have had—a desire to pursue a life of literature, who was then driven into the Church, and who must have experienced an acute civil war within himself at all times, should have established a firm and consistent standard for himself, even one of despair such as he hints at in these passages. Even in this same essay, when he explains the allegory of the daughter of Pharaoh, we find him attacking pagan learning once more and—bitter irony—with a figure which he draws from Plato. The princess is the sterile gentile philosophy[39] *Ἄγονος γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡ ἔξωθεν παίδευσις ἀεὶ ὠδίνουσα καὶ μηδέποτε ζωογονοῦσα τῷ τόκῳ . τίνα γὰρ ἔδειξε καρπὸν τῶν μακρῶν ὠδίνων ἡ φιλοσοφία, τῶν τοσούτων τε καὶ τοιούτων ἄξιον πόνων; οὐ πάντες ὑπηνέμιοί τε καὶ ἀτελεσφόρητοι πρὶν εἰς τὸ φῶς ἐλθεῖν τῆς θεογνωσίας, ἀμβλίσκονται;*[40]

So much, then, of his relationship to heathen philosophers and philosophy does Gregory openly state. Nowhere does he applaud a pagan thinker, though in his letters to a minor sophist who had flattered him he is more than polite;[41] when he mentions any Greek philosopher it is only to prove that the pretended Christianity of his own adversaries is pagan at heart and source. Yet the study of Greek literature he defends to a certain extent, partly because he loved it surely, as his early life and some of his private letters show, partly—we may believe—because his enemies had attacked him for his knowledge of it as unbecoming an orthodox bishop.

We have now to examine those passages in his writings which show what his true attitude toward these philosophers was. A complete study of the sources of Gregory we cannot now

attempt, but I intend to examine such of his writing as is related to Plato, directly or indirectly, whether it accepts Platonic notions or is obviously meant as a refutation of them. A man may influence thought as profoundly by revulsion as attraction.

The energy which has lately been exhibited in finding the sources of one philosopher in another has tended to draw an outline of thought repulsively sterile. The truth of the facts unearthed by these researches is not to be questioned, but it would have been well to balance this side of the history of philosophy by a history of contrasts in the thought of different thinkers. Nor are these contrasts always fortuitous; we should find many a theory nurtured in one mind by the statement of its opposite in some earlier doctrine. Of such contrasts—where they have truly been influenced by Plato or Platonists—and of such contrary reminiscences I shall try to take account. To expect parallels, where they exist, to be simple quotations is to believe that the philosopher is purposely writing an exercise for the "source-hunter." We must expect to untangle mixed sources, to outline shadowy reminiscences, and to identify approximations of doctrine.

II

The Soul

We have already noticed the reference made by Makrina in the dialogue upon the soul and the resurrection to the myth of the *Phaedrus*. The reason for the "abandonment of the Platonic chariot" here is the likeness of the soul to God; and the absence of the passionate element in God precludes its inclusion in the soul. Gregory is thinking of the soul with regard to its eternity, as a divine thing associated with God; therefore it is essential that it be conceived as an indissoluble unit. When the soul is viewed as related to the body in the process which is human life, this unity no longer suffices. The passionate character, for example, does exist in man; nor is it purely materialistic in character. How then is it to be related to the soul? It was in the consideration of this question that Plato hit upon the allegory

of the chariot, a means whereby he represented the soul as having parts, one part reasonable and divine, the other mortal and earthy, and this once more divided into passionate and appetitive parts. But that he did not understand that such a conception does not fulfil the requirements of the divinity and immortality of the soul is absurd; and that Gregory failed to understand that Plato saw the double nature of the problem to be solved I do not believe. The commentators who think that Gregory followed Posidonius instead of Plato in the solution of this problem surely underrate the intelligence both of Plato and of Gregory. In this very passage, first of all, Gregory shows his appreciation of the fact that the explanation of the *Phaedrus* is allegorical;[1] and, as will later be seen, he is well acquainted with those passages wherein Plato, looking at the problem from its other side, states expressly that the soul is an indissoluble unit. Such statements as that of Gronau:[2] "In der Hauptsache ist Platon also über eine Mehrheit seelischer Vermögen kaum hinausgekommen" simply show a lack of appreciation for the philosophical difficulties of the problem, for which reason they misinterpret the Platonic explanations. Gronau indeed admits that in the *Republic* (611 B) Plato does represent the soul as a unity, but he seems to think that this is an unique instance, and he discounts this instance as a "mere allegory."[3] Yet in the Phaedo (80 ff.), a passage which we shall find is often recalled by Gregory, the entire argument hinges upon the unity and divinity of the soul.[4] And previously in *Phaedo*, 78 B.C., Plato definitely shows that he bases his belief of the immortality of the soul upon the fact that it is uncompounded. In these passages it is clear that the passions and appetites, which in the allegories are spoken of as "parts of the soul," are referred to a middle ground between soul and matter and arise from the association of the soul with the body in life. Moreover, even when Plato speaks of the soul as divided into parts, that is when he speaks of an appetitive and a passionate "soul," he does not forget to insist that only the reasonable part is immortal and divine. In the *Timaeus* (41 C), the Creator, in addressing the lower gods, says *καὶ καθ' ὅσον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον εἶναι προσήκει, θεῖον λεγόμενον*

ἡγεμονοῦν τε ἐν αὐτοῖς . . . σπείρας καὶ ὑπαρξάμενος ἐγὼ παραδώσω. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῷα . . . . .

Now that Gregory saw, and understood, the double approach of Plato to this question I think can be sustained by a few quotations. In the *Republic* (611 D) Plato says of the soul as it appears in the body *τεθεάμεθα μέντοι διακείμενον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετρῖφθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, ἄλλα δέ προσπεφυκέναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας ὥστε παντὶ μᾶλλον θηρίῳ ἐοικέναι ἢ οἷος ἦν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα διακειμένην ὑπὸ μυρίων κακῶν.* Gregory in the discussion of the nature of the soul says,[5] *Ἃ πάντα* [that is the passions and desires] *περὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἐστι καὶ ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ οἷον μυρμηκίαι τινὲς τοῦ διανοητικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκφυόμεναι. Ἃ μέρη μὲν αὐτῆς εἶναι διὰ τὸ προσπεφυκέναι νομίζεται, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνό εἰσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ κατ' οὐσίαν.* The connection of the two passages is obvious; even Gronau calls attention thereto.[6] To me it seems that Gregory here declares himself aware of the fact that Plato understood the soul to be a unity encrusted, as it were, with refuse of the earthly life which comes to seem part of it. But for all this argument against the divisibility of the soul, Gregory does not refrain from speaking seriously of the three parts of the soul. Moreover, how easily he could slip into this mode of expression from the explanation which seems to reflect his more careful psychology is shown by the following passage. It will be recalled that in the passage quoted above he referred to the passions and appetites as *ἃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν* to distinguish them from itself. Now in the Canonical Epistle[7] he is discussing the manner of administering to penitents and says *τρία ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην διαίρεσιν. Τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές.* Thus far the language is Gregory's remolding of Plato. But he continues *Διὸ προσήκει τὸν μέλλοντα τὴν κατάλληλον θεραπείαν προσάγειν τῷ νενοσηκότι τῆς ψυχῆς μέρει πρότερον μὲν ἐπισκέπτεσθαι ἐν τίνι συνέστη τὸ πάθος* and he continues thereafter to speak of these "parts of the soul." Now the *περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν* could, by one defending a thesis, be pressed to mean the soul itself. But we need not go so far. Suppose that it means

quite literally "about the soul" or "in connection with the soul," yet see how unconsciously Gregory passes over to the feeling that, so long as the soul is considered to be living in a body, they are practically parts of the soul itself.

It is often that Gregory makes use of the figure of the Phaedrus myth and alters it to suit passages of Scripture which he is explaining. There could be no stronger argument urged to prove that this passage of Plato had made a lasting impression upon his mind, to disprove that he is merely copying the interpretations of Stoics or Academics than this passage from the Life of Moses[8] wherein he explains the meaning of the Egyptian chariots whelmed in the sea. Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς πάθος (he says) οἱ ἵπποι νοείσθωσαν, ἀσχέτῳ τινὶ ὁρμῇ τὸ ἅρμα δι' ἑαυτῶν ἐφελκόμενοι ἐν ᾧ οἱ τρεῖς ἐπιβάται οὓς τριστάτας ὀνομάζει ἡ ἱστορία. Νοήσεις δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς τούτους πάντως, τοὺς φερομένους ὑπὸ τοῦ ἅρματος . . τὴν τριμερῆ τῆς ψυχῆς διαίρεσιν, εἰς τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμοειδὲς ἀναπέμπων τὸ νόημα. In the first place, it is to be noted that here the triple division of the soul is put forward boldly. The queer perversion of the myth, whereby the three parts are all riders who are dragged to destruction by pleasures, the horses, is necessary to explain the three men on each Egyptian chariot. Here we may view the method which Gregory used to make Grecian philosophy serve the needs of Christian theology.

Of Gregory's psychology, then, we can say that it is essentially Platonic; more, that his use of it is Platonic. To him as to Plato the unity and simplicity of the soul is the basis of its divinity; in this it is like God; and, being like God, it is not to be considered subject to passion or desire. But in its relation to the body it must have some connection with passion and desire; and this necessity Gregory attempts to meet in various ways. First of all, where the soul is being considered as embodied, he has no reluctance about speaking of the parts of the soul in true Platonic fashion. Where he is constrained to consider both sides of the question at once, he is inclined to the Platonic explanation of an intermediate set of feelings or impulses growing out of the association of soul and body, and this condition he explains under the influence of Plato's likeness of the embodied soul to Glaukos.

Let us say here[9] that the solution of the problem attributed to Posidonius could not have been accepted by Gregory. The eclectic Stoic made all these manifestations not parts of the soul but δυνάμεις which the ἡγεμονικόν exercises under the influence of the body; the reasonable manifestations, as well as the passionate, etc., result in the same fashion. Consequently the ἡγεμονικόν is susceptible of change—a change which it actually and always undergoes in the body—and the important requisite of the argument for the divinity of the soul, that it be—like God—unmoved by externals and inalterable, is unfulfilled. Now in the dialogue on the Soul and the Resurrection, Gregory most emphatically insists upon the fact that the πάθη do not belong to the soul. Yet Gronau insists that Gregory's argument is copied from that of Posidonius, a patent impossibility.[10] How clearly the two ideas, the tripartition of the soul and its indivisibility, could be associated by a student of Plato is attested by the "Introduction" of Alcinous[11] who in chapter 24 says ὅτι δὲ τριμερής ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ κατὰ λόγον τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς τόποις ἰδίοις διανενέμηται μάθοιμεν ἂν ἐντεῦθεν.[12] Yet in the next chapter (25) Alcinous calls the soul ἀσώματος γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία, ἀμετάβλητος κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ νοητὴ καὶ ἀειδὴς καὶ μονοειδής· οὐκοῦν ἀσύνθετος, ἀδιάλυτος, ἀσκέδαστος. It is to be noted here once more that the latter description occurs in the proof of the immortality of the soul, the former in the description of the relationship of the soul to the body. So much we can say of the definite psychology of Gregory, that it has the same double quality as that of Plato. But in every reference to the soul he shows a confusion of the two attitudes. He is deeply impressed by the rhetorical character of Plato's allegory, and he generally casts his own psychological discussion into the same mold, varying the details to suit the emergency. One case of this treatment we have already examined; we may now look at the rest, both to appreciate the frequency of the recurrence of this Platonic figure in Gregory and to observe his method of handling it.

In the essay on *Virginity* during his discussion of temperance[13] he remarks that the charioteer who drives a team which does not cooperate does not urge on the swift horse and restrain the slow

one, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν εὐθύνει, τὸν δὲ ἀνακόπτει, τοὺς δὲ καθικνεῖται διὰ τῆς μάστιγος ἕως μίαν τοῖς πᾶσι τὴν πρὸς τὸν δρόμον σύμπνοιαν ἐμποιήσῃ. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς ὁ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡνίας ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἔχων κτλ. In the passage concerning the Egyptian chariots noted above, the three parts of the soul rode and were brought to doom by the horses which were pleasure. Here only the νοῦς, the divine part of the soul is driving; and the horses are the physical qualities of the body. But the reminiscence of the Phaedrus (254) is none the less obvious. Whereas the passions are here related to the body, however, in the next passage Gregory makes them manifestations of the soul. It is in the exegesis of Psalms: "He blessed them and they multiplied, nor did he decrease their beasts." Κτήνη λέγει (he says)[14] τὴν ὑποχείριον τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς κινημάτων ὑπηρεσίαν ὅταν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν χρησιμεύῃ. For the "θυμός," he continues, "is a good beast when it is obedient (ὑποζύγιον) to the reason (λογισμοῦ) and another such beast is ἐπιθυμία, carrying the soul on its back, as it were, and exalting it and lifting it up to the sublime when it is guided upwards by the rein of the intellect (διάνοια)." Aside from the obvious application of the Phaedrus myth, the usual Platonic triple division, and the assigning of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία to the soul (though as κινήματα not as μέρη),[15] a new consideration is introduced; the lower parts or inclinations of the soul may be useful even for the higher life. This is not merely a natural observation of the Phaedrus myth but is related to those many passages where Plato has insisted upon the orderly conduct of each part of a man as the only means of attaining a quiet, just, and useful life.[13]

Let us here take note of two other passages related to this myth of the *Phaedrus*, one in the essay on *Beatitudes*[17] wherein the passions are activities within the soul and the reason is not a charioteer but the bridle itself: Μακάριοι τοίνυν οἱ μὴ ὀξυῤῥοποι πρὸς τὰς ἐμπαθεῖς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατεσταλμένοι τῷ λόγῳ ἐφ' ὧν ὁ λογισμὸς καθάπερ τις χαλινὸς ἀναστομῶν τὰς ὁρμὰς οὐκ ἐᾷ τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς ἀταξίαν ἐκφέρεσθαι. Here the language easily changes from κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς to ὁρμή but the allegory though distorted is still used, and, though nothing is said of *parts* of the soul, it is obvious that Gregory is actually thinking of the κινήσεις or ὁρμαί along

with the reason as distinct parts of one whole. In the exegesis of Ecclesiastes[18] he interprets the text to mean *κατ' ἐξουσίαν, οἷόν τινα πῶλον, τὴν τῆς φύσεως ὁρμὴν μικρὸν ἀφεὶς ἐπισκιρτῆσαι τοῖς κάτω πάθεσι, πάλιν ἀνεστόμωσα τῇ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἡνίᾳ καὶ τῇ τούτου ἐξουσίᾳ ὑπήγαγον.* Here the figure, though unmistakably the *Phaedrus* myth, is carelessly handled. The speaker himself is the driver and reason is the rein; but the horse is "an impulse of nature" (i.e. of the human nature of the speaker) which sports among the lower passions. The word *ὁρμή* reoccurs here and is important, because it represents Gregory's attempt to reconcile the tripartite soul, embodied, with the single and indivisible god-like soul.[19] But from the two passages which we have just examined it is evident that the use of this word is not a strict one, for in one place it is used as a synonym for *κίνησις* which in turn is used in the figure as though it were really *μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς.* Moreover, the loose employment of the words and the free alteration of the *Phaedrus* figure in these passages scattered throughout Gregory's works seem to me sufficient evidence for the belief that in no case was he slavishly copying the account of a commentator or compiler but was himself applying in each instance to suit his need with varied emphasis the handy allegory he had found in the *Phaedrus* itself.

Now the conception of the *ὁρμαί* is, of course, Stoic; but Gregory makes no special use of the concept as such; and in the passage concerning the effect of opposite qualities upon the reason, where—had he been copying from a Stoic handbook[20]—one should have most expected a detailed account of the nature of these "impulses," we read only that those elements of the soul which are situated on the borderland and which may from their peculiar character incline toward good or evil, we consider to have been added to the soul from without (*ἔξωθεν ἐπιγενέσθαι αὐτῇ*) since no such thing may be seen in the archetypal beauty.[21] This passage reminds us at once (though it did not so remind Gronau) of the Glaukos simile in the *Republic* to which we have already quoted a parallel in Gregory. The passions are accretions upon the essential, divine soul. But it is obviously not a mere repetition of this figure as was the former citation; here the

passions are also treated as the results of motions within the soul. This and the use of ὁρμή elsewhere in the essay sent Gronau at once to Posidonius; he might better have looked at the Philebus (35 C–D) where Plato says that the impulse (ὁρμή) toward desires and their opposites is in the soul.[22] These passions and desires, whether viewed as parts of the soul or as impulses thereof, are of course not concerned with the essential soul. Gregory takes much trouble to prove this in the essay on the "Soul and Resurrection," naturally looking to the means for proving the immortality of the soul.

Plato's *Phaedo* has been frequently compared with this essay of Gregory's,[23] and there can be little doubt that the form of the latter is in imitation of that of the former. Now in the *Phaedo*, Plato has the same problem to deal with as Gregory has here, and he views the soul with an eye to the requirements of immortality; consequently throughout the dialogue he maintains the attitude that the soul is one and indivisible as he sets forth this argument at length in 78 B following.[24] But since the pure soul, the intelligent part, is of itself excellent, what reason could there have been for the creation of these "impulses toward desire?" This question Gregory answers by saying[25] that it is impossible for the reasonable function to exist in embodied life without sensation which, in turn, is based in the nature of the unreasonable. Plato[26] likewise says that, beast though this lower part be, it must be nourished along with the reason if there is to be any mortal race.[27] But it should be observed that Plato makes this concession in the *Timaeus*—and in the latter part of the *Timaeus* where he is discussing the psychology of the embodied soul—not in the Phaedo, where the senses and all that has to do with them are considered as evil influences upon the soul, things to be avoided, bonds wherefrom to be freed.[28] In his essay on the soul, however, Gregory cannot so easily dispose of these affections, for he would thereby accuse the creator of being the cause of evil.[29, 30] Consequently he explains the existence of these ὁρμαί as due to the intention to furnish a means whereby man might choose and follow the good.[31] If we obey Scripture, says he, which bids us rule over these unreasonable beasts,[32] no one

of them will be the cause of evil, but fear will make us obedient, anger brave, cowardice cautious, desire will cause us to seek the divine and perfect pleasure.[33] In the *Canonical Epistle* Gregory sets forth this doctrine in great detail;[34] the virtue of the λογιστικὸν μέρος[35] is ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ διακριτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, the ἐπιθυμητικόν is to address the desire of the soul upward to τὸ ὄντως ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ἀληθῶς καλόν,[36] the duty of the θυμοειδές is ἡ πρὸς τὸ κακὸν ἀπέχθεια. Gregory, as these two passages show, tends to amalgamate with the language of the *Phaedrus* myth this doctrine which, though implied in the *Phaedrus*,[37] is not directly spoken of there.

It is in the *Republic* that Plato makes extensive use of this conception that each part of the soul has its duty to perform and that only by the fulfillment of the duty of each in accord and harmony is the desired end of a just life (whether for the individual or for the state) to be attained.[38] The language of the *Republic* is used by Gregory in one application of this doctrine, a passage which shows beyond doubt the source from which he drew the doctrine which he used to aid him in his defense of these "neutral" impulses of the soul. In the essay on *Virginity* he attempts to show how these inclinations may be turned to good and says τὸν δὲ θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ τὸ μῖσος καθάπερ κύνας τινὰς πυλωροὺς πρὸς μόνην ἐγρηγορέναι τὴν τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀντίστασιν . . . . ,[39] which leads us directly to the *Republic*.[40] But it is more usual for him to combine the *Phaedrus* figure with this doctrine, as he does in the *Life of Moses*, where he explains the cross of blood as a "guard" against evil. This, he says, is what is meant by the tripartition of the soul by the pagan schools.[41] τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν ἀμφοτέροις (i.e. ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές) ἐπεζευγμένον, συνέχειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπὸ ἐκείνων ἀνέχεσθαι πρὸς μὲν ἀνδρείαν τῷ θυμῷ στομούμενον πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίαν δι' ἐπιθυμίας ὑψούμενον.

Consequently we may say that an examination of the treatment of the ὁρμαί or μέρη of the soul throughout Gregory's work generally shows nowhere a departure from principles which could have been drawn from Plato himself or the Platonic commentators. The language used would incline us to the belief that in all of these passages Gregory was developing independently an explanation which had been suggested to him by the reading of the

Republic and *Phaedrus*, and his constant use of an amalgamation of the ideas of these two dialogues—but always with varied emphasis and altered details to suit the circumstances of his argument—suggests that he was interpreting originals in his own fashion and not copying handbooks. Only once do we find a marked resemblance between his interpretation and that of another writer. That case is one of a Scriptural interpretation and the resemblance is to a Philonic passage.[42] That Philo was known to Gregory we know from Gregory's mention of his name; that he was followed by other Christian writers is also known from Origen, who in turn was studied by the Cappadocians. But even so, there can be no reason for denying the possibility of originality in Gregory's arrangement and use of these Platonic principles or the probability of his having drawn them directly from Plato. So much for sources so far.

Gregory, then, has expressed two views of the soul. First, it is an indivisible and eternal unit. Second, it is divided into an eternal and a mortal part, this second part being generally viewed as once again divided into two, ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές. To reconcile these two attitudes, in his stricter philosophy, he denies that these are really parts of the soul, calling them now ὁρμαί, now κινήματα. Sometimes these impulses are indeed within the soul itself, sometimes they are incrustations, as it were, upon the soul. Each of these attitudes is assumed to meet some specific requirement of psychology, that of the soul's unity when immortality is in question, that of its division to answer to the requirements of its activity when incarnate. Naturally, there is trouble when the two questions are raised at once, and the attempt to satisfy this double demand is but poorly met by the theory of ὁρμαί or κινήματα. If they are in the soul, then the soul is not essentially pure and single. To equate the theory of Gregory with that of Posidonius requires that we assume that Gregory was too dull to see this, for if the δυνάμεις are always present in the soul, the soul is not divinely pure; if they arise, from the junction of the νοῦς with the body, the soul is παθητική and capable of being moved from without. But Gregory struggles vehemently against this possibility.[43] There is, he says, a battle on the part

of the rational against these other influences, an impossibility if they were of its nature and to be referred to the essence of the soul.[44] On the other hand, if they are not in the soul—and Gregory assumes that they are not—how can they affect the soul? I do not think you will find an answer in Gregory or in Plato. Gregory here says that they "have some relation to the soul yet are not the soul," and he uses the Platonic figure of accretions upon the soul. Then he turns the discussion[45] to the possible influence for good of these impulses.

So long as the soul is considered an active principle in the embodied life,[46] this dilemma must remain.[47]

The manner in which the eternal soul is connected with the body, then, is not satisfactorily explained, and this is recognized by Gregory. Leaving the terminology of ψυχή which necessitates a consideration of the bodily affectation, he considers the rational in man as the true and only soul[48] which is connected with the lower parts of man and the body somehow and makes itself effective through the senses.[49] How this is done, he admits, is inexplicable; that it is done is certain. And he turns this inscrutability to good account, using Scripture as a major premise and the likeness of the unknown to the unknown as a minor premise, to draw therefrom a Platonic conclusion.[50] Since God, he says, made man in His image, that which in man has not degenerated is verily God. Now the one thing about God which is known to us is the incomprehensibility of His essence. And since the nature of the human νοῦς cannot be conceived it must be a true representation of the Divine νοῦς. Whatever be the relationship of passion and desire to this "mind," they cannot be a part of it, for they are certainly not to be considered as any part of God. In all the relationships of man to God, consequently, if he be spoken of as God's image, as knowing God, or as immortal, only this rational part of him is meant.[51]

This is only a change of terminology from the figure of the three parts of the soul, for even in the *Phaedrus* (247 C) it is said that the true essence is seen only by the soul's pilot, the mind. But once the terminology has changed, the possibility of the lower impulses' being parts of the soul becomes absurd; and

when one reads Gregory's words which say that the true soul is one and inseparable by nature, intelligent and immaterial, one must not think that this is a breaking away from Platonic doctrine. For it is at the conclusion of the piece wherein he has made most use of the parts of the soul that Plato says (*Republic* 611 B) "Let us not believe—for the argument will not admit it—that in her truest nature the soul is such a thing as bristles with variety and difference and dissimilarity of itself towards itself." Gregory himself objects to calling these passions and desires by the name of soul, saying that it is a misuse of language, and attempting to equate ψυχή and νοῦς.[52] Consequently, to say that the soul is immortal and eternal is to mean really that the νοῦς and only the νοῦς is so. It is the attitude and argument of the *Phaedo* which would divorce the soul from all but divine and rational characteristics, and the later Platonists accepted this as the view of Plato and their own.[53]

As to the location of this rational principle in the body, Gregory is at first reluctant to choose a side in the controversy which raged between the different Grecian schools. Plato, in the *Timaeus*, had located each of the three parts of the soul in a different part of the body, putting the νοῦς ἡγεμονικός in the head. In this he was followed by one party,[54] though another, whether this was led by Posidonius or not we have no means of knowing, sought, probably in connection with *Timaeus* 34 B and the *Phaedo*, to maintain that *Plato* had meant to distribute the soul throughout all the body.[55] The Stoics generally accepted the heart as the location of the ἡγεμονικόν. Gregory mentions the various theories but refuses to place a spatial circumscription upon an immaterial nature.[56] Again for the explanation of sensation he must consider the νοῦς as in some kind of intimate relationship with every part of the body.[57] The νοῦς is able to divide itself up among the various perceptive organs and through each in turn to acquire knowledge of reality. The use of the senses by the soul for the acquisition of knowledge goes back to the *Phaedo* (79 C) and is more closely treated in the *Theaetetus* (184 C ff.). Although the neo-Platonists also held that the soul pervaded the entire body,[58] they seem to differ in this from Gregory, that

they held the presence of the entire soul to be necessary in every part of the body.[59] The passage above cited for Gregory and another in the same essay[60] seem to show that he did not attempt to have the entire soul present simultaneously in every part of the body, but followed rather the doctrine of Xenocrates which does not concern itself with the task of maintaining the soul (or rather the *νοῦς*) indivisible and yet omnipresent.[61] However, we have already seen that Gregory never forgets that the *νοῦς* must be indivisible, and in this very passage after he has spoken of the pervasion of the *νοῦς* throughout the entire body, he reminds the reader[62] that the true soul is one and indivisible. This double necessity it was that induced the neo-Platonic solution to which we have referred; and the statement of Plotinus (IV 3, 8) that the soul penetrates to every point in the body but is not torn apart from itself when it is in the finger and in the foot, is not at variance with Gregory's statements on the subject.[63] Moreover, the discussion of the relation of the mind to the sense organs in the two authors shows the same articulation of the problem in the minds of both.[64] One solves the problem by falling back on faith in Scripture, the other by having the soul appear in two or more places at the same time. But Gregory's chapter,[65] *ὅτι ἀθεώρητος ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις* is not uncongenial with the sentence by which Plotinus closes his examination,[66] *Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν ἀπιστεῖται, καὶ διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπισκοτεῖται. ἐκεῖ δὲ φανὰ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστον.*[67]

Finally, Gregory observes that the soul is not in the body, since the immaterial is not to be contained by the material nor is the body in the soul, because the immaterial cannot circumscribe the material,[68] *ἀλλὰ κατά τινα τρόπον ἀμήχανόν τε καὶ ἀκατανόητον ἐγγίζων ὁ νοῦς τῇ φύσει . . καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖται.* The similarity of the treatment and the conclusion between Gregory and Plotinus[69] is striking. It is not that one would lightly name a source from which Gregory had copied or drawn these statements. But we cannot be wrong in assuming that, besides Plato himself, he knew the discussions of the neo-Platonists, for we see that he observes the questions and difficulties that are raised in the works of Plotinus and seeks to meet them. Cer-

tainly his attitude is not that of the Stoics; and, while it would be foolish to assert that he did not know Stoic works, it is obvious that in metaphysics, at any rate, and psychology, he could have had little sympathy with them. In addition to this fundamental incompatibility, we have found no real indications of Stoic influence thus far in the thought of Gregory.[70]

III

Creation

We must turn now to the physical doctrines of Gregory as they are set out in his explanation of the material world and its creation, chiefly in his essays on the *Six Days* and on the creation of man. Both these essays were written in close connection with the work of his brother, Basil, on the *Six Days*; and both contain a certain amount of Stoic scientifical doctrine which Gronau has sought to trace to Posidonius. Where this matter is definitely Stoic I shall not assume to decide from which of the doctors of Stoicism it has come into Gregory's work; it will be enough to note here such portions of it as are definitely non-Stoic or such as were commonplaces in Gregory's time, capable of being held and expounded by any of the eclectic teachers.

If, for a moment, we turn to the sections of the essay on the *Soul and Resurrection*, in which the question of the creation of matter is discussed,[1] we see first of all that Gregory is unwilling to explain the dilemma upon which a Christian philosopher is inevitably thrown. Whether the world was created of the supreme essence or of something outside of God, there is an equal absurdity —he says—in the conclusions to be drawn. For, if the phaenomena are of divine substance, then God and phaenomena are alike divine; if, on the other hand, there existed material outside of God's nature, this material is as eternal as God.[2] The same dilemma is stated in *The Making of Man* (209 B ff.); and the answer in both cases is, first, that we must have faith in the unbounded power of God, assured that the impulse of the divine resolve becomes a fact whenever it will, and the wish is realized

as nature so soon as it arises, for the omnipotent power does not render the will unrealized. But, though Gregory insists that this is sufficient explanation and reiterates it wherever the question occurs,[3] intending it to be a refuge if hard pressed in the argument, he does not stop with it.[4] He assumes that God first created an ideal world (I 72 A–B) which is taken in by the eye of God in a moment. The creation of the material world follows upon this in a regular order of development.[5] Now the creation of the intelligible does not present any difficulty, since its qualities are the qualities of the supreme essence also. But the creation of the material by the immaterial is unexplained. This prime difficulty Gregory attempts to dissolve in the same way in his three passages concerned therewith.[6] He employs the means of abstracting from matter its qualities, which themselves are intelligible, not material; and since matter is nothing other than a complex of immaterial, intelligible concepts, there is no inconsistency in the statement that it is created by an intelligible, immaterial God. But there is an element which separates Gregory from the Stoics and Platonists in this argument. Origen, too, abstracts "qualities" from matter as such, but these qualities are only four, heat, cold, moisture, dryness.[7] In each of the passages concerned Gregory, although he posits a substrate, includes in his list of typical qualities which are abstracted therefrom *τὸ διάστημα*. That extension itself is a quality, however, Plotinus was the first to aver,[8] and Gregory's definiteness in this regard points to his knowledge of neo-Platonic doctrines. In the essay against Eunomius[9] he refers to the homogeneity of the substrate stripped of its qualities,[10] and the use of the word *οὐσία* for matter (if indeed it be used so and not merely loosely for essence) might seem to point to the Stoics as the "philosophers" referred to. The passage is entirely too general for us to decide whether Gregory is here thinking of the same doctrine to which he has subscribed in the scientific passages cited or has in mind merely the general and widely diffused doctrine of the more ordinarily accepted qualities. In any case, that the attitude which is his in the exacter passages is not Stoic is amply certain.[11]

It is only natural that Gregory should not press his scientific theories in purely religious passages. So in his defense of the possibility of the resurrection of the body, he says that it is easy for God to restore to its former state the human body since he has done the more difficult task of creating matter out of nothing.[12] And again he insists that "nothing comes of nothing,"[13] entirely disregarding the meaning of the doctrine he had espoused. But this last occurs in the polemic against Eunomius where every weapon is used that is suited to hurt the enemy.

Time, then, was created with the world, but after the ideal world; the ideal world, as we have seen, was created by God—a doctrine in opposition to Plato but necessary on the basis of Christian monism—, and—in accord with Plato—used by God as a pattern for the material world. God himself—in all His three persons—and the ideal creation are outside of time.[14] But there is also outside of the idea of temporality, since this is a created thing belonging to the phaenomenal world alone, eternity and all that it comprises, in the form of a substrate. Gregory says,[15] *παντὶ γὰρ οἶμαι τοῦτο γνώριμον εἶναι . . ὅτι τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ τὸν ἐν τούτοις τόπον οἷόν τι χώρημα δεκτικὸν τῶν γινομένων προκαταβαλλόμενος ὁ τῶν ὅλων Δημιουργὸς ἐν τούτοις κτίζει τὰ πάντα.* This, while created by God like the ideal world, is still outside of the temporal creation. The passage is a composite of the *αἰών* of *Timaeus* 37 D and the "eternal space" of *Timaeus* 52 A, *φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἕδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν.*[16] That this was not a mere tool of argument but a definite part of Gregory's metaphysics the definition of *αἰών* in another essay will prove.[17] In explaining the phrase *βασιλεία αἰώνων* he says *Αἰῶνας δὲ λέγων, πᾶσαν ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς συστάσεως κτίσιν περιλαμβάνει τήν τε ὁρατὴν καὶ ἀόρατον.* And time itself, coming into being with phaenomena, is the time of Plato, the means of measurement of all phaenomena,[18] that in which all things move.[19]

Moses, says Gregory, is concerned in presenting only the sensible side of the creation, but the creation is double, having an intelligible as well as a sensible side;[20] and, however he may use the science of his day to explain physical phaenomena, Gregory himself constantly keeps in mind this Platonic division of

nature.[21] Now the heaven enclosed the phaenomenal world in a sphere[22] which the Word of God rightly called one since it is the complete unity.[23] Here Gregory stops to point out that the heavy materials take their place at the center of the sphere.[24] This sphere turns ever as the rim of a wheel moves about the axle, impelled by the double energy of rest and motion, each maintaining the other.[25]

For the elements of the physical universe Gregory accepts the usual four, and remarks that air and water mediate between the extremes of fire and earth.[26] However, no one of these elements is pure; but each, to some extent, appears in all the phaenomena. In his essay on the *Six Days*, Gregory explains this process at length.[27] The elements are not each made up of one quality divorced from all the rest, but each partakes of all qualities, though in different proportions.[28] These qualities are held together in different elements by different "connecting" qualities; and through the resemblance of the qualitative arrangements and proportions, the elements are related; the fluidity of air relates that element to water, while water in turn is related through coldness to earth. Consequently the increase of a quality in one element, by disturbing the equilibrium, converts it into another.[29]

It may be that Gregory found this doctrine in a commentary on the Timaeus; but the passage from the *Timaeus* noted above in connection with the long disquisition on the alteration of the elements in *Timaeus* 49 would surely have been sufficient without a commentary, especially since the doctrine was by Gregory's time a commonplace. Gregory closes his section on the articulation of the Universe[30] with the statement that all things were made subject to some kind of motion lest we consider some unchanging thing the Divinity itself. It is the voice of Plato, saying: *τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἀεὶ καὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς πάντων θειοτάτοις προσήκει μόνοις, σώματος δὲ φύσις οὐ ταύτης τῆς τάξεως.*

It is following Platonic doctrine, as we have seen, that Gregory encloses all the phaenomenal world within the moving sphere but assumes a domain beyond, the pure world of intellect and God. In this same essay[31] he says that the firmament is not material

but is the ἄκρον τῆς αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας ὅπερ ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις κατὰ τὴν ἀεικίνητον δύναμιν περιπολεῖ. This intelligible world beyond he equates with τρίτος οὐρανός of the Apostle, and he closes the essay with a "flight to the world of true Being" which is a return to the *Phaedrus*.[32] παρέδραμε καὶ τὴν διὰ μέσου τῶν ἀστέρων κυκλοφορίαν. ἐπέρασε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄκραν τῶν αἰθερίων ὅρων περιβολὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ στασίμῳ καὶ νοητῇ φύσει γενόμενος οἷδε τὰ τοῦ παραδείσου κάλλη καὶ ἤκουσεν ἃ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις οὐ φθέγγεται.[33]

After [34] God had created the simple and intelligible universe and then this material universe, a complex of the four elements, He then said, "Let us make man."[35] And He made man ὥσπερ τινὰ μικτὸν κόσμον συγγενῆ τῶν δύο κόσμων, ἐξ ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου ψυχῆς καὶ ἐξ ὑλικοῦ καὶ ὁρωμένου τετραστοίχου σώματος συγκείμενον.[36]

Elsewhere Gregory repudiates the comparison of man with the cosmos.[37] Certain pagans (τῶν ἔξωθέν τινες)—he says—thought to glorify man by calling him a "little universe" composed of the same elements as constitute the cosmos. They forget that the same can be said of all creatures; moreover, where is the nobility of the universe, since it and all it contains are changing and mortal?[38] Man has a much sounder claim to honor, his likeness to God. This is attested by Scripture, but the comparison of the blessedness of Divine life and the pitiable state of man is difficult to understand. The solution of the mystery is to be found in the fact that there was a double creation, one intelligible, the second material. The man created first was not Adam but the idea of mankind (ἡ ἀνθρωπότης). Thereafter, in the creation of the phaenomenal world, did He make Adam and then he divided the race into male and female.[40] In this material creation, too, man is the image of God, not man as we see him, but a part of him. For he is of a double nature,[41] standing midway between the intelligible and phaenomenal, capable of partaking of both. He is like God in his ability to partake of all good.[42]

Man was created last in the order of Creation in order that, since he was to be king of the world, his kingdom might be ready for him. For this reason also man was given the ability to enjoy both the passing joys of earth and the lasting joys of heaven.[43]

To him was given dominion over all the life of earth and sea and sky.[44] And from the animals God has differentiated him, also, by making him of an upright stature which carries his head up to the heaven with which that part of his body is related.[45], [46]

The creation was completed in six days, and on the seventh day God rested. The reasons for the seventh day's being the day of rest Gregory does not relate, leaving such explanations to the mathematicians and "those who have time for such matters."[47] Now Philo begins his account of creation with a dissertation upon the number six and finishes with one upon the number seven,[48] and Gregory's remarks follow almost in outline form the eulogies of Philo. We know, as we have previously remarked, that Gregory knew Philo, and the general agreement between their accounts of Creation point to the use of the latter by the former. The direct quotations and reminiscenses of Plato prove only that Gregory had not forgotten his reading, even though he may have known scientific matter derived ultimately from Stoics. Why should we expect him to have merely copied scientific treatises to the exclusion of every bit of knowledge and culture which he had made his own in those early years of passionate reading in the Greek classics of which he himself has told us? Moreover, in setting side by side passages from various essays wherein like matters are treated, we have been able to see that we cannot suppose one essay to have been written with the aid of one handbook, another with another. That he used scientific treatises in certain passages of technical difficulty we may readily suppose (though that these were the books of any particular school or man we cannot prove); but his general opinions are deeply colored by Plato and the Platonists, and his exegesis of Scripture is suspiciously like that of Philo Judaeus.

The *leitmotif* of Gregory's exegesis thus far has been the division of the universe into the material cosmos and the intelligible world, which as we have already seen and shall later note again is τὰ ἐπέκεινα, the outside of the cosmos in true Platonic fashion. This intelligible world preceded the material world, but it, too, was created, in which doctrine Gregory departs from Plato under constraint of monotheism. Now the soul, as we have

seen, is regarded by both Gregory[49] and Plato as intelligible and immaterial and this fact was pressed by Gregory in discussing the seat of the soul. But the soul is in some way connected with the body and its creation has to be examined along with that of the body. Having adopted a primary intelligible world, Gregory would seem to be forced to assign the creation of the soul to that world and to consider its connection with the material as a kind of descent or fall. For this opinion he had two great authorities before him, Plato among the Greeks, Origen among the Christians. His chief objection to metempsychosis was the difficulty it seemed to him to introduce into the explanation of the origin of Evil.[50] Against metempsychosis he directs several detailed attacks, in each case prefixing a description of the theory drawn from the *Phaedrus*.[51] One of these, that in the *Making of Man*, is directed against the Christians who have subscribed to the doctrine;[52] the other [53] against the pagans themselves and in defense of the resurrection of the body, as being no less possible than the theories of the Greeks. The passages are composed not merely of haphazard recollections of reading in different books, but they contain certain ideas that could not have been found in any commentary, even a Stoic handbook, but were introduced obviously to strengthen the case against pre-existence. For example, in I 229 B it is said that the souls in the intelligible world live among the forms of good and evil,[54] which is introduced merely to allow Gregory to say that the doctrine implies that the intelligible world is the source of evil, the material world the source of good.[55] That the same soul can, in turn, be incarnate in man, beast, and plant means that ταὐτὸν τὰ πάντα[56] and that there is but one nature in existing things which is kneaded up in an indiscriminate mass.[57] The general description of the pre-existing state of the soul is, however, taken from the *Phaedrus*.[58] The troops of souls[59] are carried about by the motion of the universe[60] so long as they remain winged, but when, through swerving toward evil, they lose their feathers they are born in a body.[61]

The theory that the soul is younger than the body is briefly dismissed, also;[62] and Gregory takes a "middle" stand.[63] ἔστι δὲ

τοῦτο, τὸ μήτε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἀπάτην ἐν κακίᾳ τινὶ βαρηθείσας τὰς τῷ παντὶ συμπεριπολούσας ψυχὰς ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ συμπαραθέειν τῇ ὀξύτητι τῆς τοῦ πόλου κινήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καταπίπτειν οἴεσθαι.[64] μήδ' αὖ πάλιν οἱονεὶ πήλινον ἀνδριάντα προδιαπλασθέντα τῷ λόγῳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τούτου ἕνεκα τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι λέγειν. As man is one, consisting of soul and body, the beginning of his creation was one and single and common to all his parts.[65] The soul, then, is in the seed potentially, as is the body. Since it cannot exist before the body or come into being later than the body, the cause of both must be one.[66] Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐμψύχων εἰς ἀφορμὴν ἔμψυχον συστάσεως ἀποσπώμενον νεκρὸν εἶναι οὐ δύναται (ἡ γὰρ νεκρότης κατὰ ψυχῆς στέρησιν γίνεται. οὐκ ἂν δὲ προλάβῃ τὴν ἕξιν ἡ στέρησις.[67]) τὸ κοινὴν τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων συνισταμένῳ συγκρίματι τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδον γίνεσθαι, οὔτε τούτου προτερεύοντος, οὔτ' ἐκείνου ἐφυστερίζοντος.[86] Plato, too, in *Timaeus* 91 A–B had called the seed living (ἔμψυχον) and in *Timaeus* 43 A–44 D he speaks of the development of the soul after its enclosure in the body. But this development is a regaining of balance, a recalling to memory of the truths known before its incarnation, while Gregory has represented it as a real growth from potential soul to actual soul.[69] But simple traducianism could not suffice for Gregory, who was steeped in the doctrine of an intelligible world and an intelligible creation preceding the material creation. These two opposing concepts he attempted to reconcile by supposing the creation of a πλήρωμα of souls in the intelligible creation. The link between such a creation and the creation of soul by soul as body is engendered by body is, of course, a weak one, wholly insufficient even for Gregory's demands, and clearly demonstrates the absurdity of a cross between two philosophical systems. The creation of a definite number of souls in the beginning, as conceived by Plato,[70] and the incarnation of the soul necessitate the incarnation of these same souls, that is their entrance into bodies from without. Gregory remarks that it is necessary[71] to suppose an end to the process of the increase of the number of souls ὅτι πάσης τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ πληρώματι ἑστώσης, εἰκός ποτε καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον εἰς πέρας ἐλθεῖν οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς νοητῆς ἠλλοτρίωται φύσεως. The Platonic notion of the creation of a sufficient number of souls in the beginning was

adopted by Origen and there can be little doubt that it was under his influence that Gregory also incorporated it into his system.[72] But his animosity toward the introduction of the soul into the body made him alter this concept until it was meaningless. For the πλήρωμα of which he speaks can be nothing but a number which forms a boundary of human increase, and the souls themselves are not part of the intelligible creation. His attempt to ward off this criticism[73] by saying that the whole human πλήρωμα was created before the material world is meaningless. Either the individual souls are generated from other souls *in time*, in which case they are not part of the original intelligible creation, or they enter the bodies from without. Gregory's attempt, however, to refute metempsychosis and to escape the difficulties of creationism is the cause of this mixture of Stoicism and Platonism which is certainly his own. We have seen how Philo saw the incompatibility which must arise from such an eclecticism on this problem,[74] and we cannot suppose that any serious pagan philosopher could have invented it. For it was only the Christian thinker who could have needed something more than one or the other Greek schools offered for the solution of the problem. Moreover, Origen's silence concerning such a solution together with the obvious borrowing of part of this doctrine from Origen's πλήρωμα stamps the queer bastardy as Gregory's own.

IV

The Divine Nature

Why should the world have been created? Such a question is especially troublesome to monotheists and can be met by them only when they have both feet firmly planted in faith. Such was not always Plato's condition. He repeatedly insists that God can be the author of the good only and that some other cause must be assigned to the evil in the world.[1] But Plato's dualism was disregarded by the ancients—even as now it is—, for in his moments of poetic exaltation he assumes the more poetical mood of monism; and in that poem which so deeply

influenced all the ancient readers of Plato, the *Timaeus*, he assumes the goodness of the world and of its maker: *ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος.*[2] This "proof" of God's goodness deeply affected Gregory, for in it as in much else of Plato he found a means of associating his religion and this great philosopher, for the study of whom, though a pagan, he would find some excuse. *Τίς οὕτως ἄθλιος*—he says[3]—*ὥστε μηδὲ τὴν θείαν τε καὶ μακαρίαν φύσιν καθαρεύειν ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν φθόνον πάθους ὑπολογίζεσθαι*; and in II 1316 D he bases his argument for the participation of the Holy Spirit in the Creation upon the statement: *οὔτε φθόνος τῆς θείας ἅπτεται φύσεως.* God, then, created the world out of goodness, desiring all things to be like to His own perfection. So Plato; and Gregory also adopts this attitude[4] that God created the world not from necessity but from love. For this reason, too, was man made like to God. It is quite the opposite attitude which deduces the goodness of God from the goodness of His works.[5] It is on this avenue of approach that Gregory meets and adopts the "cosmological" proof of the existence of God. In the "Great Catechism"[6] he prescribes for the atheist the proof of God's existence *ἐκ τῶν τεχνικῶς καὶ σοφῶς κατὰ τὸν κόσμον οἰκονομουμένων*; and in the "Soul and Resurrection" (24 A) he follows this method. One looks upon a garment and supposes a weaver, he says, and conceives the shipwright by means of the ship; also in seeing a building the onlooker thinks of the hand of the builder, *οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον ὁρῶντες πρὸς τὸν διὰ τούτων δηλούμενον ἀμβλυωποῦσιν.* This argument was a commonplace long before the time of Gregory.[7] That the Stoics deduced from the order of the universe the necessity for "Providence" was nothing strange; Plato in the *Cratylus* suggests that the ordered movements of the heavenly bodies first gave men the notion of Gods.[8] The argument from the order of the Universe is used by Plato himself, notably in the *Laws* (886 A, 966 E). There is no use in seeking a source in such commonplaces. There is one passage, however, which shows us that Gregory was not following a Stoic. As when we view the heaven, he says,[9] we do not doubt the phaenomenon to exist, *τὸ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἐρωτηθέντες διερμηνεῦσαι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν φύσιν οὐκ ἔχομεν.* We can only marvel at

the sight of the revolution of the universe. And so also with the Maker of the Universe ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν οἴδαμεν, τὸν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας λόγον ἀγνοεῖν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα. Which statements are utterly impossible for a Stoic[10] and quite in accord with many well-known passages of Plato.[11] After the admission that we can know nothing of the divine essence, it is natural that characteristics should be assigned to God only in the spirit exemplified by the statement of Alcinous, who after giving Him certain attributes says λέγω δὲ οὔχ ὡς ὁρίζων ταῦτα ἀλλ' ὡς κατὰ πάντα ἑνὸς νοουμένου.[12] Gregory takes great care to point out[13] that the names applied to God are interpretative only of contingencies of the divine nature (τῶν περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν) but have no signification of the nature itself.[14]

Such descriptions, then, as Gregory gives of God are purely Platonic; they are generally colored with the language of the allegories in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* and guarded by the expression, "whatever God's nature really is." In the description of Moses' view of God it is possible to ascertain how thoroughly Platonic is the conception of Gregory, how thoroughly un-Stoic. Only the transcendent, ideal world truly exists;[15] nothing else exists completely self-sufficient, capable of existence without participation. It alone, the divine Being, τὸ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἀεί, τὸ ἀναυξές, τὸ ἀμείωτον, τὸ πρὸς πᾶσαν μεταβολὴν τήν τε πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἐπίσης ἀκίνητον. Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ χείρονος ἠλλοτρίωται. Τὸ δὲ κρεῖττον οὐκ ἔχει · τὸ δὲ παντὸς ἀνενδεὲς ἑτέρου, τὸ μόνον ὀρεκτόν, καὶ παρὰ παντὸς μετεχόμενον καὶ ἐν τῇ μετουσίᾳ τῶν μετεχόντων οὐκ ἐλαττούμενον. Here occurs, first of all, the doctrine of the *Republic* (380 D–381 C) that God is unchangeable, also the doctrine of the transcendent world as the only truly existing world (*Phaedrus* 247 C). All things else depend upon this ideal world as reality exists in the phaenomena only through participation in the ideas. This ideal world is the only truly desired thing (*Phaedrus* myth), and like the sun of the *Republic* is not diminished by those who partake of it.[16] This divine nature transcends every conception of Good, being itself the plenitude of goods and not good by participation.[17] The passages dependent upon Plato's argument against the possibility of alteration in the divine nature[18] are numerous, and it is this characteristic which Gregory most fer-

vently insists upon.[19] Closely connected with invariability, of course, is the attribute of impassibility. This Gregory maintains, in spite of the difficulty arising from the "passion" of Jesus.[20] The difficulty of the doctrine of impassible God who suffers in the body he tries to dissolve by a comparison with man who himself is a complex of soul—which being divine should not admit of passion within itself—and body. It is a sharp rejoinder; but it pushes the difficulty back a step; it does not solve it. We have already witnessed the struggles to explain how the soul can be simple and incorruptible while it is an active agency in the body.

Gregory has put to use the extra-temporality of the intelligible world also in his arguments concerning the eternity of the Son. In those vicious squabbles which centered about the question: "How can the Son be no younger than the Father?" he applied the dictum of Plato in *Timaeus* 37 D ff. that concerning eternal essences we should not speak of "was" and "is" and "shall be" but only of "is," for that which is ever the same does not become younger or elder in time. So Gregory:[21] *ἀλλὰ μὴν πατὴρ ὁ θεὸς, οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀϊδίου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἔστιν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο ἀλλ' ἔστι πατήρ . ἐπὶ θεοῦ γὰρ ὃ ἦν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. Εἰ δὲ τί ποτε μὴ ἦν, οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε ἔσται.* This division of the whole into two worlds, phaenomenal and intelligible, the basis of his whole theology and exegesis, throws him definitely upon Plato and estranges him everywhere in metaphysics from the Stoics and Epicureans.[22]

Before we pass to the attempt to strengthen the faith in a tri-une God on the basis of Platonic philosophy, we must notice one more passage concerning the unity and simplicity of the divine nature.[23] *Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἁπλῆ καὶ μονοειδὴς καὶ ἀσύνθετος εἶναι πεπίστευται (ἡ θεῖα φύσις) καὶ οὐδεμία πλοκὴ καὶ σύνθεσις ἐξ ἀνομοίων περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ θείαν φύσιν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ ἐν παντὶ θεοπρεπεῖ νοήματι τέλειον διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου συμπαρεδεξάμεθα.* For, he proceeds, the divine is, in every respect of goodness, perfect; and, in so far as it is lacking of perfection, in that regard and to that extent is it not divine, since the name of divinity cannot be reconciled with *τῷ ἀτελεῖ καὶ ἐλλείποντι καὶ τῆς ἐτέρωθεν προσθήκης προσδεομένῳ.* Aside from the similarities which

we have noticed previously (this Platonic definition of divinity, as it were, which can be conveniently compared with the tenth chapter of Alcinous) there is another element introduced in this passage, the suggestion of a participation in the divine without divinity, another point of juncture between Gregory and Plato. A comparison with the *Phaedo* (78 D) will show that Gregory is here proceeding from the division of the whole into phaenomenal and intelligible to the necessary connection of the one with the other. We have already had indications of this where he said of the transcendent essence ἀφ' ἧς ἐξῆπται τὸ πᾶν.[24] The nature of the divine essence must be in some way transmitted to the knowledge of man in the material world; how that is to be done we may already guess. For a moment, though, we must turn back to another problem of God's nature presented by the Christian dogma.

The Trinity, presenting the notorious problem of the One and the Many, suggests to one who has struggled to reconcile the unity of the soul with the affections the temptation of solving one mystery by referring it to another. Gregory, if he had not settled the problem of the soul, had at any rate squirmed past it and could now, upon meeting an analogous question, refer the catechumen to the solution "in the previous chapter." For the moment no thought about those objections to the partition of the soul ! Our soul has been shown to be the image of God. Why is God, then, not two-in-one or a quaternity? But the soul, His image, has been shown to be a trinity. For this reason even the heathen wise men[25] defined our soul as tripartite, saying that it has appetitive, passionate, and reasonable parts. So there are three ways in which the triple God works; the appetitive is the symbol of God the Creator (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία εἰς πρᾶξιν ἄγει), the rational of the Providence of God, the passionate of the paedeutic or punitive character of God. This use of the Platonic division of the soul to prove the truth of the Trinity is pushed still further. The mind is a part of the soul and so, like the Son, is not ungenerate, yet its generation like that of the Son, is ἄῤῥητος, ἀόρατος, and ἀπαθής.[26] The language of generation applied to the Platonic partition of the soul forms one of Gregory's two chief arguments for the Nicene faith against the heretics.[27]

But Gregory's more usual manner of explaining the difficulties of the Trinity is a refuge to the Platonic discussion of the One and the Many. The unity of God in Being and His trinity in the hypostases (*πρόσωπα*)[28]—he says—is to be explained by the concepts "man" and "individual men." Paul, Peter, and Barnabas are one man in so far as the concept "man" is concerned and according to the concept "man" they cannot be many. Likewise with regard to the three hypostases of God, we must not speak of three gods. *εἷς δὲ θεὸς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς διὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς οὐσίας ἧς ἐστὶ θεὸς σημαντικὸν, καθὼς εἴπομεν.*[29] That Being is at once One and Many was a favorite paradox. It is stated at length by Plato in the *Sophist*;[30] and in the *Parmenides* it is discussed with application to the concepts "man" and "men."[31] So Gregory maintains that the use of the plural refers not to the nature of humanity but to the individual characteristics of those who partake of the one nature.[32] The nature, however, is one,[32a] *αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένη καὶ ἀδιάτμητος ἀκριβῶς μονὰς, οὐκ αὐξανομένη διὰ προσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δὶ ὑφαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν οὖσα κἂν ἐν πλήθει φαίνηται ἄσχιστος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ὁλόκληρος καὶ τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη.* As in the discussion of the soul, we are swung back and forth between unity and division, and nothing more is offered us than fervent asseverations. Here is the language of Platonic monism, the unchangeableness, the indivisibility, even the Platonic *μέθεξις* of the speech of Diotima. And this solution by participation, tacitly accepted for all other things to solve the problem of the One and the Many, while it could not be accepted for the divine Trinity, is the real answer to be drawn from Gregory's language, a solution which would be rejected, if spoken directly, but accepted when removed one degree.[33]

Although the divine nature remains inexplicable to man, this nature, being shadowed forth in man, the image of God, can be adumbrated to the mind by self-inspection,[34] or by the ascent from the beauty of the material world to the beauty of the ideal world and thence to God Himself. These two processes correspond to the comparison of God to the soul of man and the "cosmological proof" which we have already seen Gregory put to use,

for both of which he could find philosophical support in Plato.[35] The language of imitation is more frequently used than that of participation, because of the Scriptural authority to be found in the "ad imaginem Dei,"[36] but the concept of participation is not entirely lacking.[37] In one passage, indeed, the two are blended,[38] and one is forced to conclude that Gregory had no clear idea of the manner in which the soul of man was related to God. It is in connection with this process of approaching God by self-examination that Gregory uses the figure of the microcosm, and it is this that Gronau has pointed out as one of the signs of Posidonian influence in him. But always in these passages there occurs an element which no Stoic, not even Posidonius, could have accepted and which Gregory could not have found in any of their writings, the sharp distinction between the sensible and intelligible world and the advance of the mind from the world of sensation to that of pure intellection.[39] In the essay on the Psalms, he speaks of man as a microcosm[40] and also of the celestial harmony of which the *νοῦς* becomes the auditor, but he continues by saying that this harmony is intelligible, not sensible; for the *νοῦς* in hearing it *κατ' οὐδὲν τῇ ἀκοῇ ταύτῃ συγχρώμενος αλλ' ὑπερκύπτων τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αἰσθητήρια καὶ ἄνω γενόμενος, οὕτως ἐπαΐει τῆς τῶν οὐρανῶν ὑμνῳδίας.* The likeness of the passage to the famous ascent of the soul in Philo (*De Opif. Mundi*, chap. 23) in this Platonic and un-Stoic distinction is seen at once by comparing the *ὑπερκύπτων τὰ αἰσθητήρια* of Gregory with Philo's words *πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν οὐσίαν ὑπερκύψας.* The relationship of man to God or to the cosmos is an ideal, intelligible one. This is even more emphatically stated in the essay on the *Soul and Resurrection* (28 C). We are led by the perceptive activity to the intellection of the intelligible which is beyond perception. And so glancing at the cosmos within us we are incited by the phaenomena to guess about what is hidden. *κέκρυπται δὲ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὂν νοητόν τε καὶ ἀειδὲς διαφεύγει τὴν αἰσθητικὴν κατανόησιν.* While Gregory uses, at times, the figure of the microcosm, he is consistent in treating it in true Platonic fashion, dividing man, as he divides the macrocosm, into a sensible and an intelligible world.[41] To the intelligible world he relates the intelligible in man calling this part

the man himself, the abiding thing, while all the rest of man, like the world of phaenomena, is flowing and changing.[42] So it is man's fastest stronghold, this knowledge of the true self, not to think in viewing some mere contingency of the self, beauty or reputation, power or wealth, that this is the self, but to look ever to that god-like part, the soul, which is most truly the man.[43] But it is difficult to know oneself, for as in the case of the physical eye which, seeing all else, sees not itself, so the soul busies itself with everything outside, but cannot look upon itself. Even as the eyes to compass this end must use a mirror, so the soul must look to its own image, or rather to that of which it is the image, the divine, and know itself from study of that.[44] This is, step for step, the argument of the *First Alcibiades* (132 D–133 C) which concludes as follows: *Εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρῴμεθ' ἂν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν καὶ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα ὁρῷμεν καὶ γιγνώσκοιμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.* Gregory follows the argument step for step and comes to the same conclusion; but, remembering that, according to Gospel, man is made in God's image, adds that here the reflection really looks to the original. And again he converts the argument, pointing to knowledge of self as the means to knowledge of God.[45]

Gregory's recipe for the knowledge of God and the intelligible world falls naturally into two parts, the gradual advance through the knowledge of phaenomena to the knowledge of the real and intelligible, and the abandonment of the material for reflection upon the real, most often expressed in the mystical figure of the flight of the mind from the material to the real world outside. But the two are linked in the common end of search, the immaterial world. The knowledge of phaenomena is merely a ladder upon which the mind rises into the transcendent; never does it form part of the end in itself.[46]

Upon this basis Gregory is inclined to interpret the books of Psalms and Ecclesiastes. Of the latter he says[47] *σκοπὸς τῶν ἐνταῦθα λεγομένων ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπερθεῖναι τὸν νοῦν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ παῦσαι καταλιπόντα πᾶν ὅτιπέρ ἐστι μέγα τε καὶ λαμπρὸν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι φαινόμενον. Πρὸς τὰ ἀνέφικτα τῇ αἰσθητικῇ καταλήψει τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερκύψαι κἀκείνων τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν λαβεῖν ὧν οὐκ ἐφικνεῖται ἡ αἴσθησις.* Here it is obvious

that the concept of the passage through the material to the intelligible is closely connected in the writer's mind with the *Phaedrus*;[48] and in his interpretation of Moses he declares "purity from the thoughts of marriage" to mean that one must leave below all material connection when one rises to the knowledge of the divine.[49] In that famous passage of the *Republic*[50] in which Socrates depreciates mere astronomical observation as "star-gazing" he defines the true astronomy as the study of the ideal patterns through the medium of the material heavens. This passage along with the discussion of mathematics which precedes it, the *Phaedrus* myth, and Diotima's speech form the background and source for Gregory's writings on the use of the sensible for the understanding of the intelligible. Quite naturally do these passages merit the honor of laying the basis for all European thought on the subject, for they are the first great attempts to connect the phaenomenal with the real, setting forth poetically this groundwork of Plato's metaphysics which is embodied in and is the doctrine of the Ideas. A certain amount of the poetical language was adopted by the Stoics and the Epicureans; but the kernel of the thought they did not take, for they could not have used it, since they had no two worlds to connect. The Stoic whose mind rises through the universe to survey the sights of all nature never passes beyond the sensible world because for him there is no other. He marvels at the harmony of nature, but it is always the harmony of physical nature. For him mathematics and astronomy are valuable because they instruct him as to the actual processes of the universe, not because they are stepping-stones to the region beyond the universe where dwells absolute Being. But for Gregory the sights of heaven, the lessons of geometry are but instruments or instructors whereby we are led to that which is above the sensible.[51] The audible words and the visible marvels wrought by God were for this purpose, also, that the heart, rejoicing with what was seen and heard, might be led through the phaenomena to the immaterial.[52] But the sensible remains ever the transitory and its whole use is the aid it may offer a man in his ascent to that which is beyond it. Here is the use, too, of those lower parts

of the soul. The appetitive inclination may be good or bad depending upon the end it seeks, and, by cleansing, it may be lifted above the objects of sense and lead the soul to that place "whither sensation cometh not" so that we shall not marvel at the beauties of heaven "nor any of the fairness of phaenomena;" but the sight of these things will but lead us on to the desire of the beauty above. So will the soul arise and come to the contemplation of that grandeur which is above the heavens.[53] The end of the search, then, lies beyond this world, beyond the glories of the material universe; the journey is the *ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα νοητὰ ἄνοδος* of Alcinous (chap. V), and is as far removed as could be from "die schwärmerische Bewunderung der Caelestia," which has been attributed to Posidonius. It is rather the feeling of the *Republic* (525 A ff.) that such wonders are but a propaedeutic, the sentiment expressed by Alcinous that "unless we thus proceed through and beyond these studies, the consideration of them becomes worthless for us."[54] The language of Gregory is obviously that of the *Phaedrus;* the desire of the soul to rise beyond phaenomena, and the beauty that lies beyond the heavens are too clearly Platonic to be missed. But that Gregory was well aware of the meaning of the myth, he expressly shows in another place:[55] *ὁ δὲ διὰ τούτων* (i.e. *τῶν αἰσθήσεων*) *πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὄντος κατανόησιν ὁδηγούμενος καὶ διὰ τῶν παρατρεχόντων τὴν στάσιμον φύσιν κατανοήσας καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος ἐν περινοίᾳ γενόμενος εἶδέ τε τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὃ εἶδεν ἐκτήσατο.* Here, as everywhere, the distinction between the two worlds is clearly defined, and the material world and its wonders are no more than a first stage in the journey of man's mind to its true goal, "the plain of truth," which is in the world of pure intellect, the world of God beyond this world.[56]

This is the more rational method of passing beyond the sensible, the proper use of the sensible as an instrument of the soul's progress, the use of the wisdom which is manifest in the order and beauty of the material world to recognize the existence of a super-sensible beauty and wisdom.[57] But there is great danger of never making the transition from the phaenomena to the world above, for the former can easily be admired and described,[58]

but the archetypal beauty eludes the understanding;[59] reason seems unable to bring it before our eyes. But the greater the difficulty is the more is our need for passing beyond the phaenomena "lest the intelligence fail utterly to partake of the good." And it is because of this weakness that the intellect requires guidance to the invisible by means of the sensible.

It is the appetitive part of the soul which impels it in this upward flight, just as that portion of the soul may turn it downward to the crass material. In this thought there can be no apter figure than that of love which Plato used in Diotima's speech. Of the prayer of Moses to see God Gregory says,[60] Δοκεῖ δέ μοι τὸ τοιοῦτο παθεῖν ἐρωτικῇ τινι διαθέσει πρὸς τὸ φύσει καλὸν τῆς ψυχῆς διατεθείσης ἣν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀφθέντος καλοῦ πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκείμενον ἐπεσπάσατο. So the lover of the fair, taking each appearance for a likeness of the desired archetype, longs to proceed on upward. This is the advancement of the lover to the true beauty which Plato has described in the *Symposium* (210–211); and this flight to the everlasting beauty demands an understanding of the nature of that beauty and an exclusive desire for it.[61] But once the soul has climbed up this ladder of sense and come upon the ideal beauty, the object of its love, it casts away and spurns all lower beauty,[62] apprehending immediately the intellectual and invisible.

Once it has been said that at any time and by any process the mind may comprehend immediately the intellectual world, it is an easy and natural step to reverse the process, to say that this height is attained not through the use of the senses but by the utter abnegation of all sensible. Already in the passage quoted above[63] the sentiment has inclined in this direction. The love of the ideal will lead the mind to the super-sensible world, but one conceives this love εἴ τις τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ἤδη πάντα καταλιπεῖν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα εἴτε σώματα εἴτε χρήματα εἴτε τὰ ἐν ἐπιστήμαις ἢ τέχναις ἐπιτηδεύματα . . . . κτλ. This is the speech of the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus*. In the latter dialogue[64] it is by conquering the inclination toward the material that the lover rises to the ideal love; in the former[65] the soul sees truth only when it makes inquiry by itself, for when it makes use of the senses it is dragged down to transitory material until it faints with dizziness.[66]

Consequently there is a tendency to change the meaning in the figure of the soul's ascent from that of a gradual progression to that of a flight to the intelligible not *through* but *from* the material. Of existent things, says Gregory,[67] arguing for renunciation of the sensible, part is material and sensible, part intelligible and immaterial. Of these the immaterial is situated above sense-perception to the extent that we shall then know it when we lay aside the senses. The sense, since it has the power to perceive the material nature, is incapable naturally of crossing the heavenly material and entering the transcendent world. . . . . The contemplation of the fair is somehow shaded by the sensible phaenomena. Here, first of all, is no talk of the use of the senses to attain the higher goal but only of the senses as an hindrance. The senses may survey—or the mind through their aid may survey—all things up to the highest heavens; beyond that the senses are useless. The region beyond is the world of transcendent reality—a phrase which throws us back upon the *Republic;*[68] and the final sentence—*ἐπισκοτεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν ἐμφαινομένων ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ θεωρία*—is an open reminiscence of the allegory of the Cave.[69]

The flight of the soul now takes on the character of an escape from the senses. The man so elevated in mind as to disregard sensation "no longer looks to earthly things but is wholly concerned with consideration of the heavenly."[70] This escape is then interpreted as death, which is the loosening of the soul's bonds, or as a kind of mystical ecstasy. The eye sees the invisible good through the soul;[71] the soul glories in its own beauty only when it is freed from connection with the mortal and earthly body. The flight of the soul is always conceived by Gregory in the language of the *Phaedrus*, but never is his mind more obviously playing upon that dialogue than in the passages which now come under our eyes. In III 352 C he explains the activity of the soul as due to its nature of eternal motion and bases its immortality and chance of attaining the real world upon this nature, a direct reference to *Phaedrus* 245 C ff., but by no means merely a copying of the passage, for while Plato uses this argument to prove merely

the immortality of the soul, Gregory links thereto the statement that the soul must and can move only toward the truth.[72] In I 1209 A the wording is so close to the *Phaedrus*, and the distinction between what one may call Platonic and Stoic ascents is so sharply drawn that it is worth while to look at the actual words. *εἰ πτερωθείημέν πως τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ νῶτα τῆς οὐρανίας ἀψῖδος σταίημεν, εὑρήσομεν ἐκεῖ τὴν ὑπερουράνιον γῆν . . τὸ γὰρ φαινόμενον ὅσον πρὸς τὴν σωματικὴν αἴσθησιν, ὅλον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ συγγενῶς ἔχει. Κἂν γὰρ ὃ μὲν ὑψηλὸν εἶναι δοκῇ τῷ τοπικῷ διαστήματι, ἀλλ' οὖν κάτω τῆς νοερᾶς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἧς ἀδύνατον ἐπιβατεῦσαι τὸν λογισμὸν μὴ διαβάντα τῷ λόγῳ ταῦτα πρότερον ὧν καθικνεῖται ἡ αἴσθησις.* The reference to the winged nature of the soul in the ascent and the words *ὑπὲρ τὰ νῶτα τῆς οὐρανίας ἀψῖδος* are obviously from *Phaedrus* 247 B–C; 246 E. Then follows what might be taken for direct criticism of Stoic ascents. However high you go, says Gregory, you never get above the world of material phaenomena which is below the world of the intelligible Being. The last sentence returns to the notion that the mind must climb through the phaenomenal world with the aid of the senses before it comes to that boundary beyond which it alone may pass. The same idea pervades I 1140 B ff. The passage begins much like a Stoic ascent, the passage of the *αἰθέριον κάλλος* and the stars, the wondering at *πᾶσαν τὴν διακόσμησιν* (which Gronau rightly points out as Stoic language). But what follows shows that Gregory has not deserted his Platonism. *στῆναι δὲ μηδὲ ἐν τούτοις ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν καὶ διὰ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν κινουμένων καὶ μεθισταμένων ἐκτὸς γενέσθαι καὶ καταλαβεῖν τὴν ἑστῶσαν φύσιν, τὴν ἀμετακίνητον δύναμιν κτλ.*, a fervent glorification of the world of true reality beyond this world. Such passages have been cited as Stoic by the simple device of cutting them in half;[73] the mere reading of the whole passage establishes the impossibility of their ever having been part of a Stoic book.

In the essay on the *Soul and Resurrection*[74] Gregory maintains that the nature of man is like to the nature of God since God attracts the soul and like is attracted by like. Because it is known from Sextus Empiricus[75] that Posidonius used the thesis of the attraction of like by like, Gronau has maintained that this

argument was taken by Gregory from the Posidonian Timaeus-commentary. Gronau cites III 173 D ff. and compares it with the statement of Sextus. Let us look at this comparison.

Gregory: *οὐκ ἂν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων γένοιτο ἡ (τοῦ θεοῦ) μετουσία, εἰ μὴ . . συγγενὲς εἴη τῷ ὀρεγομένῳ τὸ μετεχόμενον. ὡς γὰρ ὀφθαλμῷ γίνεται τῆς αὐγῆς ἡ ἀπόλαυσις τῷ φυσικὴν αὐγὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς ἀντίληψιν ἔχειν, . οὕτως ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μετουσίας εἶναί τι συγγενὲς πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀπολαύοντος.*

Sextus: *ἔλεγε . . ὁ Φιλόλαος (τὸν λόγον) θεωρητικόν τε ὄντα τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως ἔχειν τινὰ συγγένειαν πρὸς ταύτην, ἐπείπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ὅμοιον καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκε . . . καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται . . οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου.*

The reference to sight, no doubt, springs in both cases from *Timaeus* 45 C where Plato, in explaining the activity of the eye, says *ὁμοιοπαθὲς δὴ δι' ὁμοιότητα πᾶν γενόμενον*, but this is the only point of comparison. Gregory, in the sentences leading up to this passage speaks of the "inflowing and outflowing" of the bodily nature, a reference to *Timaeus* 43 A,[76] of the *μετουσία τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος*; and this passage is an explanation of *τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχειν*. When we note the occurrence of *μετουσία*, *μετεχόμενον*, and *ὀρεγομένῳ* in the quotation itself we can have no scruple in saying that it were impossible for any Stoic to have written anything resembling Gregory's thought or words. The passage is purely Platonic; and, though such statements could have been found by Gregory in other Platonists, there is no sufficient reason for assigning the source to anyone but Plato himself.[77] The notion that like is known by like was commonplace from the time of Empedocles, and that Plato held to the doctrine was to be found everywhere; while it was common enough to quote the verses of Empedocles in connection with a discussion of this doctrine of Plato.[78] Alcinous in chapter 14 assigns the doctrine to the Pythagoreans, but in chapter 33 he states as Platonic *τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ μετρίῳ ὄντι φίλον ὑπάρχει*. Plato himself in subscribing to the belief refers to it as an ancient commonplace.[79]

That man—or the soul of man—is like God because of the attraction of the latter for the former was also accepted as a Platonic doctrine in antiquity. The concept underlies the proof of immortality in *Phaedo* 78 B ff.; in 80 D it is said that the soul is akin to the immortal and ever-changeless Being; and in *Theaetetus* 176 C it is said that nothing is more like God than a just man. Alcinous (chap. 25) reproduces the argument of *Phaedo* 80 A ff. in such a way as to show that among Platonic commentators the likeness of the soul to God was taken as one of the chief proofs of its immortality. He says *καὶ μὴν ἡγεμονεύει ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει. τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἡγεμονικὸν τῷ θείῳ ἔοικεν ὥστε ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ ἐοικυῖα ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἄφθαρτος.*

That like is known by like and that the soul is like to God we can say are in themselves commonplace enough for Gregory to have found in any of the writers on Plato or in Plato himself. The context of the passages in which he subscribes to the doctrine shows clearly, however, that he was at all times under the influence of Platonic and not of Stoic ideas. But there is another treatment of the likeness of the soul to God which links Gregory even more closely with Plato. Hitherto we have considered only the doctrine of the innate, natural affinity whereby the soul is attracted to God, to which notion both Gregory and Plato subscribe. But both writers spend much more time upon the possibility of man's becoming like God through justice and piety. When Plato says that there is nothing so like God as a just man, he implies that since it is possible for man to be just it is possible for him to become like God. In the *Phaedo*[80] he argues that the soul of the philosopher must turn from the body and must welcome death as the short cut to knowledge and the divine life. The flight from the body, whether through ascetic living or through death, is, however, an *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ*. This notion is retailed by Alcinous and discussed at length by Plotinus, while Gregory uses it in his most important essays. *τῆς δὲ φυγῆς τῶν κακῶν ἐπίνοια*, he says,[81] *οὐκ ἄλλη μοί τις εἶναι δοκεῖ πλὴν τῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ὁμοιώσεως.*[82] *τὸ δὲ ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ὅσιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστι γενέσθαι* Elsewhere[83] the end of the virtuous life is said to be *ἡ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοίωσις*. It is for the sake of accomplishing this

approximation to God that there is need of purification of the soul,[84] which is to be performed through virtuous living and piety. The reminiscence of Plato seems to be one of words as well as one of ideas. In the *Theaetetus* (176 A–B) it is said *πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.*[85] Mere loosening of the soul from the bonds of the body, while it may be the instantaneous cause of the flight of the soul to God and the truth, is not so for most souls. Only the soul which has undergone purification during its residence in matter can expect this gift from death. This notion is common enough, except for the quirk given it by the figure of the virtues as purifiers, and this is Platonic; *ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις . . . . καθαρμός τις.*[86] I have said that the similarity between Gregory's words and Plato's here seems to point to the use of these very passages by Gregory. But there is, of course, no positive proof of such a direct lineage, for these concepts were evidently treated by all Platonic writers, if we may judge from Alcinous, who devotes a chapter to them, quoting Plato directly, and from Plotinus, who discusses them at length.[87] That Gregory read the dialogues in which they appear there can be no reasonable doubt; that he read philosophical handbooks we may easily suppose but cannot be sure. It seems to me safest, then, to assume that he acquired these notions from Plato directly; but it is certain that if there was any other source it must have been the book of a Platonist or a Neo-Platonist.

Rather more important than the fixing of the exact source is the philosophical importance of the translation of these Platonic doctrines bodily into Christian theology. True, there already existed in Scripture certain passages to which the pagan philosophy could be hooked and Gregory had been shown the way by Philo and by Origen, but he was the first Christian who successfully imported into orthodox dogma so much Platonism that one may say he invented the means of making Christianity an excuse for becoming a Platonist.

Gregory in III 88 C ff. gives up the terminology of "desire for God," feeling that desire is a passion and so is essentially

evil; instead he bases the flight of the soul to God upon the attraction of like for like. If the soul has been purified of evil, it will be with the fair, that is with the divine.[88] This is in accord with the speech of Socrates in the *Phaedo* (66 B–67 B): *οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης . . . . μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές.*[89] And finally the soul, having what it desires, the divine goodness, and desiring what it has, like God has neither hope nor any desire, since such things attach only to natures which lack the good.[90] The use of the famous passage in Diotima's speech[91] is obvious; this and *Republic* 380 D–381 C are ever present in Gregory's thought. Here, however, a casual reading will show that Makrina is copying Diotima's thoughts and language, even as Gregory meant her portrayal to be a Christian form of the wise woman of Plato's dialogue.

The divine soul has now been led home to its supermundane dwelling, its nature purified and simple and divine as it was at the creation of the purely intelligible.

V

Good and Evil

It has already been noted that Plato could find refuge in the dualistic attitude when necessary; if a monist, at all, he is so only as a poet. Consequently the so-called "problem of evil" did not greatly worry him. He can assume two opposing principles, one of good, another of evil, in the universe, as he does in the *Laws;* or he could say that the beneficent God had done the best in his power with a recalcitrant material, as in the *Timaeus.* But a Christian, even as he must abandon the Platonic notion of material co-existent with God, could not in any way adapt the method of Plato to the dogma of a God at once omnipotent and omniscient. He must construct a theodicy. When Gregory has come to this problem, one might expect that, had he been so inclined to Posidonius as Gronau would have us believe, he would adopt the theodicy of the Stoics. They had

worked out the solution that what seems evil in the world is really part of the whole perfection which man does not see and so does not understand; only human myopia deems evil the fragments which are parts of a larger good.[1] In the *Making of Man*, chap. 12, and in the *Soul and Resurrection* (III 89 ff.) Gronau has attempted to prove that Gregory is copying Posidonius, yet he fails to mention that in both passages Gregory discusses the nature of evil and in neither does he so much as mention the Stoic doctrine upon this matter. Both here and elsewhere[2] his answer is that evil does not exist. Following the Platonic doctrine that evil in some way attaches to matter, Philo had already called the material substrate the source of evil in the phaenomenal world, the non-existent.[3] That matter is the source of evil is truly Platonic; that it is non-existent is not correctly taken as Plato's view, but is a common misunderstanding of Plato's statement that matter is neither Being nor non-Being but something between the two, coming into Being only through external agency and capable in this way of becoming anything.[4] Plato nowhere, however, says that Evil is non-existent, nor can such an idea be consistently drawn from any combination of his various statements.[5]

Plotinus, in developing his theory of matter, denominated it not merely non-existent but also the evil and the source of evil in the world.[6] For as we have seen, for him the substrate is known to us as matter only because of its qualities which are not material but intelligible and so have no essential connection with it. But Evil itself is *στέρησις ἀγαθοῦ*; consequently Evil and Matter, both essentially privations, are the same. It is remarkable that Gregory agrees with Plotinus in calling evil *στέρησις* and also seems to follow Plotinus in the abstraction of qualities from the substrate.[7] However, this conception of evil was also adopted by Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus;[8] and it seems likely that Origen was the thinker who introduced the idea to the Cappadocians. In the *De Principiis*[9] he says: "certum namque est malum esse bono carere"; and in the commentary on John:[10] *πᾶσα ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστι ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐκ ὂν τυγχάνει.* The thought is ultimately Neo-Platonic, however; and that Gregory must have read

Neo-Platonic treatises upon the subject is evident from the similarity of his language to that of Plotinus and his use of Platonic figures in his treatment.[11] In I 724 D ff. he attempts to prove the non-existence of evil on purely Platonic grounds. The intelligible world and all in it remains ever in a state of Being. True Being is essential Goodness[12] and through itself grants the power of becoming and of permanent being to real things. This is the language of the doctrine of ideas and participation; he proceeds: what is ἔξω αὐτοῦ [which is "without participation in the good"] is ἀνυπαρξία for it is ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος. Evil is, therefore, outside of God, since its nature is not ἐν τῷ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν μὴ εἶναι, and so is ἀνύπαρκτος. The result is, of course, not Platonic; but the argument rests upon Platonic ground, the ideas (especially the idea of Good in the *Republic*), participation, the reality of the intelligible only; one is reminded of the doubts of the young Socrates[13] as to whether there are ideas of base or common things.

This passage—occurring in the exegesis of Ecclesiastes—is probably original with Gregory, constructed on the basis of his general Platonism. But most of his discussions of the subject bear a close resemblance to the treatise of Plotinus.[14] Gregory objects[15] to the question πόθεν τὰ κακά on the ground that Evil is non-Being and no such question has meaning with regard to the non-existent; while Plotinus begins his treatise[16] by saying that those who ask the source of Evil would be wiser to enquire first after the nature of Evil, since the result of such an examination would show not only its origin and seat but whether it really existed at all in real beings. Both writers take pains to show that good and evil are opposites, not in the sense that two phaenomena may be opposites, but as non-Being is to Being, as infinity is to the formal cause; that is, Evil is opposed to Good because it is completely lacking in Goodness.[17] Moreover, both are agreed that Evil being a στέρησις of Good must be a complete στέρησις.[18] The figure of disease as obstructing the proper use of the body is used by both authors also in this connection.[19] Gregory, however, departs entirely from the Plotinean doctrine here[20] and says that both Goodness and Evil are, like health and illness,

attendant states, a statement not only inconsistent with his usual doctrine but implicitly refuted in the same paragraph when he returns to the language of Platonism and talks of the "participation in the true light which we say is the life of the participant."[21]

This similarity of treatment in Gregory and Plotinus I do not believe to show any definite source for the former; but it does, I think, prove conclusively that he was well acquainted, whether by direct or indirect reading, with the treatises of the Neo-Platonists; else had he never chanced to make the same distinctions as Plotinus. Moreover, the presence of the doctrine of the στέρησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in the two passages mentioned above,[22] which Gronau would attribute to Posidonian influence, clearly disproves the possibility of their origin in a Stoic handbook or commentary.

But while the solution of Evil by the proof of its non-existence must have delighted the monotheistic Christian, certain of the connected doctrines of Neo-Platonism did not. We have seen that Gregory subscribed to the Plotinean theory of matter, for it seems to solve the difficulty presented by the Creation of the material from the immaterial; but nowhere does he draw the Neo-Platonic conclusion that matter is the original Evil. After all, while only the intelligible world may have real and eternal existence, Scripture definitely puts the creation of matter upon God; Gregory cannot attribute Evil to any work of the All-Beneficent. Moreover, he had discarded metempsychosis, the only satisfactory explanation of the ills and inequalities of this life; and he had discarded it for the same reason. For since the Scriptural account assigns the creation of the physical world to God—even if you take the stand that He first created an intelligible world—, no Christian can denounce this life as evil. Gregory attacks the doctrine of metempsychosis on this ground, saying[23] that if no man or any living thing obtains life unless a soul falls from above, and the fall is due to Evil, then Evil must be considered the origin of the creation of Beings. And if Evil and Chance are the impulses to life there can be nothing but Evil and Chance in life.[24] If we be sprung from Evil our lives must be completely bad. But, since everyone who is purified in soul

by reason,[25] desires to lead a virtuous life, it is obvious that Evil is not older than life, and that nature does not thence receive her impulse. So far has Gregory departed from his Neo-Platonic conception of Evil, and for such reasons. He must fix the blame for man's condition somehow upon Man himself; and this he does by reverting to the similarity between Man and God.[26] For since man was made in the image of God, it was necessary that he should be endowed with freedom of will;[27] and it was through this freedom that Evil came into being. Once, indeed, Gregory re-approaches Plotinus. The soul cannot will to be evil by nature any more than the eye can by its nature fail to see; but, like the eye, it may of its own will fail to see (ἐκ προαιρέσεως πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἐπιμύουσαν[28]). But more often he speaks as though the will of man actually created Evil.[29] God, at any rate, is faultless; and Gregory echoes Plato's αἰτία ἑλομένου with τοῦ ἑλομένου τὸ κακὸν ἡ αἰτία.[30] But besides the general references to Plato which pervade all these passages, the ἀδέσποτον ἀρετή,[31] the impossibility of God's causing anything but Good, the use of the language of participation,[32] Gregory attempts to incorporate into his doctrine the Platonism that no one sins (i.e. chooses Evil) willingly,[33] that it is lack of knowledge, misunderstanding, which is the cause of man's fall. Since, just previously, it has been maintained that man is like God, in order that the possession of a free will may be granted him and at the same time be made responsible for Evil, Gregory now must point out that man is at the same time different from God in order that Evil may be created by his choice. This he does by saying that the image must differ from its prototype, else would the two be one and the same thing. This difference lies in the relationship of creator to created which brings in its wake the difference between the unchangeable and that which is subject to change.[34] It was by mistaking τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι for τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθόν that man departed from his likeness to God.[35] If Evil were presented naked and unadorned with the appearance of Good, humanity would never desert to it;[36] or, to put it otherwise,[37] if man had from the beginning an infallible basis of criticism concerning Good and Evil and had been able to consider Goodness with the mind alone, we would never have become bestial[38]

through enslavement to unreasonable sensation. It is,[39] consequently, ἀβουλία which causes man to choose the worse in place of the better.

The inconsistencies in this patchwork of theories we need not here too curiously consider; but Gregory seems to see that, since the mind could not have been deceived by appearance before its connection with matter, the blame of this incarnation lies upon God. But God created physical man because He saw—being omniscient—that man would fall through his freedom of will.[40] The Enemy is also dragged in to deceive man; he was the ruler of this world in the intelligible creation and, becoming jealous of man, deceived him with an apparent good.[41] There is, at any rate, an honest attempt to explain the difficulties of the evil in the world created by a single God who is at once omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibeneficent. Evil considered metaphysically is non-existent. So much is Neo-Platonic. Ethically, however, it is a product of the free human will which chooses it through ignorance, mistaking appearance for reality. So much is simply Platonic.

Although Gregory took occasion to ridicule Plato's descriptions of the "Fall of the Soul," he was himself inclined to adopt the phraseology of the Platonic myths when not engaged in attempting to refute the theory of metempsychosis. The figure of the "Flight of the Soul," which we have seen Gregory use, and the Scriptural "Fall" of man made it easier for him to adopt this manner of speaking—and thinking—than would otherwise have been the case. The fall of man is constantly spoken of as a fall from the intelligible to the material world and a consequent loss of the knowledge of the pure truth,[42] as a turning of the soul away from the truth and the sphere of the intelligible which is its natural home,[43] the return to the intelligible as the concentrated exertion of all the force of the soul in its proper direction[44] to free itself of the sensible and attain to knowledge of the truth, while the influence of the myth of the Cave, the sun as the idea of Good, and the language of participation saturate Gregory's essays.[45]

It is in the tone of the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium* that Gregory insists[46] upon the location of the truly good and beautiful outside of the material world, upon the necessity of being freed from the body that the soul may return to this eternal home. It is there that man may finally look directly at the nature of the Good, not having to guess at it through phaenomena; yet even in this world the rays from that sun, penetrating the darkness, light up our lives with virtue and invite us to view the source of virtue, the idea of Good, itself.[47] It is an unconscious admission of Platonism to equate the idea of good with justice as Gregory does;[48] his general treatment of virtue bears out in detail this Platonic influence. He insists that there is really one virtue which includes all conceptions of good; and this virtue he calls δικαιοσύνη, while the so-called virtues comprised in it cannot be separated one from the other;[49] and at the same time speaks of courage, etc. as virtues which are means between vicious extremes. Plato himself had laid the foundation for this explanation of the "practical virtues," and it was then taken up and expatiated upon by the later Platonists.[50] The similar tendency to treat pleasure as a unit and again to speak of different pleasures seems to me to be taken from Plato. Once Gregory says[51] that pleasure is single τῷ γένει ὥσπερ τι ὕδωρ ἐκ μιᾶς πηγῆς εἰς διαφόρους ὀχετοὺς μεριζόμενον, apparently a reference to the *Republic* (485 D) where the same figure occurs. But more usually he is wont to speak of two grand divisions of pleasure, pleasure of the body and pleasure of the soul, and to insist that the latter is the only true pleasure and that one who has tasted it turns his back forever on the former.[52]

Upon the relationship that the soul has borne to the body during life depends, then, the condition of the soul upon its departure from the body, and this condition decides the fate of the soul in the "after-life." The aim of the soul is μετουσία τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ[θεῷ] καλῶν, which is achieved by the perfection of the soul's nature. This perfection may be attained by having no concern for the material goods and evils of this life, by purification from evil while in the body, or, in default of either of these two, by purification hereafter.[53] Now in the body the soul is often drawn by the senses to a connection with the body and is, as it were,

riveted to the material;[54] which, if it be the case, necessitates some force in extracting it from the vice of the material. This forceful dragging of the soul may be attended by pain, but this pain is incidental to salvation and is caused, not by the force of God, but by the attachment of the soul to the material world.[55] The complaint against this incidental pain arises from short-sightedness, for the so-called punishment is, in truth, merely a medical treatment of the soul; the wise man regards it as *ἰατρεία καὶ θεραπεία παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ*,[56] which is a favorite Platonic explanation used in the *Republic* and the *Gorgias*.[57] Utterly nullifying this argument, however, is the Christian dogma of the punishment of the body as well as the soul. It is obvious that in the majority of cases Gregory speaks like a Platonist who believed in the necessary cleansing of the soul; but now and again he recalls the fact that his Church requires him to support the dogma of the resurrection and punishment of the body. In that situation Gregory uses an argument which is hinted at by Plotinus: We are clearly a combination of soul and body; the soul without the body would not sin; therefore, the body must be punished as the seducer of the soul,[58] as well as for its sin in its own right. That this is incompatible with the doctrine of punishment as cure is not to be wondered at; after building up a philosophy of some consistency Gregory is again and again forced to relinquish it or abjure the dogma of corporeal resurrection.

We must so live in virtue while in the flesh that, once we die, we may have no concern for the things of the material world; for, otherwise, after this death we shall require a cleansing which will amount to a second death.[59]

In leaving Gregory's doctrine of the soul finally freed from the body, let us mention again, what has previously been discussed, that he insists upon the simplicity of the soul, its *ἁπλῆ καὶ ἀσύνθετος φύσις*, that from this he deduces the immortality of the soul,[60] an argument derived from *Phaedo* 80 but common among Platonists[61] and impossible for Stoics who called the soul *συγκείμενόν πως ἔκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος*.[62] It is immaterial and "has no community with the corporeal solidity of living bodies" but is connected with the body in some way which passes human understanding, and at death it goes to the immaterial, intelligible world which is its home.

So much would be clearly and consistently Gregory's doctrine were it not for the accepted Christian dogma of the resurrection of the body. One feels that Gregory was not happy when he came to this distressing problem which for him meant no less than the absurdity of hoisting the corporeal nature up into the intelligible world. It is not strange that a man who, like Gregory, could, at the least, understand the claims that consistency is likely to press against dogma, finding himself in this predicament, contradicts himself at every word. His first defense is a "tu quoque." After having spent his scorn upon the doctrine of metempsychosis, he attempts to bolster up "corporeal resurrection" by insisting that it is no more foolish than the doctrine he thinks to have disproved. Even the pagan philosophers agree with us, he says,[63] differing only in that they say the soul returns to a different body while we claim that it returns to the same one. How firmly can the mind of Gregory have believed in a doctrine which it could defend no more strongly? In the details of the resurrection he floundered quite as sadly. After death the soul remains in all the scattered στοιχεῖα of the body,[64] and again the soul is outside the στοιχεῖα after death and stands guard over them, recalling them to itself at the signal of resurrection;[65] the soul, again, bears an immaterial relationship to the parts of the body and so calls them out of the elements into which they had been dissolved,[66] or the soul recognizes the parts of the body because the body stamped its mark upon the soul during their conjunction in life.[67] For one, who has spent so much time adjuring men to avoid the material world lest they should need a second death to purge their souls of bodily attraction, to descend to such a materialistic explanation of resurrection while everywhere else abhorring a doctrine which contaminates the intelligible immateriality of the divine world shows merely how desperate he was to find even a bad explanation for the orthodoxy to which he was pledged. There is the same sort of violent contradiction in his thought concerning the time of the resurrection. Now it will take place in the "twinkling of an eye"[68] according to the Apostle's word; again it will not be instantaneous but will proceed from the more to the less credible, being gradually accomplished.[69]

Indeed, he practically denies in so many words the resurrection of the body. The resurrection is the return to the original state of our nature (which as we have seen was purely intelligible) in which man was θεῖόν τι χρῆμα. From the body the πάθη are inextricable; and once we have shuffled off the body we must not expect to find in that other life any of the states peculiar to the body.[70] It seems that Gregory has forgotten that it is this body that must be resurrected; as often as he can he is quick to forget and avoid that dogma.

I am constrained to touch for a moment upon a much discussed question in regard to Gregory's philosophy. The imputation of Universalism cast upon him has been hotly combated by Catholic writers. No doubt the intention of salvaging a saint is praiseworthy. For us, however, who are concerned merely with the philosophy of this thinker, it is more important to note that here, if not everywhere, Gregory was consistent and definitely stated again and again that "all things shall be in God" and that "Evil shall vanish into nothingness."[71] Not merely upon his faith in the goodness of God but upon his serious doctrine of the nature of Evil does this conclusion necessarily follow. In accepting it he committed himself to "Origenism"; let us say it in praise of him. But we may suspect that had this doctrine been already branded as heterodoxy he would have been willing to abjure intellectual integrity for the sake of conservative orthodoxy as he did in the matter of the resurrection of the body.

VI

Conclusion

Thus far I have attempted to trace the outlines of Gregory's philosophy, examining in their proper places such passages as would bear out my interpretation as well as those which would seem to link his thought or his language to the thinkers who preceded him. Once we have ascertained by a cursory reading that a man is learned in the literature of the Greek and Christian philosophy, it is absurd to entertain as a working hypothesis

that his own ideas are mere copies of some one book. A list of parallel passages made at random, moreover, will not be sufficient to establish such a belief, since it is possible and even more than likely that he has recast and adapted what arguments he has made his own by constant study to his personal beliefs and his original doctrines. For this reason, before it is worth while minutely to search for latent quotations, it is necessary to understand the general tenor of a writer's doctrine and to bear well in mind the unchangeable prejudices to which he has found it necessary to fit any doctrine which he might accept or develop. That this bears special importance in the matter of a Christian bishop goes without saying; so that we might reasonably expect all philosophy to be applied to the touchstone of orthodoxy and either be utterly rejected or recast to meet that test before it could be incorporated into his own system by Gregory.

It would be natural to suppose, therefore, that such philosophies as were fundamentally opposed to Christian dogma, though they may have been known to Gregory, could not greatly attract him. This alone should make us wary of supposing that Gregory could have had any sympathy for the materialistic and pantheistic Stoicism of Posidonius. If then we find in his work, words and phrases of Stoic origin, it behooves us, not to lift these words out of their contexts and by counting them up to decide that such a sum establishes a corresponding Stoical tendency in the writer, but to examine the whole passage and observe whether in such a context there could possibly have been Stoic origin or whether the words are not perhaps the common terminology of philosophy, Stoic in origin, no doubt, but by the time of this writing a part of the general vocabulary of all writers. Confusion has arisen in the study of Philo Judaeus because investigators have leaped upon "Stoic phrases" without considering the possibility of the use of such phrases by anyone at the time of Philo, whether a Stoic or not.[1] A careful examination of the passages which Gronau has excerpted from Gregory as indicative of Stoic origin has shown, I think, that, beyond ideas of purely physical science, there is not in Gregory a single idea compatible with Stoic doctrine, and that—so far as the physical science of Gregory

is concerned—while it may be Stoic, the assignment of any definite source is impossible, since it might be taught by any Stoic or might even be the general and common knowledge of any of the schools. Moreover, even if it were possible to assign a source for this body of knowledge, we should have no ground for supposing that the metaphysics, theology, or ethics of Gregory was drawn from the same source unless these branches of thought as developed by him were compatible with the doctrines of that source of his physical science; one might well take his biology from Darwin and be a Platonist none the less. More than six hundred years divide Plato and Gregory, and we may expect the latter to have been influenced by the advances in physical science while still being a Platonist where physical science was not concerned. The sources of Gregory's medical knowledge I have purposely not touched upon, first because it seems to me that the establishment of them, even if possible, could not even feebly enlighten this more important problem, and secondly, because a superficial study would be worthless and a detailed investigation is too vast an undertaking for my time and my interest. Gronau claims to have worked upon the problem of the source of Gregory's medical knowledge with no conclusive results, and Gregory's own words would lead us to suspect that much of his knowledge was drawn from personal medical observations and from conversations with physicians. If this be true, parallels, even if they could be found, would remain inconclusive evidence. If any source is to be designated for the sporadic Stoical phrases and figures which appear in this Father, it would be most reasonable to name Philo, who combined a quantity of Stoical phraseology with his fundamental Platonism, and who, we have seen, was well known by Gregory. As Gregory found in Origen and Philo the kernel of his method of exegesis, whereby he linked Greek philosophy and the Scriptures, so there can be no doubt that a certain amount of Platonism was transmitted to him through these authors. But it is evident from our previous investigation that Gregory knew Plato at first hand and knew him exceedingly well. I cannot lay too much stress upon the characteristic which I have constantly illustrated, the freedom

with which in various contexts he weaves together variously the different threads from the Platonic spindle. There seems to me no more conclusive proof possible of the contention that he was so well acquainted with the Platonic writings as to be able to refer to them from memory. The extent of this familiarity I hold to have been no less than its intensiveness, and an examination of the parallels in the foregoing sections will show how arbitrary was the decision of Gronau in his dissertation that Gregory "had used only six dialogues: the *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and *Cratylus*." No doubt, most of his references are to the first five, because they are perhaps the most striking works of Plato; and, perhaps, there are dialogues to which we can find no reference in Gregory. But I have pointed out references to the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Alcibiades*, *Gorgias*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Laws* which are as important as those to the other dialogues; and if Gregory read these there is no reason to suppose that he did not read all the works. Gronau's other statement in this dissertation to the effect that Gregory did not know or use any Neo-Platonic works, a startling thesis to maintain concerning a writer who was obviously a student of the philosophy of the pagans and who was in close sympathy with Origen, is amply refuted by the parallels to Plotinus which, I have carefully noted, while they do not prove a specific knowledge of the works of Plotinus, show positively an acquaintance with the arguments and doctrines of the Neo-Platonic school. It would be useless and absurd to maintain that Gregory did not use handbooks when he wrote; but I think that the parallels I have pointed out between Gregory and Alcinous, parallels which extend to certain deviations from Plato himself, show that such handbooks as he used were more likely those of Platonists than Stoics. But the strongest link between Plato and Gregory and the most important characteristic of the system of the latter for the history of Philosophy is the acceptance by him of the fundamental metaphysical ideas of Plato and his constant adherence thereto. Both Philo and Origen had accepted the Platonic duality of the world and had introduced into their Biblical exegeses the creation of the intelligible world as one apart from and preceding that of the

material world. This Gregory took up and carried further. Never does he forget or abandon this firm belief that the real world is immaterial, intelligible, and ideal. Of this world the soul is a part; there is its true home and, striving toward it, thither shall it one day return. Moreover, all the Platonic attributes of that world are reproduced in Gregory. It is beyond time and space, intelligible only to the mind, and the mind—in his stricter passages—even as in Plato is alone eternal. The material world is somehow a copy of that real world; it is an image of it and it partakes of it. As in the language of the *Republic*, God becomes the Idea of Good and man rises to God by participation in Him.[2] Again and again God is that in which the mind of man participates, while the meaning of the "communion" is neatly turned to support this doctrine of Platonism.[3] Parallel to the language of participation and in the same application is found the other Platonic method of connecting the ideal and material worlds, the figure of imitation.[4] This Platonic turn of speech is easily connected with the Biblical statements of man as the image of God and Paul's characterization of himself as the "mimic" of Jesus, so that Gregory can go so far as to say Χριστιανισμός ἐστι τῆς θείας φύσεως μίμησις. The constant use of these two Platonic figures is made even more striking by the application to Christ of phrases and figures which Plato uses for God.[5] So that at the end it seems that, but for some few orthodox dogmas which he could not circumvent, Gregory has merely applied Christian names to Plato's doctrine and called it Christian theology. These few dogmas, however, make of his writings a sorry spectacle. He has so far accepted and insisted upon the pure immateriality of the world of the resurrection that it is impossible for him to explain a physical resurrection, while to accept the latter on faith means the damnation of all his previous argument. But he does accept the dogma and even tries to account for it, although his account comes tottering to the gulf of complete denial. He has up to this point argued so successfully that his reader must reject either the entire argument or the absurdly unconnected conclusion. This dogma seems to have bothered him greatly. We cannot discover what he really thought

about the meaning of it or of any of the details of the process, for he contradicts himself at every point. But that he believed the dogma, there can be no doubt; and just here lies the key to his whole mental character. He would be orthodox at any cost of intellectual integrity and, surely, if the Church had branded the whole of his reasoning as heretical he would have assisted at the burning of his own works without a murmur. The fear of heterodoxy is always upon him and everywhere he guards himself by saying that this statement or this is not to be understood as in any way departing from orthodox dogma. The famous story of his attempt to reconcile his uncle and his brother by writing to Basil letters to which he forged the signature of his uncle is not to be passed over lightly as the ingenuous action of a great-souled and simple-hearted man. No doubt he could not endure to choose a side in the controversy, which action would have alienated one part of the family which had so cowed his nature, nor was he strong enough to stand aloof and genially neutral. He was afraid of all enemies unless they were already weakened strangers; and then could he show the scourging tongue of the righteous servant of the Church, pointing with one hand of scorn at Eunomius for using the arguments of Aristotle and Plato while with the other he filched from the same source. It may be that the trial from which he fled when they accused him of embezzlement would have been unfair (no doubt the charge was falsely trumped up by Basil's enemies); but he ran away; and his letters from his round of exile whine far too much. One could have excused curses and groans.

No, it all fits together too nicely not to reveal the character of the man who had twice to be driven into the service of the Church, who grumbled but submitted to his episcopal ordination, who walked constantly with Reason until Dogma turned aside and then sought to walk with both in opposite directions. He was the most learned and subtlest thinker of the Church, and if he was the most timorous it was just that timidity that had won him for the Church in the beginning. His writing illuminates his life as his life explains his writing. Only this strange double nature of the man can explain how he could have been at once

so penetrating in thought and so perverse in drawing his conclusions. It was he who saw in Plato the instrument whereby could be builded a Christian philosophy. Plato had known the temper of the blade of human knowledge and would not bend it to the snapping-point. Where the mind of man cannot go with Reason for its guide, he let it fly with Fancy; but he always warned his readers that of the Beyond he could tell only "a likely story." But one must be wise indeed to know the bounds of Wisdom's strength, and those who read Plato took the "likely stories" for the distillation of Reason itself. So it was that the rest of Plato was almost forgotten while the myths were mistaken for the true Platonism. Gregory went not so far. He knew the hard reasoning of the dialogues, and he used it; but the myths are more easily twisted to the use of Christianity, and so we cannot wonder that the references to them far outnumber the references to the rest of Plato. What a man knows to be beyond his power to know, of which he dreams, therefore, well aware that it is but a dream, can so easily be misinterpreted by others as the result of his poor reasoning that it is the handiest tool to use against him. It is in this spirit that Gregory makes the Platonic belief in metempsychosis, which he has to his own satisfaction disproved, an argument in favor of the resurrection of the body. Reason is, indeed, mighty for her own destruction.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

A full bibliography of works concerned with Gregory may be found in Bardenhewer's *Geschichte der Attkirchlichen Literatur* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1923), Bd. 3.

The references to Gregory are given for the volumes and pages of Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*, as are those for Origen. References to Philo Judaeus are by chapters in the Cohn-Wendland edition. Works to which reference has been made are fully listed in the notes. Special mention must here be made of several papers which are frequently mentioned throughout the text and notes. "Posidonius and the Flight of the Mind through the Universe," *Class. Phil.* XXI; "Posidonius and Cicero's Tusculan Disputations," I 17–81, *Class. Phil.*, XVIII, both by R. M. Jones, have been of invaluable aid to me; but a still greater debt is due to Professor Jones' review of Dr. Gronau's book, *Poseidonius und die Jüdische-Christliche Genesisexegese.* This review is printed in *Class. Phil.*, XII, January 1917.

For the help I have received from Professor Jones personally in my general study of Greek philosophy as well as in this special investigation I am anxious to acknowledge my indebtedness and to express my sincere thankfulness.

NOTES

I. Introduction

1. Vol. 2, 84.
2. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, V, ser. 2, 8.
3. "De Basilio, Gregorio Nazianzeno Nyssenoque Platonis Imitatoribus, Göttingen Diss. 1908."
4. Rupp, Julius, *Gregor's Leben und Meinungen*, 13.
5. Letters XI and XII.
6. Letters XIII and XIV.
7. Letter XIII.
8. *ὡς ἐπὶ καλλίστοις ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀνακηρυσσόμενος, τοσούτου τὴν σὴν μαρτυρίαν ἐτιμησάμην ἣν διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἡμῖν κεχάρισαι.*
9. The following I believe to be a complete list of passages wherein Gregory mentions Greek philosophers or philosophical schools by name.
10. III 21 B.
11. Makrina is represented as the ideal champion of orthodox dogma.
12. III 560 B.
13. See below 560 C 4.
14. See above 560 A 14.
15. II 952 B. C.
16. II 261 D 5.
17. II 265 B 10.

Notes—Section I

18. II 741 A: *'Αλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα κελεύουσιν ἀντὶ τῆς οὐσίας τετάχθαι τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ἐφόδων αἱ τέχναι. ταῦτα τῆς 'Αριστοτελικῆς τεχνολογίας τὰ κατορθώματα. Διὰ τοῦτο ἐλεεινοὶ μὲν ἡμεῖς κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οἱ τῆς σοφίας ταύτης ἀμύητοι.* And II 905 D 7 he calls Eunomius *ὁ φιλοπόνως τὴν 'Αριστοτελικὴν τῶν ὄντων διαίρεσιν ἐπιθρυλλῶν.*

19. II 805 C–D: *καταφεύγων ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ὃν 'Αριστοτέλης τε καὶ οἱ κατ' αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐδίδαξαν.*

20. II 805 D.

21. II 1048 B. C. See Jaeger's edition of the *Contra Eunomium*, I, 331, where is printed a fuller text of the passage than is found in Migne. *ὢ πῶς ἐνόησε τὸν 'Επίκουρον. εἰ τὰς σημαντικὰς τῶν πραγμάτων φωνὰς τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἀνατίθεμεν διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀμερῆ σώματα καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀτόμων ἀντεμπλοκὰς καὶ συγκρούσεις καὶ ἀποπάλσεις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατ' 'Επίκουρον λέγοντες ἐλεγχόμεθα. σιγάσθω καὶ ὁ προστάτης αὐτοῦ καὶ σύμμαχος τῶν δογμάτων 'Αριστοτέλης, οὗ τὴν δόξαν ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς φησι τοῖς τῆς ἐπινοίας λόγοις συμφέρεσθαι. ἐκείνου γάρ φησιν εἶναι τὸ δόγμα τὸ μὴ διὰ πάντων τῶν ὄντων διήκειν τὴν πρόνοιαν μηδὲ μέχρι τῶν περιγείων διαβαίνειν πραγμάτων ὅπερ οὗτος σύμφωνον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ἐξητασμένοις εἶναι διϊσχυρίζεται. οὕτως ἐστὶ κρίνειν ἐπεσκεμμένως δι' ἀκριβείας τὰ δόγματα.*

22. II 804 B.

23. II 748 C.

24. II 488 C.

25. II 813 C.

26. II 1045 C–D.

27 III 164 D. See *Republic* X, 615 C.

28. i.e. *Contra Fatum.*

29. II 164 B.

30. II 164 B–C. *οἷον δὴ καὶ τὸν παιδοτρίβην 'Ηρώδικον ὁ Πλάτωνος ἱστόρησε λόγος . .* See Plato, *Republic* 406 A.

31. III 49 C: *οὐκοῦν παρέντες τὸ Πλατωνικὸν ἅρμα καὶ τὴν ὑπεζευγμένην αὐτῷ ξυνωρίδα τῶν πώλων κτλ.*

32. III 49 C.

33. I 240 C.

34. III 829 B.

35. III 901 A. B.

36. There follows a passage which, given as an interpretation of the development of the Thaumaturge, reflects the refuge which Gregory made for himself when torn between his church and his pagan studies, and which outlines for us a character of the type of Cardinal Newman's. For Gregory consoles himself with the thought that human reason cannot find a first cause, that even the Greek science necessitates some kind of faith, that, therefore, his orthodoxy is true even by the standards of Greek philosophy. To a man who pines to reach this conclusion for his soul's ease, the gap between the second and the third propositions loses the terror of its immensity. Cf. III 901 C 2:*ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνεπίβατός ἐστι λογισμοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις τῆς ὑπερκειμένης φύσεως ἡ κατάληψις, τούτου χάριν ἡ πίστις ἀντὶ τῶν λογισμῶν γίνεται, τοῖς ὑπὲρ λόγον τε καὶ κατάληψιν ἑαυτὴν ἐπεκτείνουσα.*

Notes—Section I

37. I 360 B. C.

38. I 336 D–337 A.

39. I 329 B. Cf. *Theaetetus* passim; especially 210 b.

40. The use of phrases and figures remembered from Plato is common with Gregory. That these little quotations occur in non-philosophical passages establishes a basis for belief that he knew Plato accurately enough to quote him or imitate him without recourse to the writings of Plato himself or to hand books. Compare, for example, III 324 B: *τοσαύτη τῆς παρθενίας ἡ δύναμις ὡς . . . . μετὰ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων χορεύειν δυνάμεων* with *Phaedrus* 250 B: *σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῷ κτλ.*; III 397 B on specialization of tasks with *Republic* 369 E ff.; III 708 A: *οἷόν τι ποιοῦσιν οἱ κύνες τοὺς λίθους οἷς βάλλονται περιχαίνοντες τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἁπτόμενοι* with *Republic* 469 E.

41. The letter to Libanius, XIII.

II. The Soul

1. Greg. III 49 C: . . . . *δι' ὧν ἁπάντων τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς φιλοσοφεῖ δι' αἰνίγματος.*

2. *Poseidonius und die Jüdische-Christliche Genesisexegese*, 244.

3. *Loc. cit.;* "spricht jedoch auch hier seine Anschauung nur in einem Vergleiche der Seele mit dem Meergott Glaukos aus."

4. *τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχήν.*

5. III 56 C.

6. But with a strange conclusion. He thinks that the agreement shows not that Gregory took this figure from Plato but from a source which quoted Plato, and leaps to the conclusion—usual for him—that that source was Posidonius, for which his only reason seems to be that in the *Timaeus* 41 D Plato uses the figure *ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες.* From this he concludes that Posidonius in commenting on the latter passage (in that famous commentary next to nothing of which is left to us) quoted the former and gave his own theory that the passions and desires are *δυνάμεις* of the *ἡγεμονικόν* rather than parts of the soul. There is nothing in Gregory's statement which does not spring directly from the *Republic* passage save the phrase *τοῦ διανοητικοῦ μέρους . . . . ἐκφυόμεναι.* But certainly *ἐκφυόμεναι* cannot come from a Posidonian explanation of *δυνάμεις* and, if it could, these "growths" would not be growths from the *διανοητικὸν μέρος* (the word *μέρος*, of course, in itself refutes a Posidonian source) but from the *ἡγεμονικόν* of which all the manifestations of life are *δυνάμεις.* Moreover the fact that Gregory says that they seem to be parts *διὰ τὸ προσπεφυκέναι* shows definitely that he accepts Plato's explanation here.

7. II 224 A–B.

8. I 361 C–D.

9. We are forced to consider these really irrelevant matters by the campaign of Gronau to enlist Gregory, too, under the shadowy banner of Posidonius.

Notes—Section II

10. Let us here note the manner whereby Gronau proceeds to his proof in the entire book cited above. By comparing Gregory's work with Cicero's *Tusculans* (and pointing out that one or the other rearranged the original) he decides that both copied the same source. This source he makes Posidonius on the ground of Schmekel's decision that the *Tusculans* I has that source. This work of Schmekel is definitely disproved after careful examination by R. M. Jones (*Class. Phil.*, XVIII, July 1923). With regard to our present contention compare p. 224 of this article.

11. So, for convenience, we continue to call this work of Albinus.

12. The expression *κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις* has not, of course, the Posidonian meaning. It refers merely to the functions of the different parts of the soul. Yet the origin of the Posidonian idea can be found in Plato, who does speak in *Philebus* 58 D of *τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν.* In *Republic* 358 B he inquires as to the power (*δύναμις*) of justice and injustice *in the soul.* Gronau himself quotes *Timaeus* 71 B *τῶν διανοημάτων ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ φερομένη δύναμις.*

13. III 404 D.

14. I 477 B–C.

15. We still fail to find the Posidonian *δυνάμεις.*

16. *Republic* 443 D–44 B; *Timaeus* 90 C–D. Especially *Republic* 591 D: *ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα συμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος φανεῖται.* For the language see *Laws* 708 D: *τὸ δὲ συμπνεῦσαι καὶ καθάπερ ἵππων ζεῦγος καθ' ἕνα εἰς ταὐτόν . . . . συμφυσῆσαι.* This last is interesting as showing how Plato himself could apply his image to something other than the soul. But the passages are too many to enumerate.See also *Laws* 696 C where the wise man is he whose *pleasures* and *pains* are consonant with and obedient to right reason. *Laws* 731 B: *τοῦτο δὲ ἄνευ θυμοῦ γενναίου ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀδύνατος δρᾶν. Republic* 411 E (where however only a single division is made). A typical outline of this Platonic doctrine is to be found in Alcinous, chapter 29, to which we shall refer later.

17. I 1216 C.

18. I 692 C.

19. Along with the two passages just cited I note the passage from the essay on Ecclesiastes I 705 D: *ὅταν ὁ θυμὸς ἔνδοθεν ἐκμύζων, ἢ διὰ τῆς μνησικακίας τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν τόνον καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐκνευρίζων, ἢ τὸ τοῦ φθόνου θηρίον, ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἡ κακὴ δίαιτα ζωογονήσει. ὁ αἰσθόμενος ὅτι θηρίον τρέφει ἔνδοθεν ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ, εὐκαίρως χρήσεται τῷ ἀναιρετικῷ τῶν παθῶν φαρμάκῳ.* This passage was referred by Gronau in his Dissertation to the *Phaedrus* myth. I am sure it is rather a reminiscence of *Republic* 589.

20. The idea of scholars that no author could write a sentence without a "source" at his elbow is, I suppose, drawn from their own experience. Gronau, for example, seems to delight in the statement (wholly lacking in substantial evidence): "Ihm [i.e. Gregory] werden wir in der ganzen Auseinandersetzung über die *ἀθανασία τῆς ψυχῆς* kaum mehr als das dialogische Arrangement und von den christlich-dogmatischen Bemerkungen auch nur einige wenige zuzuschreiben haben" (251).

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21. Here, too, the word ὁρμή is not used. First the vague ὅσα, "whatever things" appears with no definite antecedent, and this is replaced by τι τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κινημάτων where ὁρμῶν would be expected. (Moeller, "De Hominis Natura," p. 40 note, first pointed out that τῆς ψυχῆς should be taken with ὅσα not with ἐν μεθορίῳ; that the κινήματα are said to be ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ proves the correctness of this view.) III 57 C.

22. The word ὁρμή is used also in this sense by Platonic commentators. See Timaeus Locrus 102 E–103 A; Alcinous, chap. 31.

23. Ἀκύλας: ἡ περὶ ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς, Jena Dissertation, 1888.

24. Posidonius did not believe the soul to be eternal. See R. M. Jones' article, *Class. Phil.*, XVIII, July 1923, 216.

25. III 60 C–61 A.

26. *Timaeus* 70 E.

27. Compare Origen I 126 A: Nos homines animal sumus compositum ex corporis animaeque concursu. Hoc enim modo habitare nos super terram possibile fuit.

28. *Phaedo* 79 C–D; 80 E; 82 D–83 C.

29. III 61 A; In I 1233 B. C. the inclinations have definite moral value; the fate of a man depending upon which of them τὴν ῥοπὴν ἔχει.

30. In his essay on *Virginity* Gregory expresses the attitude of the *Phaedo* with all forcefulness. There he speaks of all bodily activity as soiling the soul and prescribes as the only defense (III 348 A) ὡς ἔστι δυνατόν, χωρισθῆναι τῆς πρὸς πάντα τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμπαθῆ τε καὶ σάρκινον ὁμιλίας. μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ συμπαθείας ἔξω γενέσθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ κατὰ σάρκα βιοὺς, ὑπεύθυνος γένηται ταῖς ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς συμφοραῖς. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ μόνῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ζῆν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὴν τῶν ἀσωμάτων δυνάμεων πολιτείαν.

31. Their indeterminate quality is necessary (or excused) in view of the doctrine of free-will. How they came to be so frequently misused we shall consider under the origin of Evil.

32. This is the favorite interpretation of the Bible passage that man shall rule the ἄλογα and shows how Gregory turned Plato to account in explaining Scripture (see *Phaedrus* 254 E; *Republic* 589). Like many of the Platonic interpretations of Scripture in Gregory, this seems to have come, directly or indirectly, from Philo. See *Leg. All.* II, chap. 4

33. Here occurs another application of the figure of the *Phaedrus*. εἰ δὲ ἀποβάλοι τὰς ἡνίας ὁ λόγος καὶ οἷόν τις ἡνίοχος ἐμπλακεὶς τῷ ἅρματι κατόπιν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σύροιτο κτλ. For the same figure in a like context and with remarkable resemblances of detail not to be found in Plato's account see Philo. *De Agric.* 16.

34. II 224 C–225 A.

35. Again these are treated as *parts* of the soul.

36. Here is inserted a direct reminiscence of Diotima's speech (see *Symposium* 211) εἴ τις ἐν ἡμῖν ἐρωτικὴ δύναμίς τε καὶ διάθεσις, ἐκεῖ κατασχολεῖσθαι πᾶσαν, ἐν τῷ πεπεῖσθαι μηδὲν ὀρεκτὸν εἶναι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἄλλο πλὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς κτλ. There is a tendency in Gregory's mind to fuse the *Phaedrus* myth with the doctrine of the *Symposium*, which is not unnatural since the last part of the myth (with its application) approaches the manner as well as the matter of the speech of Diotima.

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37. The reason guides and governs the horses of the lower soul, but it is only with their aid that it "climbs above the arch of heaven" or sinks to the baser world.

38. Besides those passages cited above (note 16) see *Republic* 441; 571 E–572 A; 586 E–587. The doctrine was current in the outlines of the commentators, too. See Alcinous, chap. 29.

39. III 389 D; for the harmony of the parts of the soul: I 1161 C–D. Compare *Timaeus* 89 E–90.

40. Book II *passim*, Book III 404 A especially.

41. I 353 C.

42. See notes on Gregory III 61 A, above. Also note Philo's mention of passions and senses as aids of the soul, *Leg. All.* II, chap. 4.

43. And that too in the "Soul and Resurrection" where Gronau would find Posidonius.

44. III 53 C. Insensibly Gregory slips into a mode of expression which is applicable only to a partitioned soul. But the fault lies in the nature of the problem; he has to keep a middle course between a soul which is *παθητική* and one which is *τριμερής*, a feat, so far as I know, impossible. But the point is that he recognizes the danger of either alternative and attempts to escape between.

45. III 57 A.

46. Compare the Sānkhya theory of the soul.

47. Gregory's statement (III 53 D) *Δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπιθεωρουμένων ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη τῆς φύσεως ὄντα καὶ οὐκ οὐσία*, in which he seems to make the soul *παθητική* comes not from Posidonius but from the logical result of a too literal acceptance of the *Timaeus*. See Alcinous, chap. 16 *τὰ πάθη ἀπὸ σώματος προσφύσεται θνητά . . . . αἰσθήσεις . . . . ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, φόβος τε καὶ θυμός κτλ.*

48. I 176 B: *ἡ μέν ἀληθής τε καὶ τελεία ψυχὴ μία τῇ φύσει ἐστιν, ἡ νεορά τε καὶ ἄϋλος, ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῇ ὑλικῇ καταμιγνυμένη φύσει.*

49. I 152 B ff. Compare *Phaedo* 79 C.

50. *Phaedo* 80 B; Gregory I 156 A–B.

51. That this part alone was meant by the phrase "in his own image" will later be shown.

52. I 176 D–177 A: *οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ νοερῷ τε καὶ λογικῷ τὸ τέλειον ἐχούσης, πᾶν ὃ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὁμώνυμον μὲν εἶναι δύναται τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐ μὴν καὶ ὄντως ψυχὴ ἀλλά τις ἐνέργεια ζωτικὴ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς κλήσει συγκεκριμένη.* When this is compared with the speech of the Demiourgos (*Timaeus* 41 C) the likeness not merely of ideas but of words is striking: *καὶ καθ' ὅσον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον εἶναι προσήκει, θεῖον λεγόμενον ἡγεμονοῦν τε ἐν αὐτοῖς . . . . παραδώσω. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες.* The persistence of this handy figure for explaining a really incomprehensible relationship is seen in the language of the commentators. E.g., Alcinous, chap. 33: *ψυχὴν παραλαβόντες ἀθάνατον . . . . δύο αὐτῇ προσέθεσαν μέρη θνητά.*

53. Proklus III 311 A: *μόνον τε τὸν νοῦν ἀθάνατον διατηροῦντες* (i.e certain of the Platonic commentators) *ὡς μόνον καὶ μένοντα καὶ ὁμοιούμενον τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ μὴ*

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φθειρόμενον, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιότεροι καὶ ἕπεσθαι τῇ λέξει κρίναντες, δι' ἧς ὁ Πλάτων φθείρει τὴν ἄλογον, θνητὴν αὐτὴν καλῶν, τοὺς Ἀττίκους λέγω καὶ Ἀλβίνους καὶ τοιούτους τινάς.

54. Cf. Alcinous, chap. 23.

55. Chalcidius 230 (quoted by Gronau to show that Posidonius attributed this doctrine to Plato) must be read in conjunction with 231. While 230 reads "Censet [i.e. Plato] eam per omnes artus ac totum corpus meare etc.," the word "eam" refers not to every part of the soul but only to the whole soul proportionately to the whole body; i.e., some part of the soul is present in every part of the body. But that the νοῦς was present in any part but the head, the next paragraph denies: "Rationabili velut arx corporis et regia utpote virtuti, quae regali quadam eminentia praestet, id est domicilium capitis in quo habitet animae principale, ... *purum separatumque* ab ea, quae cibo alimentisque nascatur, inluvie."

56. When Gronau says "Trotzdem nimmt er III 605 D und I 828 A ohne Bedenken das Herz als Seelensitz an," he is at least misleading. In the latter passage Gregory calls the heart the source of the warmth in us which spreading thence through the arteries warms and enlivens the limbs of the body (see *Timaeus* 70). Ἡ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ παραδεξαμένη refers to the "bride" and τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ is certainly not a synonym for "heart" here, as a glance at the sentence will show. In the former passage, he does say that the ἡγεμονικόν is in the heart; but he does so in order to interpret a passage of Scripture.

57. I 153 C.

58. Plotinus IV 3, 8.

59. Plotinus IV 9, 1: Ἆρ' ὥσπερ ψυχὴν ἑκάστου μίαν φάμεν εἶναι, ὅτι πανταχοῦ τοῦ σώματος ὅλη πάρεστι · καὶ ἔστιν ὄντως τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον μία οὐκ ἄλλο μέν τι αὐτῆς ὠδί, ἄλλο δὲ ὠδὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα.

60. I 161 B: ὁ νοῦς δι' ὅλου τοῦ ὀργάνου διήκων καὶ καταλλήλως ταῖς νοητικαῖς ἐνεργείαις, καθὸ πέφυκεν, ἑκάστῳ τῶν μέρων προσαπτόμενος ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένων τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐνήργησεν. That this is the same as Chrysippos' statement (quoted by Gronau, p. 180, note) I do not see. Chrysippos (Galen, *De Placitis Hipp. et Plat.* Book III 287–8) says the soul is πνεῦμα παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον but he apportions part of the soul to each sense organ (ταύτης οὖν τῶν μέρων ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένων μορίῳ κτλ.) while Gregory certainly does not relate certain parts of the soul to various sense organs.

61. See Lactantius, chap. XVI 12: Sive etiam mentis locus nullus est sed per totum corpus sparsa discurrit, quod et fieri potest et a Xenocrate Platonis discipulo disputatum est, siquidem sensus in qualibet parte corporis praesto est; nec quid sit mens nec qualis intelligi potest, cum sit natura eius . . . subtilis ac tenuis. Gronau rightly compares with the last clause Gregory I 156 B to the effect that the essence of the νοῦς is incomprehensible and that its nature escapes our understanding; but this is in itself proof that he could not have procured his doctrine from a Stoic source where obscurity as to the nature of the soul is entirely out of place (see Jones, *op. cit.*) This maintenance of the ignorance of man concerning himself and the world is a frequent motif. See II 945 D: ὅθεν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ πάντων διάγομεν πρῶτον ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες οἱ ἄν-

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θρωποι ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα. Whereupon follow rhetorical questions concerning the soul and the universe. Jaeger notes here: "haec omnis disputatio neoplatonicorum de animae facultatibus sapit librum." For a discussion of similar passages in Philo which have been wrongly attributed to Posidonian influence see Jones, *Class. Phil.*, XXI, April 1926, 101–104. In the same spirit is II 828 A which Jaeger refers correctly to Philo's "*De migratione Abrahami*, chap. 24."

62. I 176 B.

63. See also Plotinus III 9, 1 and IV 3, 4.

64. Gregory I 152 B–153 D; Plotinus IV 3, 19.

65. *De Hominis Opificio*, chap. 11.

66. IV, 9, 5.

67. Gregory's use of the figure of the soul as a workman whose tool is the body goes back to Plato, *I Alcibiades* 130 A. The parallels cited by Gronau show only that the figure was a commonplace. Nor does he mention Plotinus' use of it I 1, 3. Plotinus IV 3, 23 is closer to Gregory's use than most passages: κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀργάνου πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἐπιτηδειότητα δύναμιν τὴν προσήκουσαν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἀποδιδοῦσαν . . πρὸς γὲρ ταύτην τὴν ἀντίληψιν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον τῇ ψυχῇ παρεῖναι.

68. I 177 B.

69. IV 3, 20 ff.

70. In his section on sleep, it may be that there is some Stoic material, though in what way this came to him is uncertain. The presence of the words τόνος, ἄνεσις, and others of the same figure in the explanation of Sleep and Waking seems to show at least an admixture of Stoic doctrine in Gregory's sources. But these Stoic words and figures are imbedded in another treatment of the matter which is founded in the continual flow and counterflow, depletion and replenishment of the body's material which is definitely a Platonic notion (*Timaeus* 80 D–81; 43 A; τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίῤῥυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόῤῥυτον [note also *Timaeus Locrus* 101 D–102 B where in his explanation of this doctrine the word ἀνατείνεται occurs.] These passages from Gregory (I 165 A and III 141 C) I believe to be more closely related to the *Timaeus* passages here cited than to the *Cratylus* 402 A to which Gronau has referred them). Now this is the sort of thing which causes Gronau to refer the origin of a passage to Posidonius on the ground that any reference to the *Timaeus*, especially if colored by Stoic words, must have come from the Posidonian Timaeus-Commentary. But here there are definitely non-Stoic ideas also, such as the use made of τῶν αἰσθητηρίων πόροι (see Jones, *Class. Phil.*, XVIII, 212). Most important, the aim of Gregory in the passage is to show that dreams are to be referred not to the νοῦς but to the unreasonable part of the soul, quite the contrary of the Posidonian notion (Cicero *De Divinatione* I 30, 64; I 49, 110; I 51, 115) and exactly the doctrine of Plato (*Timaeus* 71 D–72 B).

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III. Creation

1. III 121 B–124 D.

2. III 124 A ὅπερ δὴ καὶ Μανιχαῖοι . . . καί τινες τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγμα τὴν φαντασίαν ταύτην πεποίηνται, an obvious reference to the doctrine of the *Timaeus*, as the phrase ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπερκειμένης οὐσίας . . . . is of *Timaeus* 35 A where the creation of the soul is described.

3. I 212 B; I 68 D ff.

4. Neither does he adopt the argument of Origen I 185 B ff. that the fitness of matter for the fulfillment of its task shows that God created it. The fragment of Philo in Eusebius, *Prep. of the Gospel* VIII, chap. 21, bears a resemblance to Origen's explanation.

5. With regard to the contention that the use of σπερματικοὶ λόγοι occurring in this doctrine proves a Stoic source, let it be noted (1) that the intelligible world first created is looked upon by God (i.e., it is really a pattern of the material world, not the source of it), (2) that the λόγος is equated with the σοφία of God which is manifested in the created phaenomena, (3) that the passage quoted for σπερματικοὶ λόγοι (I 77 D) says that all things were present in God's first impulse toward creation οἱονεὶ σπερματικῆς τινος δυνάμεως πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν καταβληθείσης; this does not necessarily mean that the principles of development are sown in the phaenomena themselves. Nor does the existence of the terminology here prove a Stoic source. The σπερματικοὶ λόγοι play in Plotinus' system a far greater part than in Gregory's. See Zeller III, 2, 609 ff; but, while the language of Gregory is vague, I hold it for certain that the λόγος is not immanent, for him, but transcendent. For discussions of Philo's use of λόγοι and the weight to be given Stoic influence see Jones: . . . Ideas as the Thoughts of God, . . . *Class. Phil.*, XXI, October 1926, and Billings: *Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, 44.

6. I 69 C; I 212 D–213 C; III 124 C–D.

7. I 185 A–B. See the view of the Platonic schools, Alcinous, chaps. 8, 11.

8. Baeumker, *Problem der Materie*, 403 ff.

9. II 337 B.

10. ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ἐδείχθη παρὰ τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοσοφεῖν εἰδότων μηδεμίαν δύνασθαι διαφορὰν ἐννοῆσαι ἐάν τις αὐτὴν ψιλώσας καὶ ἀπογυμνώσας τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων ποιοτήτων τε καὶ ἰδιωμάτων αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐξετάζῃ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον.

11. See Billings, *op. cit*, 25, for the use of the Stoic term οὐσία in non-Stoic passages in Philo. Below in II 337 C 6 Gregory uses a common Stoic simile to illustrate substrate and quality. Compare Arnim, *Frag. Stoic.* 153, 8; 155, 30; 156, 20 (quoted by Gronau).

12. I 1312 A. Here the words ὕλη and οὐσία are joined in the meaning of "matter."

13. II 329 B: ὁμολογηθήσεται (μὴ εἶναι Jaeger) τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναφυόμενον. ὅταν γὰρ αὐτό τι μὴ ᾖ, πῶς ἕτερον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὑποστήσει;

14. II 357 B ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς πρώτης φύσεως τῆς πᾶσαν μὲν χρονικὴν ἔννοιαν ὑπεραιρούσης κτλ. Compare *Timaeus* 38 A.

15. II 365 D ff.

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16. An examination of the note on this passage in Paul Shorey's *Unity of Plato's Thought*, 38, will show how closely Gregory has followed this doctrine of the *Timaeus*.

17. II 1321 B.

18. I 700 B–D; *Timaeus* 37 D, 38 B ff., 39 B.

19. I 120 A; *Timaeus* 38 A; Alcinous, chap. 14.; Pseúdo-Platonic *Definitions* 411 B.

20. I 76 D.

21. In commenting upon the "waters of the firmament" he espouses the doctrine that they are the intelligible waters, I 85 B: *ἐπειδὴ δὲ διεκρίθη μὲν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ὕδατα τὰ τε ὁρώμενα καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, καὶ μέσος ὅρος ἀπεδείχθη τῆς διπλῆς τῶν ὑδάτων φύσεως ὁ οὐρανός* . . . . The heaven as the boundary between the phaenomenal and intelligible worlds is a Platonic touch which is given more obviously in I 65 D where, ridiculing the notion that these super-celestial waters could be sensible, he says *τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑγρᾶς οὐσίας ἐπαπορούμενα, ὡς οὐ δυνατὸν ὂν ἄνω τῆς οὐρανίου ἀψῖδος ἐν τῷ σφαιροειδεῖ σχήματι τὸ ῥευστὸν ἐφιζῆσαι,* where the language connects this section of Gregory with *Phaedrus* 247 B, *ὑπὸ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψῖδα,* and 247 C, *ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ.*

22. I 128 C.

23. I 85 D. Compare *Timaeus* 33 B; Alcinous, chap. 12.

24. Compare *Timaeus* 62 C. Gregory I 128 C.

25. Gregory I 128 D. *Timaeus* 34 A. See Gronau 144, 145 for Stoic parallels. He quotes also Alcinous, chap. 15 but he does not observe that, since Alcinous is closer to Gregory's wording, it is at least as possible that this passage was incited by a Platonic handbook as by a commentary the contents of which we cannot know.

26. I 129 A–C. Compare *Timaeus* 32 B, Alcinous, chap. 12.

27. I 108 D–109 C.

28. Compare *Timaeus* 58 A ff.

29. I 92 B: *οὐθέτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ τρέφεται,* an objection to *Timaeus* 33 C.

30. 120 D.

31. I 80 D.

32. I 121 D.

33. *Phaedrus* 247 C–D.

34. I 1328 B ff.

35. I 260 C–D contains a discussion of the plural which is explained as the first statement of the doctrine of the tri-une God. Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chap. 24, had followed Plato, *Timaeus* 41 C; and Gregory is repudiating this explanation when he says, *"ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον" καὶ οὐκ εἶπε "καὶ ἐποίησαν" ἵνα μὴ πολυθεΐας λάβῃς ἀφορμάς.*

36. *Timaeus* 43 A; Alcinous, chap. 17; Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chap. 46; Origen (in the translation of Rufinus) I 184 A: Sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatum est et ab una anima continetur ita et universum mundum velut animal quoddam immensum atque immane opinandum puto quod quasi ab una anima virtute Dei ac ratione teneatur. Compare *Timaeus* 34 B, Alcinous chap. 14.

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37. I 177 D ff.

38. Nor is the rejection of the divinity of the cosmos un-Platonic: *Timaeus* 28 A.

39. *διπλῆ τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κατασκευή.* See Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chap. 23; Aucher's *Latin of the Armenian Fragments* 4.

40. II 592 C. *Ἐποίησε τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν κατ' ἀρχὰς μετὰ πάντων ὁ τὸ πᾶν συστησάμενος καὶ μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τὸν Ἀδὰμ τότε τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γέννησιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐνομοθέτησεν.* Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chap. 24: *πάνυ δὲ καλῶς τὸ γένος ἄνθρωπον εἰπὼν διέκρινε τὰ εἴδη φήσας ἄρρεν τε καὶ θῆλυ δεδημιουργῆσθαι . . . . .*

41. II 1256 A: *ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἐκ νοερᾶς ψυχῆς, σώματι συνδραμούσης, τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει.* I 181 B–C. *Δύο τινῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκρότατον πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστηκότων, μέσον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, τῆς τε θείας καὶ ἀσωμάτου φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ κτηνώδους ζωῆς. ἔξεστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι θεωρῆσαι τὴν μοῖραν. τοῦ μὲν θείου τὸ λογικὸν . . τοῦ δὲ ἀλόγου τὴν σωματικὴν κατασκευήν.* Compare Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chap. 23, *ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν λέλεκται κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόνα νοῦν . . . . . ;* chap 51: *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ᾠκείωται λόγῳ θείῳ . . . . , κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κατασκευὴν ἅπαντι τῷ κόσμῳ.*

42. I 184 B *παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ μέτοχον τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἐποίησεν. Εἰ γὰρ πλήρωμα μὲν ἀγαθῶν τὸ θεῖον, ἐκείνου δὲ τοῦτο εἰκών. ἂρ' ἐν τῷ πλῆρες εἶναι παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἡ εἰκὼν ἔχει τὴν ὁμοιότητα.*

43. I 132 D–133 C. See Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chaps. 25 and 28. The similarity is striking, even to the comparison by both authors of God to a good *ἐστιάτωρ.*

44. I 268 B–C: Man rules all by his intellect *συμπαρίπταται τοῖς πτηνοῖς τῇ τοῦ νοῦ δυνάμει κτλ.* Compare Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chaps. 23, 28, 51. In I 276 C–277 B, the usual metaphorical interpretation is put upon this fact: *ἐδόθη σοι ἄρχειν ὥστε τοῦ ἀλόγου πάθους ἐγένου ἄρχων, "καὶ ἀρχέτωσαν τῶν θηρίων" παντὸς θηρίου ἄρχεις* (compare Philo, *Leg. All.* II, chap. 4: *θηρίοις δὲ καὶ πτηνοῖς ἀπεικάζει τὰ πάθη κτλ.*) *τί οὖν; ἐρεῖς · ἐγὼ θηρία ἔχω ἐν ἐμαυτῷ; καὶ μυρία καὶ πολὺν ὄχλον ἐν σεαυτῷ θηρίων ἔχεις . . . . . μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν διὰ τοῦ πάθους ᾧ προσῳκειώθη* (compare *Phaedrus* 230 A, *Republic* 588–9) *Μήτε λογισμοὺς ἔχε μετεωροπόρους, μήδε κοῦφος ἔσο καὶ ἄστατος τῇ διανοίᾳ. Πτηνῶν ἄρχειν ἐκρίθης* (which is intelligible only by reference to *Timaeus* 91 D).

45. I 293 C–D: *Ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς ὀρθὸν (τὸν ἄνθρωπον) . . Ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι εἰς γαστέρα βλέπει, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἄνω κεφαλὴ αὐτῷ ὑψηλή, ἵνα τὴν ἄνω βλέπῃ συγγένειαν. . Ἐγένου ἵνα θεὸν βλέπῃς οὐχ ἵνα ἐπὶ γῆν σύρηταί σου ἡ ζωή, οὐχ ἵνα τὴν κτηνώδη ἔχῃς ἀπόλαυσιν ἀλλ' ἵνα τὴν οὐράνιον ἐπιτελῇς πολιτείαν.* Compare *Timaeus* 90 A, 91 E ff.; Xenophon's *Memorabilia* I 4, 11; Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chap. 56. The head is the leader of the body, Gregory III 273 D: *Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κεφαλὴ τὰ ἄνω βλέπει καὶ τὰ μέλη δεῖ πάντως, τὰ ὑφηρμοσμένα τῇ κεφαλῇ, ἕπεσθαι τῇ τῆς κεφαλῆς ὁδηγίᾳ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄνω τὴν ῥοπὴν ἔχειν.* See *Timaeus* 44 D–45 B; 90 A ff.; Alcinous chap. 23.

46. Concerning the medical details of Chapter 30 of the essay, *De Hominis Opificio*, I shall say only so much. Gronau in *Poseidonius und die Jüdische-Christliche Genesisexegese*, 206 ff. has printed in parallel columns the chief passages from Gregory and the *Timaeus*. The agreement of treatment is

striking; and, when Gregory's own medical knowledge is remembered, there is no reason for looking for further sources for his explanation. Gronau's only argument for a Stoic source is the teleological character of Gregory's essay; yet no Stoic could have surpassed the *Timaeus* itself in the defense of such an attitude toward man and the universe. Further, Gronau states that Galen's work agrees in most details with Gregory's which—even though Galen be not considered as his source (and we recall that Gregory knew his work to some extent)—shows that these medical and physical doctrines could well have been held by others than Stoics at Gregory's time.

47. I 285 B ff.

48. *De Opif. Mundi*, chaps, 3, 30.

49. *inter alia.* III 29 B: *ψυχή ἐστιν οὐσία γεννητὴ, οὐσία ζῶσα, νοερὰ κτλ.* and for Plato see *Phaedo* 80 *et passim.*

50. III 113 B.

51. In I 229 B he introduces his abstract as though it were taken from Origen. It is a question debated in the churches, he says, and *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν δοκεῖ οἷς ὁ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπραγματεύθη λόγος καθάπερ τινὰ δῆμον ἐν ἰδιαζούσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὰς ψυχὰς προϋφεστάναι λέγειν.* Now this obviously refers to Origen's *De Principiis* Book II, chap. 9. But then Gregory's language sounds like an abstract of the *Phaedrus.* However, we have not Origen's text and we know that Rufinus took generous liberty with his "translation." Consequently we cannot be sure that Origen himself did not give a more extensive and Platonic treatment of the "fall" than Rufinus has transmitted. His text seems to be an attempt to obfuscate the real doctrine of Origen, anyway.

52. The following sentence (I 232 A) is final proof of this: *οὔ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καθαρεύειν δογμάτων κτλ.* (Gronau makes much of the fact that Gregory and Chalcidius both distinguish between the more and the less extreme forms of metempsychosis and that both quote the same verse of Empedocles. But he does not mention this, that the quotation of Empedocles occurs in one essay (I 232 A) where there is no distinction drawn between two types of metempsychosis, even though Gregory here refers to Origen, who held the Platonic theory in a mild form and so was not to be confused with Empedocles, while the distinction drawn between the two types occurs in another (III 108 B). Nor can I see any remarkable resemblance between Gregory and Chalcidius, considering that the distinction was obvious and commonly known.)

53. III 108 B ff.

54. *προκεῖσθαι δὲ κἀκεῖ τά τε τῆς κακίας καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑποδείγματα.*

55. I 233 A: *προτιμοτέραν τὴν ἐν θάμνῳ ζωὴν τῆς ἀσωμάτου διαγωγῆς ἐκ τούτων ἀποδεικνύουσιν . . εἴπερ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἡ πρὸς κακίαν κατάπτωσις γέγονεν, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἡ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐπάνοδος γίνεται.*

56. III 109 C ff.

57. This and I 232 A Gronau refers to Anaxagoras; but in the latter passage it is Empedocles to whom direct reference is made. If one turns to Plutarch's *Adversus Coloten,* he will find not only apt quotations from Empe-

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docles but a defense against the very arguments Gregory is here advancing (*Adv. Colot.* 1111 E–1113 C). In III 116 C ff. Gregory asks how it is that the birth of a man and the fall of a soul are simultaneous. If men and women should cease from intercourse, would evil no longer attack the souls in heaven? This is the argument of Lucretius III, 776 ff. (quoted by Gronau), and it looks as though Gregory knew Epicurean doctrines as well as Stoic.

58. III 112 C ff.

59. A reminiscence of *Phaedrus* 247 A.

60. *τῇ τοῦ παντὸς συμπεριπολοῦνται δινήσει.* *Phaedrus* 246 B: *πάντα οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ* and 247 C *αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περιφορά.* These approximate quotations seem to me to show that he was quoting or reconstructing the passage from memory, as does the queer perversion of *Republic* 619 C. Plato there speaks of a soul "who was one of those who came from heaven and who *in his former life* had lived in an orderly community." Gregory remembered the passage as saying that the soul *in heaven lived in an orderly community*, and twice he thus reproduces the passage, III 112 C, I 229 B.

61. III 112 C. See *Phaedrus* 246 C: *ἡ δὲ πτεροῤῥυήσασα* (the same word is used by Gregory) *φέρεται ἕως ἄν στερεοῦ τινὸς ἀντιλάβηται, σῶμα γήϊνον λαβοῦσα.* In I 229 B–C: *εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀποῤῥυῇ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίας, πρὸς τὸν τῇδε βίον κατολισθαίνειν . . . . ,* he was thinking rather of *Phaedrus* 248 C. My contention that Gregory wrote such passages without reference to books is strengthened by a similar mélange from the *Life of Moses* I 337 A–B: *ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἡ ἔξωθεν φιλοσοφία φησίν* [which could refer to almost any school but the Stoa or the Garden] . . . . *ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνειν ἀπὸ σωμάτων εἰς σώματα καὶ ἐκ λογικῆς φύσεως εἰς ἄλογον αὐτὴν μεταφύεσθαι* [*Timaeus* 90 E ff., *Phaedrus* 249 B]. *θεὸν εἶναί φησιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑλικὸν αὐτὸν οἴεται* [which fits the Stoics only; for Epicureans he would have said *θεούς*; it is utterly un-Platonic] *δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖ ἀλλὰ ὕλης πρὸς δημιουργίαν δεόμενον* [*Timaeus* 30 A] *ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δυνατὸν εἶναι δίδωσιν* [*Timaeus* 29 E] *ἀλλὰ παραχωρεῖν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῇ ἀνάγκῃ τῆς εἱμαρμένης . . . . .* [which seems rather to be meant for the Stoics—see Plutarch *De Fato* 574 D—than for the *Timaeus* 41 E where the fated laws are given by God]. Not the wildest Eclectic could have furnished the source for this passage.

62. I 229 C. *τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ προτιμοτέραν ἀποδεικνύουσι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν σάρκα . . λέγουσι γὰρ διὰ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν γενέσθαι . . πᾶν δὲ τὸ διά τι γινόμενον ἀτιμότερον πάντως ἐστὶ τοῦ δι' ὃ γίνεται.* III 125 A–B: *φανεροῦ πᾶσιν ὄντος ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἀψύχων κινητικήν τε καὶ αὐξητικὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύναμιν ἔχει, τῶν δ' ἐν νηδύϊ ἐντρεφομένων οὔτε ἡ αὔξησις οὔτε ἡ τοπικὴ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἀμφίβολος.* See *Phaedrus* 245 C–D, *Timaeus* 34 B–C. Compare Plotinus III 7, 13.

63. I 233 B–C.

64. See *Phaedrus* 248 C–D.

65. I 235 D; III 125 C: *Λείπεται οὖν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος ἀρχὴν τῆς συστάσεως οἴεσθαι.*

66. III 128 A.

67. *Phaedo* 64 C.

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68. Also I 233 D ff.: If the body were elder than the soul *στέρησις* would precede *ἕξις*. In I 256 A ff. Gregory remarks that even plants have a kind of soul, seeming to follow *Timaeus* 77 B ff., though he does not attribute to them *αἴσθησις* (*μέχρι τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν κινημάτων οὐκ ἔφθασε*), in this agreeing with Aristotle (*De Anima* I 5, 410 B, 22) and dissenting from Plato (this agreement with Aristotle is noted by Gronau).

69. I 236 C–D. Note a remarkable parallel in Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chap. 22 where after speaking of the development of the *θρεπτική* and *αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις* he adds, *τὴν γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τανῦν ὑπερθετέον διὰ τοὺς φάσκοντας θύραθεν αὐτὸν ἐπεισιέναι θεῖον καὶ ἀίδιον ὄντα.* Both Gregory and Philo are here reproducing Stoic belief; the latter feels that there is a contradiction between the theory of development and that of the soul's eternity, while Gregory is trying desperately to compound a theory which will retain the advantages of both. For another sign of dependence on Philo, compare Gregory I 269 A–D, a discussion of the life of man divided into periods of seven years each, with Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, chaps. 35–36.

70. *Timaeus* 39 E: *ἥπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας τῷ ὃ ἔστι ζῷον, οἷαί τε ἔνεισι καὶ ὅσαι, καθορᾷ, τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας διενοήθη δεῖν καὶ τόδε σχεῖν.*

71. III 128 B ff.

72. Origen I 225 C (Greek from Justinian's letter to Mena) *Ἐν τῇ ἐπινοουμένῃ ἀρχῇ τοσοῦτον ἀριθμὸν τῷ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ ὑποστῆσαι τὸν θεὸν νοερῶν οὐσίων ὅσον ἠδύνατο διαρκέσαι.* Also the Latin of Rufinus I 225 C ff.

73. I 233 D ff.

74. *De Opif. Mundi*, chap 22.

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1 E g., *Republic* 379 C–380 C; *Theaetetus* 176 A; *Politicus* 273 B–C; *Laws* 896 E.

2. *Timaeus* 29 E.

3. II 381 A.

4. II 20 D ff.

5. E.g., II 1105 C.

6. II 12 A.

7. III 25 B–28 B. Gronau refers this passage to Cicero's *Tusculans* I 68 and 70, and, on the assumption that the source of Cicero is Posidonius, refers the passage of Gregory to that source also. R. M. Jones has shown that the Ciceronian passage cannot come from Posidonius (*Class. Phil.*, XVIII, July 1923, 220); moreover, Gregory speaks of viewing the heavens *τῷ διανοητικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμῷ*, a distinctly Platonic notion (see *Phaedo* 99 E, *Sophist* 254 A–B, *Republic* 527 E, 533 D, 530 D).

8. Gronau calls the sentence of Gregory quoted above (III 24 A) "Stoic" as though it could have come only from that school and thinks to enforce the argument by pointing out the criticism of Epicurus' failure to go beyond the senses, which immediately precedes. Atticus (in Mullach's *Fragmenta*

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Philosophorum, III, 191) has this same arraignment of Epicurus and later (p. 193) uses the argument concerning shipbuilders, etc. to prove the providence of God. The "dazzling" of the eyes when they try to look on God is common to Philo and may be traced to Plato (see R. M. Jones' article in *Class. Phil.*, XXI, April 1926, 102).

9. II 933 B–D.

10. See Zeller, III Teil, 1 Abteilung, S. 144. Especially 1 Bemerkung: *Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν (θεὸν λέγουσι) . . . . Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες κτλ.*

11. *Timaeus* 28 C, *Cratylus* 400 D, e. g.

12. Alcinous, chap. 10.

13. e.g., II 121 A ff.

14. We have seen that Gregory was acquainted with the *Cratylus* (see Introduction and II 1045 C) and sought to attach to it Eunomius' doctrine of the divine origin of names. Whether he thought Plato ascribed the origin of names to God (as Gronau implies in his Dissertation, p. 64) or to the artificer of names who imposes name according to the nature of the thing named, he does not say; but he insists that a name can help us to understand a thing only through the related significance of the name to the underlying nature of the thing named (III 256 A–B). He himself explains *θεὸς* as derived from the *ἐνέργεια θεατικὴ καθ' ἣν τὰ πάντα ἐφορᾷ* (II 121 D, II 960 C, II 1108 A, II 121 D, II 128 B). The etymology of *οὐρανός* as *τὸν τῶν ὁρατῶν . . . . ὅρον* (II 1004 A) is not to be referred to *Cratylus* 396 B–C, as Gronau refers it. Here the etymology is given as from *ὄψις ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω.*

15. I 333 B: *οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα τε τῇ αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεται καὶ ὅσα κατὰ διάνοιαν θεωρεῖται, τῷ ὄντι ὑφέστηκε πλὴν τῆς ὑπεράνω ἑστώσης οὐσίας καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ παντός ἀφ' ἧς ἐξῆπται τὸ πᾶν.*

16. For a similar use of the figure see *Letter* XIV 1052 A: (referring to his sharing a letter) *κοινὸν προϋθηκα τοῖς παροῦσι τὸ κέρδος καὶ πάντες μετεῖχον, τὸ ὅλον ἕκαστος ἔχειν φιλονεικοῦντες, καὶ οὐκ ἠλαττούμην ἐγώ.*

17. III 92 C–93 A. Compare Alcinous chap. 10 *παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ αἴτιος ὤν . . . . οὐδὲ συμβέβηκέ τι αὐτῷ . . . οὔτε ἀγαθόν· κατὰ μετοχὴν γάρ τινος ἔσται οὗτος καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθότητος.* For Gregory's words *οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ καλῷ κινουμένη*, see *Republic* 380 E. For *οὔτε τὴν ἐλπιστικὴν κίνησιν ἐν ἑαυτῇ δέχεται*, see *Symposium* 200 A ff.

18. *Republic* 381.

19. II 933 A–B. (This passage is also to be referred to *Timaeus* 37 D ff., for Gregory sharply distinguishes between the phaenomenal and the eternal ideal world on the basis of time, this element attaching only to the former. All things in the intelligible world are outside the realm of Time); II 469 C; II 336 A (see also Alcinous, chap 10); III 96 B–97 B. (From the premises of the argument in the *Republic* Gregory here deduces the infinity of God, though in II 456 D he compares His eternity to a circle: *οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν περιγραφὴν τοῦ κύκλου βλέποντες ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ πανταχόθεν ἀλήπτου τῆς ζωῆς ἀφορῶντες.* Compare *Sophist* 244 E [quotation from *Parmenides*] and Alcinous, chap. 10 *τὸ σχῆμα φύσει τέλεόν ἐστι καὶ σύμμετρον.* Gregory's comparison is temporal, not spatial.) I 500 A.

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20. II 1253 C: *τὴν θεότητα μὲν ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι εἶναι ὁμολογοῦμεν, οὐ μὴν τὴν ἀπαθῆ φύσιν ἐμπαθῆ γενέσθαι . . . .* See *Republic* 380 D ff.

21. II 593 C.

22. Gregory mentions the two names together twice, the only times he mentions the Stoic name. See Introduction.

23. II 1304 D.

24. I 333 B.

25. I 1336 B–C.

26. I 1333 B–C. See *Philebus* 30 C; *Timaeus* 30 B; *Laws* 961 D.

27. Compare the arguments, based on a comparison of the divine λόγος with the human word, with such passages as *Sophist* 263 E: *οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὴν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια;—πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—τὸ δέ γ' απ' ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος;* Gregory I 1333 D: *γεννᾶται γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ γέννησίν τινα ἀκατάληπτον καὶ ἀσώματον . . . . καὶ γεννᾶται δευτέραν γέννησιν σωματικὴν διὰ χειλέων . . . .* ; also Gregory II 16 C. In II 1297 C–D the problem of three being one, that is of more than one thing occupying the same space, is referred to the existence of more than one science in the human mind. The treatment, and even the words, are paralleled by Plotinus IV 3, 2; VI 5, 5–6, as Gronau has noted.

28. Compare Plotinus VI 5, 7 for the figure *οἷον πρόσωπα πολλὰ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κορυφὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ εἴσω μίαν.*

29. II 180 D.

30. *Sophist* 244 B–245 E.

31. *Parmenides* 130 C: *τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου; Philebus* 15 A–B, *Republic* 507 B. Plato's solution of the difficulty, participation, is not stressed by Gregory, for he could not have God partake of unity and trinity. God must *be* unity and trinity and this is, to use Socrates' words, a marvel (*Parmenides* 129 B–C). Aristotle stamped Plato's theory with a name taken from this example (*αὐτοάνθρωπος*), *Ethica Nicomachea* I 4, 1096[a] 34. See also Plotinus VI 4, 14: *καὶ γὰρ ἓν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον αὖ καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ καὶ ἕκαστον ἔχει διακεκριμένον καὶ αὖ οὐ διακριθὲν χωρίς κτλ.*; IV 3, 2. Gronau has treated these references in his dissertation.

32. This is quite Platonic, but Gregory forgets himself. He would not apply it to the "persons," saying that each one partakes of the nature of divinity, for each one is itself God.

32a. II 120 B.

33. The distinction between the phaenomenal and intelligible world is drawn in II 129 D–132 C and the concept of multitude is confined to the former: *Μόνα γὰρ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀριθμεῖται ὅσα κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν θεωρεῖται· ἡ δὲ περιγραφὴ ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ σώματος . . . . κτλ . . . . καταλαμβάνεται. τὸ δ' ἔξω τούτων θεωρούμενον ἐκφεύγει τὴν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων περιγραφήν, ὃ δὲ μὴ περιγράφεται οὐκ ἀριθμεῖται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀριθμούμενον ἐν πλήθει θεωρηθῆναι οὐ δύναται.* See *Plotinus* VI 5. 5. *Parmenides* 165; 144 E: *τὸ ἓν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθός ἐστιν.* Gregory (directly following the above citation):

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Επεὶ καὶ τὸν χρυσόν φαμεν, κἂν εἰς πολλοὺς διακερματίζεται τύπους, ἕνα καὶ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι. . . . .

34. "Know thyself" was early interpreted "know thine own soul" and was a commonplace long before Gregory (see Eliza G. Wilkins' *'Know Thyself' in Greek and Latin Literature*, 60 ff., Chicago Dissertations).

35. In the *Life of Moses* a thoroughly Platonic account of falsehood and truth is given. I 333 A: *ὁρισμὸς ἀληθείας, τὸ μὴ διαψευσθῆναι τῆς τοῦ ὄντος καταvοήσεως (ψεῦδος γάρ ἐστι φαντασία τις περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐγγιγνομένη τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὡς ὑφεστῶτος τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. ἀλήθεια δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἀσφαλὴς κατανόησις).* See *Sophist* 260 C: *τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν . . . . τοῦτ' ἐστί που τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον*, also *Republic* 477 B, 478 D, 479 E. So it is that through contemplation of the sublime one recognizes *τί μέν ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ὂν ὃ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχει · τί δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὃ ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν εἶναι μόνον ἐστὶν, κτλ.*

36. I 137 C: *ὁρᾷς ἐν σεαυτῷ καὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ διάνοιαν, μίμημα τοῦ ὄντως νοῦ τε καὶ λόγου.* Compare *Philebus* 30 D; for the divinity of the soul see *Republic* 611 E. *συγγενὴς οὖσα τῷ θείῳ κτλ.*; I 137 D–140 D—God is simple in nature though working through complex means, for man is made in God's image and in him there is one intellectual force which works through the senses in different ways. (Compare *Laws* 961 D–E; *Phaedo* 79 C.) This argument from the nature of man to the nature of God has been noted as the one used for the Trinity, for which see also I 1340 B–C. *Εἰ φιλοσοφεῖν περὶ τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ βούλει, οὕτω φιλοσόφησον, σὺκ ἐκ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐντός σου τὸν κρυπτὸν θεὸν γνώρισον ἐκ τῆς ἐν σοὶ τριάδος, τὴν τριάδα ἐπίγνωθι δι' ἐνυποστάτων πραγμάτων.*

37. I 585 C–D. *χαρακτὴρ δέ τις τῆς ἀφράστου φύσεως διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν σκιαγραφίας τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὴν ὀρῶσιν ἐγγίγνεται*, for all the virtues accessible to the understanding are not merely *ἡ τῶν θείων πτερύγων σκιά*. See *Republic* 510 E, 516 A, 517 D. Previously it is said that the divine is inaccessible to the human nature and hovers above the rational part of man (*τοῦ λογισμοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερπετόμενον*), seemingly a reminiscence of the difficulty experienced by the mortal charioteers in the *Phaedrus* myth. The constant repetition of the impossibility of ascertaining the divine nature is noteworthy as alienating all such passages from any sort of Stoic influence.

38. II 17 A: *ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Λόγον ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀναλογικῶς ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης ἔγνωμεν φύσεως, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, καὶ τῇ περὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐννοίᾳ προσαχθησόμεθα, σκιάς τινας καὶ μιμήματα τῆς ἀφράστου δυνάμεως ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς θεωροῦντες φύσει* where the *σκιάς* is the word with which Gregory expresses participation. Compare Plato's manner of saying that we must learn of the Divine through the divine in us, *Timaeus* 90 D.

39. The arguments which the Posidonians might adduce from parallels between Philo and Gregory on this ground are rendered nerveless by the refutation of the Posidonian characteristics of the Philonic passages (see R. M. Jones, *Class. Phil.*, XXI, April 1926, 105).

40. I 440 C–D.

41. There follows upon this passage the argument that the soul is to be known from the body by seeking *τὸ κρυπτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων*. The soul

itself teaches that it is ἄυλος and ἀσώματος and uses the body and the senses as tools, since after death these latter remain but are useless. With this is to be compared *Phaedo* 70–80 to which we have often referred. Gronau admits that this is un-Stoic but claims that Gregory is trying to adapt Posidonius to Christian theology and for this reason has himself, in taking over Stoic theory, divested it of its materialistic stamp. He points to the materialistic language sometimes used by Gregory; but where can he find any philosopher who, in explaining the intelligible, does not use examples from the phaenomenal world? "For men with bodies Absolutes are hard to track and find," and Gregory is no more to be held on this score than Plato. Never once can Gregory be found to abandon or forget the distinction between the intelligible and phaenomenal world, between the immateriality of the soul and the materiality of the body. In the argument for the immortality of the soul, which is based upon its immateriality, the same reasons are urged as Plato gives against the theory of the soul as an harmony. (Compare Gregory III 24 B ff. with Phaedo 94 B ff.)

42. I 804 B: *οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν παρερχομένων ἐστὶν ἡμέτερον. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις κρατήσειε τοῦ παροδικοῦ τε καὶ ῥέοντος; ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔμμενον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει ἡ νοητή τε καὶ ἄυλος φύσις ἡ δὲ ὕλη παρέρχεται διὰ ῥοῆς τινος καὶ κινήσεως πάντοτε ἀλλοιουμένη· ἀναγκαίως ὁ τοῦ ἑστῶτος χωριζόμενος τῷ ἀστατοῦντι πάντως συμπαραφέρεται· καὶ ὁ τὸ παρερχόμενον καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς καταλιπὼν ἀμφοτέρων διαμαρτάνει . . . .* κτλ. See *Phaedrus* 247 C ff.; *Cratylus* 439 D ff.; *Phaedo* 87 D; *Timaeus* 37 E, 43 A–B; *Symposium* 207–8. It is through the distinction of the ideal, intelligible world as real from the unreality of the phaenomenal world that Plato sought to solve the riddle of flux and permanence. *τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν* (*Symposium* 208 A–B).

43. I 804 A. See *Apology* 36 C: *μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἐαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη. I Alcibiades* 130: *ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὁ ἐπιτάττων γνῶναι ἑαυτόν.*

44. III 509 B–D.

45. I 1332 A: *Εἰ βούλει γνῶναι θεὸν, προλαβὼν γνῶθι σεαυτόν. . . . .* For Plato's proof of the existence and nature of God from the soul, see *Laws* 897, *Phaedrus* 246 B, *Philebus* 30 D: *ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς φύσει βασιλικὴν ψυχήν* (*ἐρεῖς*).

46. For this same distinctively un-Stoic characteristic of the flight of the mind in Philo see R. M. Jones' article, *Class. Phil.*, XXI, April 1926, 105.

47. I 620 B.

48. *Phaedrus* 249 C: *ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως.* (For the substitution of *ὑπερκύπτω* for *ἀνακύπτω* see Proclus *In Timaeum* III 346 B, cited by R. M. Jones.)

49. I 773 A–B: *μέλλοντας προσβαίνειν τῷ πνευματικῷ τῆς θεογνωσίας ὄρει ἐν ᾧ τὸ θῆλυ γένος τῶν λογισμῶν μετὰ τῆς ὑλικῆς ἀποσκευῆς τῷ κάτω καταλείπεται βίῳ.* For this interpretation of the female side of humanity see I 328 A: *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑλική τε καὶ ἐμπαθεστέρα διάθεσις πρὸς ἣν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις κατολισθαίνουσα φέρεται τὸ θῆλυ τῆς ζωῆς . . .* Philo: *Leg. All.* II, chap. 8; *Leg. All.* III 16; also Plato's connection of the female with the body, the male with the mind: *Sym-*

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posium 208 E ff. In II 317 A a purely scientific method of research is outlined: *πᾶς λόγος ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τε καὶ πᾶσιν ἐγνωσμένων τὰς ἀρχὰς λαμβάνων τοῖς ἀμφισβητουμένοις δι' αὐτοῦ ἐπάγει τὴν πίστιν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἑτέρως τι καταληφθείη τῶν κεκρυμμένων, μὴ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀδήλων σύνεσιν χειραγωγούντων.* See Plato's remarks on the dialectic, *Republic* 533 C–D; the outline of method, *Phaedrus* 237 D; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII 1029 B 3–12; Alcinous, chap. 5: *ἡ δὲ (ἀνάλυσις) διὰ τῶν δεικνυμένων καὶ ὑποδεικνυμένων ἄνοδος ἐπὶ τὰς ἀναποδείκτους καὶ ἀμέσους προτάσεις.* See also Gregory II 969 C: *Ἔστι . . . . ἐπίνοια ἔφοδος εὑρετικὴ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων διὰ τῶν προσεχῶν . . . . τῇ πρώτῃ περὶ τὸ σπουδαζόμενον νοήσει, τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐξευρίσκουσα.* Even in these discussions, however, Gregory takes pains to recall the difference between the phaenomenal and intelligible worlds, e.g., II 1101 D ff.

50. *Republic* 529–30.

51. III 33 B ff. *τὰς γεωμετρικὰς ἐφόδους διὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν χαραγμάτων πρὸς τὰ ὕπερ αἴσθησιν ἡμᾶς χειραγωγούσας.* See Alcinous, chap. 7: *αὕτη* (i.e., *ἡ τοῦ μαθεματικοῦ θεωρία*) *. . . . θήγουσα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν ὄντων ἀκρίβειαν παρεχομένη. χρήσιμον . . καὶ ἡ ἀστρονομία καθ' ἣν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεασόμεθα ἄστρων τε φορὰς καὶ οὐρανοῦ . . . . κτλ. . . . ἐξ ὧν κατά τινα οἰκείαν ὁδὸν καὶ τὸν ἁπάντων δημιουργὸν ζητήσομεν, μετίοντες ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν μαθημάτων ὥσπερ τινὸς ὑποβάθρας καὶ στοιχείων.* *Republic* 530 A–B; *Phaedo* 79 C for the use of the senses by the soul; *Republic* 525 A.

52. III 681 B–C. *ἡ δὲ καρδία τοῖς λεγομένοις τε καὶ βλεπομένοις εὐφραινομένη, τὴν ἄφραστον ἐτυποῦτο μακαριότητα, διὰ τῶν φαινομένων χειραγωγουμένη πρὸς τὸ ἀόρατον.* Here occurs, as often, a figure (that of the seal) which was in common use among the Stoics. The meaning of the passage—the advance through the phaenomena to the invisible—precludes the possibility of its having come from a Stoic source. Many of the so-called Stoic parallels are of this nature. Gregory uses Stoic words that have passed into general use in passages utterly un-Stoic. With this passage compare Alcinous, chap. 7: *δεῖ γὰρ ὀξέως ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουστῶν μεταβαίνειν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν μόνῳ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμῷ.*

53. III 365 B.

54. Alcinous, chap. 7.

55. I 624 C.

56. The *Phaedrus* is the chief source for Gregory's treatment, though he mixes in references to the *Symposium*, also "The man whose spiritual eye [*τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμόν.* see *Sophist* 254 A, *Republic* 533 D] is clear and who can see such things *χαίρειν ἐάσας τὴν ὕλην τὴν ὑποβεβλημένην τῇ τοῦ καλοῦ ἰδέᾳ, οἷον ὑποβάθρᾳ τινὶ τῷ ὀρωμένῳ χρήσεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νοήτου κάλλους θεωρίαν* [*Symposium* 211 C: *ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον . . . .*] *οὗ κατὰ μετουσίαν τὰ ἄλλα καλὰ γίνεται καὶ ὀνομάζεται*" (III 364C), which is a clear exposition of the participation of phaenomena in the ideas (*Symposium* 211 B, *Phaedo* 100 C). Most important for a consideration of the sources of Gregory is the observation that references to different Platonic dialogues are woven together differently in different passages to suit the need of the matter under discussion; the following passage from the exegesis

on Ecclesiastes furnishes an excellent example. I 624 B: *'Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐρεῖ πάντως* [i.e. that God is also creator of the fleshly organs] *ὁ μήπω τῆς σαρκὸς ἔξω γενόμενος μηδὲ ἀκριβῶς πρὸς τὴν ὑψολητέραν διακύψας ζωήν.* [*Phaedrus* 249 C: *ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως*] *'Επεὶ ὅ γε πεπαιδευμένος τὰ θεῖα μυστήρια οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ πάντως ὅτι οἰκεία μὲν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ἡ ζωὴ ἡ πρὸς τὴν θείαν φύσιν ὁμοιωμένη* [*Theaetetus* 176 C]. *ἡ δὲ αἰσθητικὴ ζωή, διὰ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνεργείας διεξαγομένη, ἐπὶ τούτῳ φύσει δέδοται ἐφ' ᾧ τὴν τῶν φαινομένων γνῶσιν ὁδηγὸν γενέσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀοράτων ἐπίγνωσιν* [*Timaeus* 47 B–E; Alcinous, chap. 7]. The combination of these various Platonic notions in a passage which is not primarily philosophical, but exegetical, is sufficient proof of Gregory's ability to use such ideas without reference to a handbook in which these doctrines would be treated in widely separated sections (see, for instance, the arrangement in Alcinous); and, more, it shows how deeply Gregory's thought was saturated with this fundamental Platonism which would have made it impossible for him to copy from handbooks, even when he used them, doctrines which were at variance with the basic Platonism of his own thought.

57. III 181 A. Following in 181 C there is a remarkable parallel to the language of Alcinous. Gregory says *ἵνα δὲ παρῶ τὰ μαθήματα ὅθεν θήγεται πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἡ διάνοια, γεωμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν. . . . .* Alcinous, chap. 7: *αὕτη* (*τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ θεωρία*) *θήγουσα τὴν ψυχὴν κτλ.* Both Plato and Gregory insist upon the inefficacy of the correct principle without ethical practice and vice versa (Gregory I 1057 B; *Euthydemus* 289 B; Alcinous, chap. 2).

58. See *Symposium* 211 A.

59. III 361 C–364 A. This is exactly what the Stoics do, for they stop at the boundary of the physical heaven and look back at the wonder of the cosmos instead of looking up to the intelligible forms.

60. I 401 D ff.

61. III 368 C: *πρὸς ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἐρωτικῶς . . ἔξει ὃ οὐχ ἑτέρωθεν ἔχει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ ποτὲ ἢ πρός τι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.* See *Symposium* 211 A.

62. III 365 C–D: *οὐκοῦν ὁ πάσης πικρίας καὶ σαρκικῆς δυσωδίας ἑαυτὸν ἀποστήσας καὶ πάντων τῶν ταπεινῶν τε καὶ χαμαιζήλων ὑπεραρθεὶς . . ἐκεῖνος εὑρήσει τὸν μόνον ἐπιθυμίας ἄξιον καὶ γενήσεται καὶ αὐτὸς καλὸς τῷ καλῷ προσπελάσας.* Compare *Symposium* 212 A, *Republic* 511 B–C.

63. III 368 C.

64. *Phaedrus* 256 A–B.

65. *Phaedo* 79 C–D.

66. This is the ascetic attitude and is championed by Gregory in the ascetic essay on *Virginity*. See III 348 B ff.: *πᾶσα γάρ ἐστι σπουδὴ τοῦ τοιούτου βίου* [the virginal life] *ὅπως μὴ τὸ ὑψηλὸν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως τῶν ἡδονῶν ταπεινωθῇ καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ μετεωροπορεῖν καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄνω βλέπειν τὴν διάνοιαν ἡμῶν πρὸς τὰ σαρκὸς καὶ αἵματος κατενεχθεῖσαν πάθη πεσεῖν.* (See *Phaedo* 82 E–83 E for the evil effect of bodily pleasures on the soul; *Phaedrus* 246 C: *τελέα μὲν οὖσα μετεωροπορεῖ.*) The soul dragged down by the body is compared to swine that have their eyes turned to the ground and cannot glance at heaven, which is expressed in the language of metempsychosis in *Timaeus* 91 E. But

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the soul that is not forced to bodily attachments transfers its ἐρωτικὴν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῶν σωματικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν νοητήν τε καὶ ἄυλον τοῦ καλοῦ θεωρίαν. (See *Phaedo* 83 B.) Here I must mention a queer passage from the third epistle in which Gregory uses the language of the *Phaedrus* (246 C) ascent in speaking of the resurrection of the body. One becomes light, he says (III 1016 C) and ἐξελαφρύνας διὰ καθαρωτέρας ζωῆς ὥστε αὐτῷ νεφέλης δίκην συμμετεωροπορεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω τὴν σάρκα . . . . We shall see later what insuperable difficulties he had with this Christian doctrine.

67. I 697 A.

68. *Republic* 509 B.

69. See especially *Republic* 518 A–B. The ascent of the soul from the phaenomenal to the real is the meaning of the allegory of the Cave, and the language of this Platonic figure was incorporated by later authors in their accounts of the flight of the soul. It is in the spirit of the *Phaedo* passages (79 C–D, 82 D ff.) which portray the senses as hindrances rather than instruments of the mind in its search for truth; and Gregory has many references to the allegory in this sense: I 1225 B: τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ φῶς ᾧ τὸ ζοφῶδες τοῦτο τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως σπήλαιον ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίῳ οὐ καταυγάζεται. In speaking of a man who finds God within himself and comes to scorn his former standards, he says (I 453 B) ὡς εἴ τις τῶν ἐν φυλακῇ τεχθέντων μέγα τι κρίνων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν ζόφον ᾧ ἐνετράφη τε καὶ συνηύξησεν, εἶτα τῆς ὑπαίθρου χάριτος μετασχὼν καταγινώσκει τῆς προτέρας αὐτοῦ κρίσεως, a direct reference to the altered view of the man who has ascended from the cave. The imprisonment, the love of the dark, the subsequent scorn of it, all are direct quotations from *Republic* 514–516. In I 824 C ff. the divine virtue is the idea of good which like the sun makes the unseen visible to us and the unapproachable our possession, and like the sun we look at it first in a mirror (*Republic* 517 C; 516 A). In I 763 B ff. there is a mixture of Platonic doctrine; reference to the slow growth of the mind's authority over the senses, which is drawn from *Timaeus* 44 A ff.; the inability of the eye of the soul to look at the sun of truth (with this reference to the *Republic*, the presence of the words ἀχλύς and ὀμίχλη points to *II Alcibiades* 150 D); the enslavement and bestializing of the mind by the pleasures of sense (*Republic* 589–90). The exegesis of the passage: "the eyes of the wise man are in his head" is shot through with reminiscences of the allegory of the cave. I 681 D–685 B: for example, μακαριστὴ ἂν γένοιτο τῆς ὀξυωπίας ἐκεῖ ἔχουσα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὅποῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ ἐπισκότησις.

70. I 588 B. In II 948 A Gregory says: "How can the same soul ascend *above the heavens* in concern for the invisible and also slip down to material affections dragged by the weight of the body (see *Phaedo* 79 C: ἕλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος and 81 C)? Who would not be inclined to believe that he has τινα δῆμον ψυχῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ? (*Republic* 591 E: ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν κτλ.). Plato's comparison of the soul to a civic commonwealth (at times represented as the body and soul together) has given Gregory a figure easily adapted to the exegesis of Scriptural texts. On the "peacemakers" he remarks I 1289 D ff. that the true peacemaker is the one who brings to concord τὴν ἐν

ἑαυτῷ στάσιν τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος when the law of the body, which fights against that of the soul, is no longer at work but is subordinated to the rule of the better. In this way will man be made simple and unified and so like to God. (See *Republic* 589 ff.) Peace results in a man, he says (III 261 A ff.) when fleshly considerations are placed under the leadership of the divine part of him; and this figure is developed (II 576 C): ἡ ἐπαινετὴ τυραννὶς τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τῆς σοφίας τὴν τῶν παθῶν δημοκρατίαν εἰς τὴν τοῦ νοῦ μοναρχίαν μετασκευάσασα δουλαγωγεῖ τὰ κακῶς εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφηνιάζοντα · πάντα τὰ σωματικά τε καὶ γήϊνα λέγω φρονήματα. The entire *Republic* is built upon this figure; see especially 440 A–E, 556 E, 559 D–E; *Sophist* 228 A–B; also Plotinus IV 4, 17. But while the conclusion here is that the mind must control the lower parts of man and so attain to peace, the other conclusion is also drawn (III 512 D), that only when the mind is released from the body by death can it be free of this incessant war. See *Phaedo* 66 D.

71. III 484 D. See *Republic* 527 D–E, 533 D.

72. The passage is in the ascetic essay on *Virginity* and is not to be sharply criticized for its logic; it is an attempt to be poetical after the manner of the *Phaedrus*.

73. See R. M. Jones' article in *Class. Phil.*, XXI, April 1926, 106, for the passage from Maximus of Tyre cited as Stoic by Capelle and Grönau.

74. III 97 B ff.

75. *Adv. Math.* VII 93.

76. See also Timaeus Locrus 102 B.

77. In the passage cited by Gronau from Gregory II 21 C occur: τοῦ μετέχοντος, man as μέτοχος τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν, τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετουσίαν, man as having τὴν ἔφεσιν πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον, God as τὸ μετεχόμενον—concepts which are utterly un-Stoic and as characteristically Platonic.

78. Consequently that Sextus cites them (in the passage above quoted) and that Chalcidius (chap. 51) does the same cannot throw any light on the commentary of Posidonius. Proclus (*In Timaeum* II 232 C) does so and so does Aristotle (*De Anima* 404 b). The Empedoclean passage in Diels, Frag. 109 is taken from this passage of Aristotle.

79. Gorgias 510 B :φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. *Lysis* 214 B: τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμασιν ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτα αὐτὰ λέγουσιν ὅτι τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι;

80. *Phaedo* 65 B ff.

81. I 1145 A–B.

82. See Plotinus I 2, 1: βούλεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ φεύγειν τὰ κακά, φευκτέον ἐντεῦθεν. τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; θεῷ φησιν ὁμοιωθῆναι.

83. I 1200 C.

84. I 961 A.

85. Compare also *Republic* 500 C–D; 613 A–B: ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. For the flight from the body, *Phaedo* 65 D.

86. *Phaedo* 69 C. See also *Phaedo* 67 C and *Sophist* 227 D–E.

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87. Plotinus I 2, 1 (quoted above); I 2, 3–7 is devoted to a consideration of the virtues as purifiers, with Plato's words often quoted.

88. See also III 96 B: the delight in goodness expels all else, and the soul having thereby become ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ ἄυλον ἀγαθόν has need for nothing.

89. See also *Theaetetus* 185 D ff.

90. III 92 C ff.

91. *Symposium* 200 A ff.

V. Good and Evil

1. Zeller, III 1, 176 ff.

2. e.g., II 32 C: πονηρία πᾶσα ἐν τῇ τοῦ 'αγαθοῦ στερήσει χαρακτηρίζεται κτλ.

3. Zeller, III 2, 435.

4. Zeller, II 1, 719 ff.

5. In the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* 369 E Socrates says: Συνάπτεις ἀνεπιλογίστως, τῇ στερήσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν 'αντεισάγων κακῶν αἴσθησιν, which Gronau in his dissertation seems to take as a parallel to Gregory.

6. Zeller, III 2, 601 ff.

7. See above, chap. 3.

8. See Gronau, Dissertation, 9.

9. Origen I, 227 A, Rufinus' translation.

10. Origen IV 136 B both this and the above are quoted by Gronau .

11. See I 333 A–B where Gregory defines truth and falsehood in Platonic words: ψεῦδος γάρ ἐστι φαντασία τις περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐγγιγνομένη τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς ὑφεστῶτος τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. ἀλήθεια δὲ, ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἀσφαλὴς κατανόησις. καὶ οὕτω . . . . τις . . . . ταῖς ὑψηλαῖς. . . . . ἐμφιλοσοφήσας μελέταις μόλις κατανοήσει τί μέν ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ὂν ὃ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. τί δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὃ ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν εἶναι μόνον ἐστίν. See *Sophist* 236 B–C, 260 C, 263 D, 264 A; *Republic* 477 B–479 E; *Parmenides* 166 A.

12. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν. Compare Alcinous, chap. 10.

13. *Parmenides*, 130 C–D.

14 Plotinus I 8 περὶ τοῦ τίνα καὶ πόθεν τὰ κακά.

15. III 176 B; for the argument here based on γνῶσις, see *Republic* 478 B.

16. Plotinus I 8, 1.

17 Gregory II 28 C; Plotinus I 8, 3.

18. Gregory II 25 A: Gregory uses the figure of light and darkness: τοῦ φωτὸς ὑφαιρεθέντος ὁ ζόφος ἐπηκολούθησε, παρόντος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν κτλ. But he becomes confused and carries the figure too far until he talks of an actual γένεσις ἐναντίου. This is partly due to the fact that he is about to speak of the "free will." Plotinus I 8, 5.

19. Gregory III 1020 D ff.; III 176 D ff. Plotinus I 8, 5; I 8, 9; I 8, 13.

20. III 176 D ff. Though καθάπερ τις λήμη κτλ. is directly parallel to Plotinus I 8, 13.

21. Undoubtedly a reminiscence of the comparison between the sun and the idea of Good.

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22. III 93 B; I 161 C ff.

23. III 116 C.

24. III 117 B–C; III 120 A, III 117 D ff. The passages are direct attacks upon the fall of the soul and metempsychosis as pictured in *Phaedrus* 248 C ff.; *Timaeus* 90 E; and upon the idea of a judgment incorporated with this theory in *Phaedrus* 249 A.

25. III 120 B; *Phaedo* 69 C: *ἡ φρόνησις καθαρμός τις.*

26. Though in I 192 A ff. he says that the evil in Man springs from the unreasonable part of his nature which he shares with the brutes. The λόγος may be perverted to the service of the ἄλογα, in which case man becomes more brutish than the brutes (*Republic* 589 C–D), or the ἄλογα to the λόγος so as to be of service to good.

27. II 24 D ff.; I 1253 D.

28. III 120 C ff. Compare Plotinus I 8, 9.

29. II 24 D: *ἐμφύεταί πως τὸ κακὸν ἔνδοθεν, τῇ προαιρέσει τότε συνιστάμενον ὅταν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ γένηται τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναχώρησις* where the absence of good is a necessary circumstance to the existence of evil but evil is no longer essentially and merely the absence of good. I 1256 B: *ὁμοῦ τὸ ἐλέσθαι τὸ κακὸν ὑφίσταται, τότε εἰς γένεσιν παραγενόμενον ὅταν ἐλώμεθα.*

30. II 227 A; *Republic* 617 E.

31. II 25 A, III 120 C; I 184 B; Alcinous, chap. 31; *Republic* 617 E; Gregory III 101 D.

32. II 21 C ff.

33. *Timaeus* 86 E; Alcinous, chap. 31.

34. III 41 C ff.; I 184 C. See *Timaeus* 28 A–B, 37 E–38 B, 41 B; *Republic* 380 D–381 C.

35. I 201 A–B.

36. I 1249 C.

37. I 736 D.

38. Again a reference to *Republic* 589 C–D.

39. II 25 A.

40. I 189 C ff.

41. II 576 C; II 25 B ff. In the latter passage Lucifer is much like the lower gods of the *Timaeus* who create man. Of him, Gregory says, *δι' ἀπάτης τῇ προαιρέσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν κακίαν ἐμμίξας κτλ.*

42. III 288 B: *πλάνη τις τῶν ὁρατῶν τούτων καὶ ῥεόντων ἀεὶ διὰ πάθους ἀλόγου καὶ πικρᾶς ἡδονῆς τὴν . . ψυχὴν ἀπατῶσα καὶ γοητεύουσα πρὸς κακίαν ἕλκει δείνην.* *Phaedo* 79 C: *ἕλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ.* *Phaedo* 81 C: *ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον.* Also later Gregory says that the Grace the Saviour brought is *ἡ γνῶσις τῆς ἀληθείας* and that the soul that strives piously toward God is made *εὐπειθῆ καὶ εὐήνιον τοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς δρόμοις,* as Plato speaks of the teams of the Gods (*Phaedrus* 247 B) *ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα ῥᾳδίως πορεύεται.* (Better perhaps *Laws* 880 A: *ἐὰν μέν τις τοιούτοις παραμυθίοις εὐπειθὴς γίγνηται εὐήνιος ἂν εἴη.*) I 636 A: *ὅτε γὰρ εἰς κακίαν ἡ φύσις ἔῤῥεψε, λήθη τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐγεν-*

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ὁμεθα. See *Phaedrus* 248 C. The passage which is an interpretation of the text "There is no memory of the first, etc." is an explanation based on the Platonic notion of the confusion in the minds of children (*Timaeus* 43 C) and reminiscence (e.g., *Phaedo* 75 E).

43. II 1216 B: *ἡμεῖς διὰ τὸ τραπῆναι πρὸς τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀτρέπτου προσδεήθημεν* (perhaps for *προσεδεήθημεν*) *κτλ.* *Phaedo* 250 A: *ἐπὶ τὸ ἀδικὸν τραπόμεναι* (*ψυχαί*) *κτλ.* III 372 B: *ἐκπεσὼν τῆς οἰκείας ἀξίας οἷον πάσχουσιν οἱ ἐξ ὀλισθήματος ἐγκατενεχθέντες βορβόρῳ* (see *Phaedo* 69 C and Plotinus I 8, 13 *ad finem*).

44. III 352 B. Compare *Phaedo* 65 B–C, 67 C, 83 A.

45. Besides passages cited above see III 176 A: *ἐπεὶ δέ πως ἡ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθοῦ ἄγνοια καθάπερ τις ὀμίχλη τῷ διορατικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπεσκότησεν . . . . ὥστε διὰ τοῦ βάθους ἀγνοίας τὴν ἀκτῖνα τῆς ἀληθείας μὴ διαδύεσθαι. . . . . Εἴρηται γὰρ τὴν ἀληθῆ ζωὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ μετουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργεῖσθαι, τῆς δὲ ἀγνοίας πρὸς τὴν θείαν κατανόησιν ἐμποδιζούσης ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς ζωῆς τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ μετέχουσαν.*

46. III 500 A ff.; I 737 B.

47. I 1012 A; I 1196 C–D; III 261 B–C. See *Republic* 517 B–C; 508–9. In many of the passages already cited, as in III 261 B–C, Gregory calls the *ἀρεταί* the *ἀκτῖνες τοῦ ἡλίου τῆς δικαιοσύνης* or *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.*

48. *Republic* 353 A ff. where the *ἀρετὴ* of the soul is *δικαιοσύνη.*

49. I 1241 C–1244 A: *οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι δυνατὸν ἔν τι τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶδος τῶν λοιπῶν διεζευγμένον, αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ τελείαν τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι.* (Also III 384 A: *φασὶ . . . . μὴ ἀπεσχίσθαι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀλλήλων κτλ.* Compare Alcinous, chap. 29: *ἀχώριστοι οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἀλλήλων αἱ τέλειαι.*) *Εἰ οὖν μὴ πάντα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ συνθεωροῖτο, ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη τὸ λειπόμενον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι . . . . εἰ δὲ παντὸς τοῦ χείρονος ἀμιγὴς ὁ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγος ἐστίν, ἅπαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ πάντως τὸ ἀγαθὸν περιείληφεν.* See *Republic* 443 D–E; Gregory I 1245 D–1248 A, where the divine *λόγος*, the intelligible Good, and *δικαιοσύνη* are all synonyms.

50. Gregory I 697 C: *τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μέτρον ἐστι τῇ μεσότητι τῶν παραθεωρουμένων μετρούμενον*; and I 927 A. See also *Republic* 619 A, Alcinous, chap. 30, Zeller II, 1, 882 ff. with 2^{te} Bemerkung S. 884, and Shorey, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, 14.

51. III 401 A: the words *καθὼς ἀκούειν ἔστι τῶν σοφῶν* seem to stamp the figure as a commonplace; but the actual words must point to Plato or to commentators who copied the figure from him.

52. I 648 C–D. See *Philebus* 53 C ff. for the instability of bodily pleasure; for pleasure as a bait, compare *Timaeus* 69 D, *Sophist* 222 E. Gregory I 993 C, for the pleasure of the soul as opposed to that of the body; compare *Phaedo* 83 A ff., *Republic* 582 B, 583 B.

53. III 152 A ff. Compare *Phaedo* 83 A ff. and 69 C. The purification by the virtues and the carelessness of philosophers for material affairs have been discussed above in Gregory and Plato.

54. I 1297 A: *συμφύεταί πως ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ τῶν σωματικῶν αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα τοῦ βίου κτλ.* (Compare *Phaedo* 83 C) *Διὰ τοῦτο οἷόν τινι ἥλῳ πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα τοῦ βίου τῇ αἰσθητικῇ δυνάμει προσκολλωμένη. . . .* See *Phaedo* 83 D: *ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα.*

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55. III 97 B; I 1297 A: δυσαποσπάστως ἔχει τούτων οἷς συνεφύη. . . . . *Phaedo* 108 B: the soul which has become attached to the body ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα βίᾳ καὶ μόγις . . . . οἴχεται ἀγομένη.

56. II 36 D.

57. *Republic* 380 B; *Gorgias* (at more length) 479. See also, for the figure of Jesus as physician of the world, Origen I 1047 A ff.

58. III 677 A–B; man as a combination: *Phaedo* 80 A ff.; Plotinus I 1, 12.

59. III 85 C–88 C. This passage is a patchwork of quotations from the *Phaedo*, most of which Gronau has given. I must give the passage here with a list of parallels which deviates somewhat from his. οἰόμεθα δεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν σαρκὶ βιοτεύοντας διὰ τῆς κατὰ ἀρετὴν ζωῆς χωρίζεσθαί πως καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν σχέσεως (*Phaedo* 67 A, 67 C, 69 B) ἵνα μετὰ τὸν θάνατον μὴ πάλιν ἄλλου θανάτου δεώμεθα τοῦ τὰ λείψανα τῆς σαρκώδους κόλλης ἀποκαθαίροντος (Gronau's citations here are beside the point. See rather the repeated return of the soul to Hell, *Phaedo* 114 B, the necessity of death in an after life as punishment for murder, *Laws* 870 E, 872 E) ἀλλὰ καθάπερ δεσμῶν τῇ ψυχῇ περιῤῥαγέντων (A Platonic adaptation of an Orphic figure: *Phaedo* 67 D, 114 B–C; *Cratylus* 400 C; *Timaeus* 73 D, 81 D–E) κοῦφος αὐτῇ καὶ ἄνετος ὁ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν γένηται δρόμος (*Phaedrus* 248 C, 249 A–B) οὐδεμίας αὐτὴν σωματικῆς ἀχθηδόνος ἐφελκούσης (*Phaedo* 81 C, 79 C, *Republic* 538 D). ὡς εἴ τις ὅλος δι' ὅλων ἀποσαρκωθείη τῇ διανοίᾳ πᾶσαν ψυχῆς κίνησίν τε καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἐν τοῖς θελήμασι τῆς σαρκὸς ἀσχολῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲ τῆς σαρκὸς ἔξω γενόμενος τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν παθημάτων χωρίζεται (*Phaedo* 81 B–C) . . . . There follows the Platonic explanation of ghosts, that these body-loving souls cannot leave their bodies but flutter about the tomb, and are visible because of their connection with matter. (*Phaedo* 81 D. See Wyttenbach's note on this passage for the ubiquitous quotation of it in antiquity; Gronau quotes only Stoic passages for its use.) Now, while Gronau admits most of these parallels with Plato, he insists that the passage is Posidonian because of its similarity to Cicero's *I Tusculan*, chap. 75. R. M. Jones (*Class. Phil.* XVIII, July 1923,) has shown conclusively that this section cannot be Posidonian; but even if Posidonius did adopt this section of the Platonic thought, there is no reason for supposing that Gregory must have taken it from him, since even Gronau admits that Gregory had studied the *Phaedo* itself, and there is nothing in his sentences that is not in Plato. Moreover, the likeness between Cicero and Gregory is not so striking as he maintains, for Cicero says nothing of a "second death" while Gregory makes much of this thought. What parallels there are, are Platonic passages which were quoted everywhere in antiquity. Plutarch speaks of two deaths (*De facie in orbe lunae* 943 A–B); but he makes two deaths necessary for all, one death resolving the tripartite soul to a duality, the other reducing it to a single essence. There is no hint of such an idea in Gregory. He definitely asserts that those who are not hardened by evil, go immediately upon their death in the body to their state of blessedness. (III 157 B ff.) The explanation of the word Hades as "the unseen" used by Gregory (III 68 B) was common; Plato uses it in *Gorgias* 493 B and when, in the *Cratylus* (404 B), he gives a more *recherché* etymology, refers to it as the common interpretation.

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60. III 41 B ff.

61. e.g. Alcinous, chap. 25: ἀσώματος γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία, ἀμετάβλητος . . καὶ νοητὴ καὶ ἀειδὴς καὶ μονοειδής. οὐκοῦν ἀσύνθετος, ἀδιάλυτος κτλ. See also Wyttenbach's note on *Phaedo* 78 B.

62. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* II Secs. 786–87. Posidonius accepted the definition of the soul as πνεῦμα ἐνθερμόν nor could he have believed in the eternity of the soul. (See Zeller III, 1, 603, 1ste Bemerkung.) Note also III 45 B the use of ὄχημα for the body, a use parallel to that of *Timaeus* 69 C: αὐτῇ τὸ σῶμα ὄχημα ἔδοσαν.

63. III 108 B–109 B.

64. III 48 C: οὐκοῦν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν οἷς ἅπαξ ἐγένετο κτλ.

65. III 76 B 7.

66. III 84 D ff.

67. I 225 B ff.

68. I 205 D.

69. III 136 C ff. A favorite idea with Gregory used here and in I 215 C ff. to explain the graduated marvels of the miracles of Jesus, and applied to the order of books in the Bible to interpret the meanings of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs. (I 768 A.) Origen also held to the "gradual restoration of the blessed state" (I 338 D).

70. III 145 B–149 B. Just before this in 141 A the material life is again spoken of as a flux (compare *Timaeus* 43 A) τότε τῆς κινήσεως λήγουσα ὅταν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι παύσηται. (Compare *Phaedrus* 245 C παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς.) The same parallels occur again some sentences later (III 141 C), the exact words of *Timaeus* 43 A being quoted. In I 145 C recurs the language drawn from the myth of the cave—the guessing in the darkness and the truth as the sun, in the light of which we shall scorn these former guesses and doubts.

71. III 104 A–105 A; I 1313 A ff.; III 133 C ff.; I 585 B–C.

VI. Conclusion

1. See Billings, *Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, 21–22, *et passim.*

2. For similar language in Origen see I 411 B ff. Here occurs the proof of the likeness of the soul to God and hence its immortality from the participation of the soul in Divinity, the first part of which in Gregory Gronau claimed as Posidonian. Also there is the figure of the seeing eye and the light, which we have seen in Gregory. Consequently, we see that Gregory had a strong precedent for his Platonic exegesis in this Father whom we know he studied, while the language of participation renders a Stoic source unthinkable.

3. II 321 C where God is the Good which the mind in participating does not diminish; for the communion explained on the theory of the participation in the ideas see I 737 D ff. The language of archetype and image is applied to the Father and the Son in III 720 C ff. also.

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4. The two figures are sometimes used together as in I 1093 D: *συμμεμορφῶσθαι λέγει τῷ Χριστῷ, τὸ ἴδιον κάλλος ἀπολαβοῦσα, τὴν πρώτην τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν μακαριότητα, κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρώτου κάλλους τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ καὶ μόνου ὡραϊσθεῖσα* κτλ. It is to be noted that a few sentences later the soul *πᾶσαν ὑλικὴν ἀπορῥιψαμένη κηλῖδα καθαρὸν τοῦ ἀκηράτου κάλλους ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ εἶδος ἀνετυπώσατο.* The figure of the stamp was Stoic and Gronau would trace a passage like this to Stoic influence; but the soul has "flung away all material," an idea utterly opposed to all Stoic doctrine and purely Platonic. The necessity for the use of material figures even when talking of the immaterial I have previously mentioned. Because Gregory was constrained by this human necessity we cannot therefore consider him a materialist; while the figure of the "stamp" was by his time too common to be an exclusive earmark of Stoicism.

5. For example III 1028 A: *ὁρμήσαντα τῷ ταπεινῷ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐπ' εὐεργεσίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων συγκαταβῆναι . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ διαφεῖναι τὸ πᾶν ἀκυβέρνητον,* a reference to the seeming carelessness of God in the *Politicus* 272 E: *τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος* κτλ. Compare also II 802 A with *Theaetetus* 144 A–B, and III 1064 B with *Republic* 551 C and *Protagoras* 319 B–D.

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